הרב ראובן חיים קליין Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein

Uttering the Names of Idols

Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein is the author of the newly-released work God versus Gods: Judaism in the Age of Idolatry (Mosaica Press, 2018). His book follows the narrative of Tanakh and focuses on the stories concerning Avodah Zarah using both traditional and academic sources. It also includes an encyclopedia of all the different types of idolatry mentioned in the Bible.

Rabbi Klein studied for over a decade at the premier institutes of the Hareidi world, including Beth Medrash Govoha in Lakewood and Yeshivas Mir in Jerusalem. He authored many articles both in English and Hebrew, and his first book Lashon HaKodesh: History, Holiness, & Hebrew (Mosaica Press, 2014) became an instant classic. His weekly articles on synonyms in the Hebrew language are published in the Jewish Press and Ohrnet. Rabbi Klein lives with his family in Beitar Illit, Israel and can be reached via email to: rabbircklein@gmail.com

Idols in everyday speech

Most of us do not spend a lot of time discussing idols. Or do we? When talking about manned spacecraft, the name “Apollo” just rolls off our tongues. When discussing brand name footwear, we mention “Nike” without any second thoughts. And of course an old fashioned glass thermometer is a “mercury thermometer.” However, most of us have forgotten the idolatrous origins of these words: Apollo was the Greek god of the sun, Nike was the Greek god of victory, and Mercury was the Roman god of travel.

Are we halachically allowed to say these names, and if so, under what circumstances?

The prohibition of saying the names of idols

The Bible exhorts a Jew to be careful regarding everything I [G-d] have said to you. The name of the gods of others you shall not mention, nor shall your mouth cause it to be heard (Ex. 23:13). This is traditionally understood[1] to prohibit a Jew from causing the name of an idol to be uttered, whether by himself or by others.[2] One practical application of this law is that a Jew may not say, “Meet me next to such-and-such idol.”[3] Another corollary is that a Jew may not engage in a business partnership with an idolater, lest the Jew be required to take an oath and swear in the name of the idolater’s god.

The Talmud[4] offers two notable exceptions to this prohibition against saying the names of idols. Firstly, one is allowed to utter the names of idols if one does so mockingly.[5] Secondly, one is allowed to utter the names of idols that are explicitly mentioned in the Bible.[6]

Why saying the names of idols mentioned in the Bible is permitted

The commentators disagree about exactly why the Talmud allows one to say the names of idols mentioned in the Bible.

1. Achai Gaon (d. 752) understood that the Talmud allowed this because once explicit mention of the idol is allowed in one case, it is permitted in all cases.[7] In other words, since one is certainly allowed to pronounce those names when reading the Bible, then one may also utter those names in other contexts.[8]
2. Eliezer of Metz (d. 1175) writes that one is allowed to utter names of idols mentioned in the Bible because if the Bible was allowed to mention those names, then apparently those idols were already annulled. Then for the same reason that the Bible was allowed to use those names, individuals are also allowed to do so. In other words, the Bible’s use of an idol’s name does not intrinsically permit individuals to do so. The Bible’s usage merely proves the permissibility of such usage.[9]
3. Yehonatan Eyebschitz (1690–1764) writes in the name of the Zohar[10] that the reason that names of idols mentioned in the Bible may be said is that these idols have an element of holiness to them. In a nutshell, he compares these idols to the Tree of Knowledge, which has the potential to bring knowledge of good and knowledge of bad (see Gen. 2:17). This is symbolized by the ever-turning sword (Gen. 3:24) protecting the trees of Eden, which alternates its disposition between good and bad. In essence, he argues that the idols mentioned in the Bible have some aspect of good, so their names are allowed to be said. This stands in contrast to the names of idols not mentioned in the Bible, which are wholly evil as they are the root of all impurity, so uttering their names defiles one’s mouth and tongue.[11]

Questioning R. Eliezer of Metz’s explanation

1. Yair Chaim Bachrach (1639–1702) raises a difficulty with R. Eliezer of Metz’s approach: The reason for allowing one to utter the names of idols mentioned in the Bible cannot be that those idols were already annulled, because that is not always true. For example, Isaiah’s prophecy (Isa. 46:1) foretelling the future downfall of Bel and Nebo (two well-documented Babylonian deities) clearly implies that these deities still existed in Isaiah’s time. Thus one cannot say that if the Bible mentions a deity, it already ceased to be worshipped.[12]

Some suggest splitting R. Eliezer of Metz’s reasoning into two arguments. Accordingly, he means that the names of most idols mentioned in the Bible may be said because by now, they have already been annulled. As for the other idols, which have not yet been nullified, they may nonetheless be uttered for whatever, other reason the Bible was allowed to mention them.[13]

Names which preceded idolatrous usage

1. Yair Chaim Bachrach argues that there is another type of idol whose name may be said, even though it is not mentioned in the Bible. That is, if an entity existed before its name became associated with idolatry, then one is allowed to continue using its original name, despite its idolatrous association. He proves this assertion by noting that even though the seven astral forces (i.e. the sun, the moon, and the five closest planets) have historically been used for idol worship, Jews have not stopped using the names of those forces. That is, they continue to say Saturn for Shabtai, Jupiter for Zedek, and Lucifer (Venus) for Nogah, even though these entities have regretfully become associated with idolatry. He then notes that the seven astral forces are in any case not really idols because the gentiles do not view them as gods, per se, and even those who pray to these forces are only using them as intermediaries, not gods.[14]

Mentioning obsolete idols

1. Bachrach asks: how can the Talmud say that Rav and Shmuel did not go to the Temple of Netzrafi,[15] which was an idol,[16] if it is forbidden to mention the names of idols? He suggests that perhaps the prohibition only applies at the time that a given idol is still being actively worshipped. Once any idol becomes obsolete, one may utter its name—even if it is not mentioned in the Bible.

Nonetheless, he notes that according to this explanation, an incident in the Talmud becomes difficult to understand. The Amoraic sage Ulla was criticized for mentioning that he had lodged in Kal-Nebo, for Nebo was the name of an idol. One must, therefore, postulate that Nebo was still worshipped in Ulla’s time because otherwise, the Talmud’s criticism would be baseless.

However, this does not seem plausible because the joint downfall of Nebo and Bel is prophesied by Isaiah, and Bel had certainly already been eliminated by the time of Daniel (long before Ulla’s time). One would therefore assume that since Isaiah linked the downfall of Nebo and Bel, if Bel was no longer worshipped, neither was Nebo.[17] To resolve this, R. Bachrach posits that one must say that even after Daniel eliminated the idols of Bel and Nebo, they were later reinstituted, so that in the generation of Ulla, they were still worshipped.[18]

Idol names for studying Torah

1. Bachrach also suggests that one is permitted to say the name of an idol for the purposes of discussing and clarifying Torah. He bases himself on a Mishnah, which relates the following story about Rabban Gamliel:

Proclus, son of Plospus, asked Rabban Gamliel in Acre while he was bathing in the bathhouse of Aphrodite and he said to him: “Is it not written in your law, No part of the banned property may adhere to your hand (Deut. 13:18)? Why are you bathing in the bathhouse of Aphrodite [the Greek goddess of love, whose idol should render the bathhouse banned property]?” He [Rabban Gamliel] said to him, “I did not enter her domain, she entered my domain. They did not say ‘let us make the bathhouse an ornamentation for Aphrodite’, rather they said, ‘let us make [the idol of] Aphrodite an ornament for the [preexisting] bathhouse’. Furthermore, even if they gave you a lot of money, you would never enter the temple of your idol while naked, or after a seminal emission, or urinate in front of the idol. This idol [of Aphrodite] stands atop the sewage duct and everyone urinates in front of her. It only says their gods, [this serves to limit the prohibition to actions] which are customary because that idol is treated as a god, [but actions done with an idol that are] not because it is treated as a god are permitted.[19]

1. Bachrach reasons that the Mishnah deemed it appropriate to mention the name Aphrodite—and did not just mention an “idol” in a vague way—because mentioning the names of idols is permitted for the purposes of clarifying the details of Torah and halacha.[20] The same idea is proposed by the fourteenth-century authority R. Menachem ha-Meiri (1249–1310),[21] who allows for mentioning names of idols which are not in the Bible if needed in order to learn and rule halachic matters. He cites, as an example, the case of the Roman god Marculus (Mercury), which is consistently mentioned by name in Rabbinic literature, even though it does not appear in the Bible.[22]

R. Tam disagrees with ha-Meiri

However, this allowance is not universally agreed upon. Rabbeinu Tam (1100–1171), the celebrated Tosafist and grandson of Rashi, writes in his explanation of the etymology of the name Marculus[23] that the name itself speaks disparagingly of the idol and is not its real name.[24]

Consequently, when R. Chaim Benveniste (1603–1673) compares the explanation of R. Tam with that of ha-Meiri, he explains that they both attempt to answer how the Rabbis were allowed to refer to the idol Marculus by name, if one is forbidden from uttering the names of idols. Ha-Meiri resolves this issue by explaining that when needed for the purposes of Torah study, one is allowed to mention the name of an idol.

However, R. Tam, as R. Benveniste understands, disagrees with this assumption and is instead forced to explicate the name Marculus, arguing that it is not the idol’s real name.[25] Thus, R. Tam’s engaging in onomastics shows that he rejected ha-Meiri’s approach. Therefore, R. Benveniste concludes that while ha-Meiri allows one to mention the names of idols if needed for Torah study, R. Tam disagrees.

Another commentator takes note of the disagreement between R. Tam and ha-Meiri and offers evidence supporting ha-Meiri’s view. The Talmud[26] lists by name several idols that are considered “permanent places of daily idolatry” even though those idols are not mentioned in the Bible. This implies that mentioning the name of an idol for the purposes of delineating its halachic status is permissible. On the other hand, he notes that the Talmud elsewhere[27] finds problematic the fact that a Tannaic source refers to the idol Gadyon by name even though it was in a halachic context.[28] Thus, the evidence remains inconclusive as to the final ruling in this dispute between R. Tam and ha-Meiri.

R. Tam agrees with ha-Meiri

Nonetheless, recently discovered Medieval sources attest to the notion that R. Tam himself agreed that one is, in fact, allowed to utter names of idols if needed for Torah study. R. Yehuda Sir-Leon (1166–1224) quotes the same passage of R. Tam as cited above. However, according to R. Sir-Leon’s version, R. Tam’s question was set up slightly differently: R. Tam asked how the Talmud could mention the name of Marculus, if uttering the name of an idol not mentioned in the Bible is forbidden. R. Tam qualifies his question by noting that in other places, the Talmud refers to different idols/idolatrous concepts by name (such as the Roman holidays Calanda and Saturnura[29]) because it was required to do so in order to teach about the halachot relating to them. R. Tam then asserts that the Talmud only forbids mentioning the name of an idol for the sake of Torah study when the actual name of the idol denotes a positive aspect of the idol.[30] Because of this, R. Tam found it difficult that the Talmud refers explicitly to Marculus even though its name has a positive association. To avoid this difficulty, R. Tam reinterpreted the name Marculus in an unflattering way.[31]

Given this version of the discussion, it seems clear that R. Tam agrees with ha-Meiri that one is allowed to mention the name of an idol as needed for Torah study; he only disallows doing so when the very name of the idol denotes a positive aspect of the deity.

Idols mentioned in the Targum

The Talmud states that one is obligated to read each week’s Torah portion twice in the original Hebrew Scripture and once in the Aramaic Targum. The Talmud then broadens this obligation by noting that even the verse Ataroth and Dibon and Jazer and Nimrah (Num. 32:3) should be recited in the above manner.[32] This particular verse simply lists names of several places in the Jewish-occupied Trans-Jordan, which the tribes of Reuben and Gad wished to secure for themselves. As proper nouns, these names are not translated by Targum. Thus, saying the verse in Targum amounts to repeating the exact same verse again verbatim without adding anything.[33]

However, R. Chaim Yosef David Azulai (1724–1806) notes that this is not entirely true. The cities Ataroth and Dibon are mentioned here twice: once in the initial request by Reuben and Gad, and once again when their request was granted and they built up those cities. Only in the latter instance does Targum Onkelos not translate these names (Num. 32:33). In the first instance, Onkelos translates Ataroth and Dibon as Machlelta (מכללתא) and Malbeshta (מלבשתא).[34] R. Azulai resolves this inconsistency by explaining that the original names of those cities were names of idols, which were replaced by Reuben and Gad with non-idolatrous names.[35] Thus, while the Torah consistently refers to the cities by their Jewish names Ataroth and Dibon, Onkelos translates the names of those cities into their original, idolatrous names Machlelta and Malbeshta. But later, when Onkelos translates the verses describing the execution of Reuben and Gad’s plan, he does not translate the city names mentioned in the Bible, since at that point the cities had already been re-named.

This begs the question: Why does the Talmud single out the verse about Ataroth and Dibon when it insists that Targum must be read for every verse? If the Targum added no explanation whatsoever, then this verse would indeed make the Talmud’s point well. Yet this is not the case, for Targum does add an explanation to the Scripture (by “translating” the city names into their original idolatrous names used before the conquest of Reuben and Gad). Why, then, did the Talmud single out this verse?

1. Bachaya answers this question by explaining that the Talmud was teaching a different law by citing this verse. As discussed, one may only say the names of idols which are mentioned in the Bible. Accordingly, explains R. Bachaya, one might think that the prohibition includes idols which are mentioned in the Targum, but not in the Bible. In order to pre-empt this argument, the Talmud makes a point of stating that one should read the entire Targum—even of the verse Ataroth and Dibon which contains the names of idols. This teaches that one is allowed to say the names of idols mentioned in the Targum just as one may say the names of those mentioned in the Bible itself.[36]
2. Azulai codifies this law into practice,[37] as does R. Emmanuel Chai Ricci (1687-1743).[38] R. Azulai writes elsewhere[39] that R. Yehonatan Eyebschitz[40] offers the same explanation, as does R. Menachem Azariah of Fanu (1548–1620)[41] in a then-unpublished manuscript.[42]

In short, if one is forbidden from uttering the names of all idols not mentioned in the Bible, even when necessary for Torah study, those names mentioned in the Targum are still allowed to be uttered.

The Rabbis corrupted the names of idols

As mentioned above, the Talmud[43] offers a list of “permanent places of daily idolatry”: the Temple of Bel in Babylon, the Temple of Nebo in Kursi, Tar’ata in Mapug, Zerifa in Ashkelon, and Nishtra in Arabia.[44] The Tosafist R. Yehuda b. Klonymous takes issue with this delineation of idolatrous names and asks how the Talmud could mention them if they are not found in the Bible (save for Bel and Nebo). He answers that the Talmud slightly altered their names in order to present these idols in a disparaging way. For example, the name Tar’ata conjures the word ‘arai (עראי, temporary), alluding to the “temporary existence” of this idol until its eventual downfall. The god Nishtra was spelled nishra, conjuring the word neshira (נשירה, falling/balding).[45]

Similarly, the Mishnah offers a list of pagan holidays celebrated in Roman times and includes in that list a holiday known as Saturnura (סטרנורא).[46] R. Yisrael Lipschitz (1782–1860) points out that the real name of this winter holiday was Saturnalia, the day which celebrates the astral force Shabtai (known in Latin as Saturn).[47] R. Lipschitz explains that the Rabbis purposely distorted the word Saturnalia in order to avoid the issue of explicitly using the name of an idol. They referred to it as Saturnura, which is a portmanteau of satar (סטר, far away) and nura (נורא, fire), a reference to the Earth’s distance from the sun during the winter period.[48] (In some ways, this follows R. Lipschitz’s general approach of explaining that while the Hebrew language does incorporate some elements of foreign languages, the Rabbis insured that it would not do so verbatim, but would slightly alter the meaning and/or pronunciation of adopted foreign words.[49])

A third instance of this phenomenon is found where the Talmud[50] mentions an Egyptian deity named Sar-apis (סר אפיס). The Talmud explains that this god is named after the Biblical Joseph, who was sar u-mefis (סר ומפיס, he disappeared and [then ended up] sustaining [the entire world during the years of famine]). R. Yaakov Emden (1697–1776) notes that in this case, the Talmud purposely split the god’s name Serapis into two words in order to disparage it. That is, the Talmud’s spelling of the Egyptian deity’s name is orthographically similar to Sar efes (שר אפס), which literally means “prince of nothing.”[51]

Using idol names in everyday life

1. Yitzchok Schmelkes of Lvov (1828–1905) discusses using the names of idols in everyday correspondence. He rules that it is unbefitting of the local Bikur Cholim chapter (an aid group which visits the sick and infirm) to bear the name Gaia, because Gaia was the name of a Greek goddess responsible for health. He notes that even though it seems that this idol has already been rendered obsolete, the possibility still exists that somewhere, someone believes in it. He also denounces using the Yiddish phrase gesundheit because the German word gesund (health) recalls the name of the Greek goddess Gaia, regardless of whether or not the German word preceded the establishment of the Greek pantheon. He then notes that even though the Hebrew word mammon (ממון, money) was derived from the pagan god of silver,[52] its usage as the term for money is somehow not connected to that god in any way, while the German word for health is, in fact, directly related to the Gaia.[53]

Maharal (1512–1609) writes that it is forbidden to mention certain well-known coins which were named after idols.[54]

Writing names of idols

1. Yosef Babad (1801–1874) writes that he is unsure about whether or not the prohibition of saying the names of idols also applies to writing them.[55] After discussing the matter, R. Schmelkes effectively rules that there is no prohibition to write the names of idols, a view upheld by R. Ezriel Hildesheimer (1820–1899), as well.[56] However, R. Schmelkes adds the caveat that one who wrote about an idol, “this is my god” has violated a capital prohibition in the same way as one who says those words.[57]
2. Menashe Klein (1924–2011) quotes these sources to allow writing the addresses of streets and towns named after idols. He further justifies his position by noting that according to R. Eliezer of Metz, one is allowed to say the name of any idol that is obsolete. Accordingly, since streets and towns[58] are usually named after obsolete forms of idolatry, there is generally no problem. Nonetheless, R. Klein concludes that, if possible, one should try to avoid directly writing the name of an idol when writing out a city or street name, and should instead purposely misspell the idolatrous name.[59]

Places named after idols

1. Moshe Sternbuch tolerates uttering the names of idols in situations that most people do not realize those names are actually of idolatrous origins. R. Sternbuch applies this reasoning to justify, for example, using the secular names for months which are named after idols (see below). He also uses this to permit saying the name of the Indian city Bombay, even though it is named after an idol. Regarding Bombay, R. Sternubuch also notes that the actual Indian goddess for whom the city is named was Mumbai and when the British occupied India, they changed the name of the city from Mumbai to Bombay,[60] thereby showing their disregard for the theistic implications of its name. Once this occurred, the name of the city can no longer be said to be associated with that idol.[61]

In discussing streets named after idols, R. Efrayim Greenblatt (1932–2014) notes that nowadays those streets only refer to the idols in name, but do not actually conjure their memory. Nonetheless, he writes that when one needs to mention the name of an idol when writing the address for a mail item, one should optimally abbreviate the idol’s name, instead of writing it out in full. R. Greenblatt also notes that in 1951, R. Moshe Feinstein (1895–1986) told him that, if possible, one should refrain from verbally mentioning street names that refer to idols (similar to R. Klein’s ruling), but if it cannot be avoided, one should express the name in a way that it is clear that he conveys no religious significance to the idol. When all is said and done, R. Greenblatt concludes that while some people are stringent in this matter, the norm is to be lenient.[62]

The late R. Avraham Weinfeld argues that places named after idols are allowed to be mentioned provided the idol itself is not located in that place. Nonetheless, if the place actually houses the idol for which it is named, uttering the place’s name would be forbidden.[63]

Names of idols in dates

There are several complicated issues that arise when referring to dates by the conventional Western system. The names of some components used in this system allude to elements of idolatry, leading to the possibility that a Jew is forbidden from using such a dating system:

1. Years: The secular calendar supposedly begins counting its years from the birth of the Christian man-god Jesus. By using that date as one’s point of reference, one lends significance to that religion, which may be forbidden. Nonetheless, after discussing the matter at great length, Ovadia Yosef (1918–2013) allows using the secular year in private letters. Interestingly, he proves that anyways the year 1 CE was not actually the year of Jesus’ birth.[64] Some authorities mention that if one wants to be especially stringent, he can use the Christian year in correspondence, but should note that such is the year “according to their calculation” to exclude himself from giving any significance to the Christian counting. Alternatively, if one omits the millennium and only counts the century and the year in the century (e.g. if in the year 1987 he simply writes 987), he is in the clear because he has sufficiently deviated from the Christian nomenclature. Nonetheless, R. Meir Amsel (1907–2007) proves from various rabbinic responsa that all of this is unnecessary.[65]
2. Months: The names of the first six months of the conventional calendar are derived from names of Greek and Roman gods (January=Janus, February=Februus, March=Mars, April=Aphrodite, May=Maia, June=Juno). Nonetheless, R. Sternbuch rules that this does not cause a problem in using those names, because since people do not realize their idolatrous origins, they may be uttered.[66] Another complicating factor is that using the numbers of the secular months (1 for January, 2 for February, 3 for March, et al.) may be considered a violation of the Biblical directive (Ex. 12:2) that Nissan should always be considered the first month.[67]
3. Days of the week: The conventional names for the days of the week are related to the idolatrous names of the seven astral forces. In English and German, most of those names are related to Norse gods, while in other Latin-based Romance languages (such as Spanish, French, and Italian) the days are named after Roman gods.[68] This raises an issue with using those names because they speak of idols. Furthermore, halacha calls for connecting the days of the week to the Sabbath: The fourth of the Ten Commandments commands the Jews to Remember the Sabbath day to sanctify it… (Ex. 20:8). Mechilta de-Rashbi explains that this commandment entails remembering the Sabbath during the rest of the week by naming each day of the week as a function of the days elapsed since the previous Sabbath. Thus, Sunday is “the first day,” Monday is “the second day,” and so forth (see footnote[69]).
4. Yehuda Herzl Henkin[70] rules that one is permitted to say the names of foreign deities which are no longer worshipped nowadays because once the deity is no longer worshipped, its name can no longer be said to be a name of idolatry. Furthermore, he argues that the Torah only forbids uttering the name of a foreign god per se but does not prohibit uttering the names of places or the like which are named after foreign gods. With this in mind, he justifies using the names of Norse gods in the days of the week. However, he too notes that if the idol in question is located inside the city which bears its name, then uttering the city’s name is forbidden.

Interestingly, while the consensus seems to permit using secular dates, R. Ovadiah Yosef clearly writes that his lenient ruling does not allow for using secular dates on Jewish tombstones.[71]

Conclusion

In short, there are several common cases in which the Poskim allow for one to verbalize the names of idols. The first two cases—speaking of an idol disparagingly or saying a name mentioned in the Bible—are explicitly mentioned in the Talmud. As a corollary of the second case, many Poskim also allow for saying the names of idols mentioned in the Targumim, even if they are not mentioned explicitly in the Bible.

Some sources see a dispute between R. Tam and ha-Meiri about whether one is allowed to mention the names of idols not found in the Bible when doing so in the context of Torah study, with ha-Meiri ruling in the affirmative and R. Tam disagreeing. However, there is evidence that points to the contention that R. Tam himself actually agrees to ha-Meiri’s lenient ruling—as long as the idolatrous name is not overly flattering of the deity.

Another leniency is that it is permissible to say the names of idols which are no longer worshipped or to say their names in contexts outside of their existence as deities (i.e. things which are named after those gods). In practice, contemporary Poskim generally adopt lenient positions when the names of idols appear as street names, city names, and in other everyday uses. The consensus is to rule even more leniently when the matter concerns merely writing names of idols, as opposed to actually saying them.

[1] Nachmanides (there) understands that this prohibition is derived from the plain reading of the verse cited, implying that the prohibition of mentioning the name of an idol is Biblically-ordained. However, Maimonides (Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Negative Commandment #14 and in Laws of Avodah Zarah 5:10) understands that only swearing in the name of an idol is Biblically forbidden, while the prohibition of mentioning an idol’s name in other contexts is of Rabbinic origin. This approach is also adopted by Sefer ha-Chinuch (#86) and Gersonides (to Ex. 23:13).

[2] R. Yitzchak Luria (1534–1572), better known as Arizal, taught (see Likkutei Torah, Parshat Mishpatim) that this prohibition also includes saying any name of the Satan (Samael), including “Diablo”. The author of responsa Torah li-Shmah, ostensibly R. Yosef Chaim of Baghdad (1832–1909), writes (there §426) that he is careful to refer to the archangel by the first two letters of his name, Samech-Mem. R. David Grossman (the voice of the Shaspod) calls him “Sammy.”

[3] Piskei ha-Rosh (Sanhedrin §7:3) cites an opinion which maintains that this prohibition only applies to using the name of an idol for a utilitarian purpose, but to use the name for no practical reason is permitted. However, Piskei ha-Rosh rejects this view, arguing that mentioning a name of an idol for no real reason is worse than doing so for a practical reason. Piskei ha-Rosh’s rejection of that opinion is codified by the author’s son in the Tur Yoreh Deah §147 (see also Beit Yosef there) and Shulchan Aruch (there).

[4] Sanhedrin 63b.

[5] The Talmud (Sotah 42a) says that scoffers are amongst those who do not merit being greeted by G-d’s Holy Presence. Nonetheless, those who mock idolatry are an exception to this rule. Similarly, Maharsha (to Megillah 25b) writes that the notion of “clean language” does not apply to discussions about idolatry, so one may use crude expressions in deriding idols.

[6] R. Chaim Benveniste in Shiyarei Knesset ha-Gedolah, Yoreh Deah §147 points out that this dispensation applies even when not said mockingly.

[7] R. Yosef Engel (1859–1920) in Gilyonei ha-Shas (to Sanhedrin 63b) notes that the rule “once something is allowed in one case, it is permitted in all cases” is not universally accepted. Therefore, he argues that according to those who disagree with this rule, one is forbidden from uttering even the names of idols mentioned explicitly in the Bible.

[8] S. Mirsky (ed.), Sheiltot de-Rav Achai Gaon vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Yeshiva University/Mossad HaRav Kook, 1962), pg. 136.

[9] Sefer Yeraim, §75 [§245 in other editions].

[10] I am unable to locate the source of the Zohar cited by R. Eyebschitz.

[11] Yaarot Dvash (vol. 2, derush #2).

[12] Responsa Chavot Yair vol. 1, §1.

[13] This answer is proposed by R. Yosef David Zintzheim (1745–1812) in Yad David (to Sanhedrin 63b) and by Shem Chadash to Sefer Yeraim (there). R. Mordechai Yaffe (1530–1612), in his work Levush Ateret Zahav (Yoreh Deah §147:4), also notes that uttering names of idols mentioned in the Bible is permitted and simply writes, “just as the Torah mentioned them, we are also allowed to mention them.”

[14] Responsa Chavot Yair (vol. 1, §1).

[15] Shabbat 116a.

[16] M. Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (New York: Judaica Press, 1971) pg. 930 claims that the term Netzrafi is a cacophemistic disguise of the word Notzri (נוצרי, Christian).

[17] R. Bachrach does not reveal his source for the assertion that Daniel eliminated the Babylonian idol Bel. Nonetheless, this idea is found in two early sources: Yanai, an early payytan (poet) who lived in the Holy Land wrote a poem about different miraculous feats which had historically occurred at night. This poem, popularly recited towards the conclusion of the Passover Seder, mentions the destruction of Bel between mentioning the miraculous destruction of Sennacherib’s army and Daniel miraculously interpreting Nebuchadnezzar’s dream. This placement implies that the idol’s destruction happened in the time of Daniel and Nebuchadnazzar. Additionally, Yossiphon (Book I, Ch. 3), a Hebrew work loosely based on Josephus’ writings, relates the story of Daniel proving to an unnamed Babylonian king that Bel itself does not eat the sacrifices offered to it, but rather its priests eat those sacrifices and pretend like the idol ate it. The priests of Bel admitted to perpetuating this ploy, prompting the Babylonian king to destroy the Temple of Bel.

[18] R. Yaakov Emden (1697–1776) in his glosses to Avodah Zarah 11b also makes this suggestion about Bel. Archeology suggests that this restoration of the idol happened sooner rather than later because the Alexander Chronicle (BM 36304) records that Bel-worship existed at the time of King Darius’ downfall (although, scholars disagree about whether this refers to King Darius I or Darius II). See A. Hool, The Challenge of Jewish History (Mosaica Press, 2014), pgs. 53–54.

[19] Avodah Zarah 3:4.

[20] Responsa Chavot Yair (vol. 1, §1).

[21] Beit ha-Bechirah to Sanhedrin 63b.

[22] Although ha-Meiri does not expressly use this position to justify the Mishnah invoking the name Aphrodite, R. Avraham Sofer (1897–1982), who was the first to publish many volumes of ha-Meiri’s work, notes that his ruling also explains that phenomenon; see A. Sofer (ed.), Beit ha-Bechira, Sanhedrin (Jerusalem: Kedem Publishing, 1971), pg. 239. R. Yaakov Yakub Ettlinger (1798–1871) also asks how the Mishnah was allowed to mention the name Aphrodite, but does not offer a conclusive answer, see his Aruch la-Ner (to Sanhedrin 63b).

[23] R. Tam contends that the idol’s proper name was Cilus (קילוס) which means “high praise” in Hebrew. In order to counter the positive meaning of the idol’s name, the Rabbis nicknamed it Culus, which is related to the Hebrew word keles (קלס, disgrace). They also prefixed to the name the word Mar (מר) which means “replace”. Thus, the final name of the idol in Rabbinic eyes is Marculus, “[He whose ‘positive’ name should be] replaced [with] disgrace.” Similarly, R. Isaiah of Trani (1180–1250) in Piskei Rid (to Sanhedrin 63b) explains that the original name of the idol was Ramculus (רמקוליס), meaning “the exalted Culus,” which the Rabbis changed to Marculus, “the bitter Culus”.

See Maharam (to Sanhedrin 64a) who explains why according to R. Tam the Rabbis had to add the word Mar and did not simply call the idol Culus, which itself means disgrace. He also discusses why the Rabbis did not name the idol Marcilus, “Replacing Cilus.” See also Maharshal’s commentary to Smag (Negative Commandment #32) and R. Benveniste’s commentary there (Chamra de-Chayei to Smag).

Interestingly, R. Yaakov Yakub Ettlinger (Aruch la-Ner to Sanhedrin 64a) writes that he is unsure whether one is now allowed to say the name Cilos because that idol is no longer worshipped or if even nowadays it may not be verbally mentioned because it is the name of an idol. R. Ettlinger notes that according to the latter understanding when Tosafot quote in the name of R. Tam that the idol’s name was really Cilus, that name should only be written, but not read. Remarkably, Tosafot preface their quote of R. Tam with the words “R. Tam said…,” which implies that this explanation was said by R. Tam (as opposed to being only written by him).

[24] Tosafot to Sanhedrin 64a and Avodah Zarah 50a.

[25] Shiyarei Knesset ha-Gedolah, Yoreh Deah §147, also cited by Darkei Teshuvah (there).

[26] Avodah Zarah 11b.

[27] Sanhedrin 63b.

[28] Parashat ha-Kesef to Maimonides’ Laws of Avodah Zarah 5:10.

[29] Mentioned in the Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1:3.

[30] Interestingly, ha-Meiri in a bevy of locations (see his commentary to Brachos 57b, Kiddushin 7b, Sanhedrin 40a, 60b, 63b, Avodah Zarah 42a, 42b, 49b, 50a, 50b, 51a, 51b, 52b, 64b) consistently refers to the idol as Marcilus (מרקילוס), using the positive name that R. Tam found objectionable (see above). My colleague R. Zvi Mordechai Libber of Milwaukee informed me that in almost all extant manuscripts of the Talmud, the name of this idol is consistently spelled מרקוליס, with the exception of MS Escorial G-I-3 to Bava Metziah 25b, which twice spells it מרקילוס (like ha-Meiri), even though that manuscript otherwise uses the more common spelling.

[31] This passage appears at least twice in R. Sir-Leon’s relatively-recently published writings: M. Y. Blau (ed.), Tosafot Rabbeinu Yehudah mi-Paris, Avodah Zarah (New York, 1929), pgs. 250–251 and N. Zaks (ed.), Tosafot Rabbeinu Yehudah, Brachot vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Machon HaTalmud HaYisraeli HaShalem, 1972), pg. 618. It also appears in Tosafot ha-Rosh (to Avodah Zarah 50a and Bava Metzia 25b).

A third version of R. Tam’s discussion reveals another factor in why R. Tam assumed that the idol’s real name was Culus, not Marculus. The Talmud (Bava Metziah 25b) refers to the “stones of the Temple of Culus”. Tosafot (there) note that because of this, R. Tam understood that the real name of the idol was Culus, not Marculus. According to this version, it seems that R. Tam was not at all bothered by the Talmud using the name Marculus and only assumes that Marculus was not its real name simply because the Talmud itself refers to the idols of Culus. See also Sefer ha-Yashar le-Rabbeinu Tam (Chiddushim, §699).

[32] Brachot 8a–8b.

[33] Rashi (to Brachot 8b) writes that Onkelos does not translate this verse at all. This assumption is shared by Tosafot (there) who write that while Onkelos does not translate this verse, Targum Yerushalmi does. Talmidei Rabbeinu Yonah (to Alfasi Brachot 4b) note that the Targumic translations cited below are from Targum Yerushalmi, not Targum Onkelos. See the glosses of R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes (1805–1855) and R. Elazar Landau (1778–1831) there who suggest emending the text of the Talmud to refer to a different passage that mentions the names Ataroth and Dibon or that perhaps some passages printed within Targum Onkelos are really copied from Targum Yerushalmi.

Talmidei Rabbeinu Yonah explain that the Talmud singled out the verse in question to teach that even though it does not have Targum Onkelos, one is still obligated to recite its Targum Yerushalmi. Nachmanides (or an early scholar who might be confused for Nachmanides) writes that the Talmud singled out this verse because the Targum to this seemingly mundane verse includes the Kabbalistic secrets to the system of the High Chariot; see C. D. Chavel (ed.) Kitvei Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1964), pg. 468.

1. Elazar Moshe Horowitz of Pinsk (1817–1890) notes in his glosses to the Talmud that this verse is special because in Targum’s rendition, it translates the name of a place based on something which had not yet happened at the time being described, thus it cannot be considered a simple translation of the Bible. As a result, the Talmud singles out this verse to teach that even when the Targum deviates from simply translating the Bible, it should still be recited.

[34] Alternate versions of Onkelos read שכלילתא  or מכלכלתא for the first city and מלבישתא for the second. Other Targumim read: מכללתא and מדבשתא (see Targum pseudo-Jonathan and Targum Yerushalmi). FTV Num. reads דובשתא for the second city.

[35] This follows the approach of Rashi (to Num. 32:38) who understood that when the Bible mentioned and Nebo and Baal Meon with altered names amongst the cities inhabited by the tribe of Reuben this means that the original names of those cities were Nebo and Baal Meon. Rashi explains that since those names are names of idols, the Reubenites changed the names of those cities. Nachmanides, on the other hand, disagrees with Rashi’s approach and explains (there) that Nebo and Baal Meon were the original names of those cities under Moabite rule and the Amorites who conquered them altered their names, until they were later restored by the Reubenites.

[36] To Num. 32:3.

[37] Birkei Yosef to Yoreh Deah §147 and Orach Chaim §285.

[38] Aderet Eliyahu to Brachot 8b.

[39] Responsa Tov Ayin §18:59.

[40] Yaarot Dvash (vol. 2, drush #2) and Tiferet Yehonatan (to Num. 32:3).

[41] Sefer Maamarei ha-Rama mi-Fanu vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Yismach Lev-Torat Moshe, 2003), pg. 177.

[42] R. Azulai cites this in his Kuntres Acharon to Birkei Yosef, Orach Chaim (above).

[43] Avodah Zarah 11b.

[44] See Harkavy (ed.), Zichron la-Rishonim ve-gam la-Acharonim vol. 1 (Petersburg, 1879), pg. 22 for a Geonic responsum that discusses the somewhat-related issue of which ancient Persian holidays mentioned by the Talmud (there) were still practiced.

[45] See Y. Maimon (ed.), Yechusei Tanaim ve-Amoraim (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1963), pg. 161.

[46] Avodah Zarah 1:3.

[47] The Italian scholar R. Chananiah Elchanan Chai Cohen (1750–1834) in Bamot Baal (Reggio, 1809), pg. 36a answers this discrepancy differently. He posits that for some reason when transliterating the name of the Roman holiday from Latin to Hebrew, the l-sound of the word saturnalia switched to an r-sound to produce saturnura. He notes that the inverse phenomenon is found in the name of the Roman god Mercury in which the second r-sound was switched into an l-sound in Hebrew to produce the name Marculus. Indeed, Egyptologists also see the interchangeability of these two sounds in the Ancient Egyptian language. Linguists recognize that both the r-sound and the l-sound are considered liquids and are therefore somewhat interchangeable.

[48] Tiferet Yisrael to Avodah Zarah 1:3, Yachin §8.

[49] See R. C. Klein, Lashon HaKodesh: History, Holiness, & Hebrew (Mosaica Press, 2015), pg. 159.

[50] Avodah Zarah 43a.

[51] Hagahot Yaavetz to Avodah Zarah 43a.

[52] I have not found any source for this assertion. R. Reuven Margolis in Mekor Chesed to Sefer Chassidim §427 points out that the Midrash (Bamidbar Rabbah §22:8) offers another explanation of the Hebrew word mammon: It is an abbreviation of the phrase mah atah moneh kelum (מה אתה מונה כלום, what are you counting– nothing).

[53] Responsa Beit Yitzchak, Yoreh Deah vol. 1, §152.

[54] Gur Aryeh to Ex. 23:13.

[55] Minchat Chinuch, §86.

[56] Responsa Rabbi Ezriel (Yoreh Deah §180).

[57] Responsa Beit Yitzchak, Yoreh Deah vol. 1, §152.

[58] R. Chaim Halberstam of Sanz (1793–1876) is reputed to have refrained from pronouncing the given names of cities because he suspected that they contained allusions to idolatry. Instead, he would purposely mispronounce the name of the city or give use some other way of identifying the city besides its name. Nonetheless, R. Meir Amsel dismisses the story about R. Chaim Sanzer as an unsourced rumor and points to several halachic responsa where R. Chaim Sanzer himself uses the gentile names of cities. See Responsa Hamaor vol. 1 (New York, 1967), pgs. 493–494 and ha-Ish ha-Domeh le-Malach (Bene Barak, 2002), pg. 62.

Similarly, the town known in Hungarian as Szatmárnémeti and in Romanian as Satu Mare was historically known amongst Jews as Sakmar/Sakmir. In fact, its own rabbis such as R. Yoel Teitelbaum of Satmar referred to the town as such. The phenomenon was likely due to an urban legend which argued that Satu Mare refers to “Saint Mary”. Nonetheless, others point out that the name Satu Mare simply means “large city” in Romanian.

[59] Responsa Mishnah Halachot vol. 9, §169.

[60] When asked by my colleague R. Dovi Leibowitz of Givat Zev HaChadashah about the 1995 legislation in India that restored the name Mumbai to the city, R. Sternbuch responded that even so, people still continue to call the city Bombay, so his ruling remains. Furthermore, noted R. Sternbuch, even if the name Mumbai catches on, since most people do not realize that it is the name of an idol, it is still permitted to be mentioned.

[61] Responsa Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot vol. 6, Yoreh Deah §178.

[62] Responsa Rivevot Efrayim vol. 8, §556.

[63] M. Amsel (ed.), Kovetz Hamaor vol. 18 (Brooklyn, 1951), pg. 9 and Kovetz Chachmei Lev (Jerusalem: Yeshivat Lev Avraham, 1998), pgs. 75–78.

[64] Responsa Yabia Omer vol. 3 Yoreh Deah §9 and vol. 7 Yoreh Deah §32.

[65] See Responsa Hamaor vol. 1 (New York, 1967), pgs. 490–491.

[66] Responsa Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot vol. 6, Yoreh Deah  §178.

[67] See R. Yaakov Yerucham Warschner’s Seder Yaakov vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 2010), pgs. 373–375 who offers a survey of the various opinions on this matter.

[68] Interestingly, Portuguese is the only Romantic language in which the days of the week (except Saturday and Sunday) are named ordinally, not nominally (see below).

[69] Mechilta de-Rabbi Yishmael (there) simply quotes the Tannaic sage Rav Yitzchak who said, “you should not count in the way that others count; rather you should count for the sake of the Sabbath.” Nachmanides (to Ex. 20:8) and Ritva (to Rosh HaShanah 3a) explain that this means that the days of the week should not be given nominally, but rather ordinally in relation to how many days passed since the previous Sabbath. Their explanation bridges the statements of Mechilta de-Rabbi Yishmael and Mechilta de-Rashbi.

Yosef Elbo (1380–1444) in Sefer ha-Ikkarim (9:33) quotes Nachmanides and adds that this means that one should not use the names Lunis, Martis, Marculus (the respective Spanish words for Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday) to refer to the days of the week. R. Yosef Teomim (1727–1792), better known as the Pri Megadim, in Sefer Notrikon (Bilguriya, 1910), pg. 10 also quotes Nachmanides and adds that this means that one should not use the German/Yiddish names Sonntag (Sunday), Montag (Monday), et al., for the days of the week.

This begs the question: How can the Jewish community at large use the names for the days of the week in their respective languages, if they really should name the days of the week in the above manner? R. Baruch Epstein (1860–1941) writes in Baruch she-Amar Al Haggada Shel Pesach (Tel Aviv, 1965), pg. 84 that because of the bitter exile, Jews have become caught in the general custom of giving pagan names for each day of the week. He notes that they retain the Jewish custom of dating days of the week to the Sabbath in religious documents such as Gittin (ritual bills of divorce) and Ketubot (marriage documents). Thus, while R. Epstein raises the issue, he fails to offer an adequate solution, instead attributing the phenomenon post facto to outside causes.

An answer is proposed by both R. Yoel Teitelbaum (1887–1979) in responsa Divrei Yoel (vol. 1 §15) and R. Menachem Kasher (Torah Shleimah vol. 11, pg. 181). They explain that Mechilta’s requirement to correlate the names of the days of the week to the Sabbath does not require one to always refer to the days of the week vis-à-vis the previous Sabbath. That is, if one mentions the day of the week as it relates to the Sabbath once a day, he has already fulfilled the requirement of the Mechilta and this allows him to continue referring to that day in other ways. In the daily liturgy, the Song of the Day is prefaced with an introduction, “Today is the x^th day of the week and on it, the Levites would sing in the Holy Temple…” Simply reciting this declaration allows one to fulfill the Mechilta’s obligation, permitting him to use other means of referring to the day afterwards. [This does not entirely solve the problem according to those who follow the custom of the Vilna Gaon who recited different Psalms on special days because those Psalms are not prefaced with a declaration mentioning the day of the week.]

[70] Responsa Bnei Banim vol. 3 §35.

[71] Responsa Yabia Omer vol. 3, Yoreh Deah §9 and vol. 7, Yoreh Deah §32.

Reuven Chaim (Rudolph) Klein

Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein is the author of the newly-released work God versus Gods: Judaism in the Age of Idolatry (Mosaica Press, 2018). His book follows the narrative of Tanakh and focuses on the stories concerning Avodah Zarah using both traditional and academic sources. It also includes an encyclopedia of all the different types of idolatry mentioned in the Bible.

Rabbi Klein studied for over a decade at the premier institutes of the Hareidi world, including Beth Medrash Govoha in Lakewood and Yeshivas Mir in Jerusalem. He authored many articles both in English and Hebrew, and his first book Lashon HaKodesh: History, Holiness, & Hebrew (Mosaica Press, 2014) became an instant classic. His weekly articles on synonyms in the Hebrew language are published in the Jewish Press and Ohrnet. Rabbi Klein lives with his family in Beitar Illit, Israel and can be reached via email to: rabbircklein@gmail.com

The term “avunculate marriage” refers to marriage between a man and his niece. In this paper, we will explore the Bible’s view on the permissibility of such unions, and discuss several examples of such marriages in the Bible. Not only does rabbinic literature generally presume that such marriages are permitted, the Talmud even encourages it. On the other hand, other sources ban these relationships. The Sadducees believe that the Bible forbids such marriages. While various Tosafists believe that such marriages are Biblically permitted, they still prohibit marrying one’s niece (at least in some cases) for other reasons.

Abraham & Nahor marry their nieces

Upon close examination, one will find that at least six Biblical personalities married their nieces. Each of these cases can and are interpreted in various ways; calling into question their relevance to our discussion. However, the mere fact that tradition allows for these sorts of interpretations shows that avunculate marriage is compatible with Biblical tradition, and constitutes a legitimate building block in the institution of the Jewish family.

The first two examples of avunculate marriages in the Bible are those between Abraham and Nahor and their respective nieces. The Torah says:

And Terah lived seventy years, and begot Abram, Nahor, and Haran. Now these are the generations of Terah: Terah begot Abram, Nahor, and Haran; and Haran begot Lot. And Haran died in the presence of his father Terah in the land of his nativity, in Ur of the Chaldees. And Abram and Nahor took them wives: the name of Abram’s wife was Sarai; and the name of Nahor’s wife, Milcah, the daughter of Haran, the father of Milcah, and the father of Iscah. (Gen. 11:26–29)

This passage records that Abram (i.e. Abraham), Nahor, and Haran were brothers. Nahor married Milcah, the daughter of Haran; and Abraham married Sarai. According to an ancient tradition preserved in rabbinic sources (Seder Olam Ch. 2; TB Megillah 14a; and TB Sanhedrin 69b) and by Josephus (Antiquities of the Jews Book I, Ch. 6), another name for Sarai is Iscah. The assertion that Sarai is the same person as Iscah is supported by the fact that the Torah provides the paternity of Nahor’s wife Milcah, yet does not mention the paternity of Abraham’s wife Sarai. Given that the Torah delineates one wife’s father, we would have expected it to mention the father of the other wife as well. This difficulty can be resolved if we assume that Sarai is Iscah, since the Torah states that Haran was the father of Iscah.[1]

If we assume that the Haran who is mentioned as Abraham and Nahor’s father-in-law is the same person as their brother Haran and that Sarai is Iscah, then this passage records two instances of avunculate marriages: Nahor married his niece Milcah and Abraham married his niece Iscah/Sarai.

However, it is debatable whether Nahor and Abraham’s marriages to Milcah and Sarai were truly avunculate marriages. In order to claim that they were, one must rely on two assumptions, both of which are subject to dispute. Firstly, Ibn Ezra (to Gen. 11:29) expresses skepticism regarding the identification of Iscah with Sarai.[2] Secondly, even if Iscah is Sarai, some commentators (including Abarbanel (Gen. 11) and the Medieval work Moshav Zeqenim[3]) understand that the Bible refers to two different men named Haran. One was a brother to Abraham and Nahor (and father of Lot); while the other was the father of Iscah/Sarai and Milcah.[4] Accordingly, there is no clear consensus on whether Abraham and Nahor married their nieces.

Dinah’s daughter

Later in Genesis, the Bible relates that when Joseph was the Egyptian viceroy, he married Osnath daughter of Poti-Phera (Gen. 41:45). According to many Midrashic sources (Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer Ch. 38; Masekhet Sofrim 21:9; and Targum Pseudo-Jonathan to Gen. 41:45(, Osnath was none other than the daughter of Dinah (Jacob’s daughter) and her rapist, Shechem. This “illegitimate” child was initially shunned by Jacob’s family, but eventually found her way back in by marrying Joseph. Thus, Joseph’s wife Osnath was his niece, the daughter of his sister Dinah. Although others understand that Osnath was actually an Egyptian woman,[5] the Midrashic sources above reject the notion that Joseph would marry a non-Israelite woman.

Similarly, Rabbeinu Hayyim Paltiel quotes a Midrash[6] which says that Simeon married the daughter of Dinah who was born by rape through Shechem.[7] According to this Midrash (which is probably mutually exclusive with the abovementioned sources), Simeon married his niece, the daughter of his sister Dinah.

These examples differ from the others under consideration because these are the only explicit examples of a man marrying his sororal niece (i.e. his sister’s daughter). All the other examples involve a man marrying his fraternal niece (i.e. his brother’s daughter).

Uziel and Miriam

Amram had three children: Miriam, Aaron, and Moses. The Bible records the marriages of both of Amram’s sons: Moses married Zippora daughter of Jethro (Ex. 2:21), and Aaron married Eliseba daughter of Amminadab (Ex. 6:23). However, the Bible does not tell us about the family of Amram’s daughter Miriam. Rabbinic literature states that she married Caleb (Exodus Rabbah §1:17; Sifrei, Beha’alothkha §78; and TB Sotah 11b–12a). However, according to the apocryphal work The Testament of Amram found amongst the Dead Sea Scrolls at Qumran (4Q543, 4Q549), Amram gave his daughter Miriam to his younger brother Uzziel to wed. That work understands that the sons of Uzziel listed in the Bible (Ex. 6:22) were born to his wife Miriam. Thus, that work believed that Uzziel married his brother’s daughter Miriam.

Othniel and Achsa

As related in the book of Joshua (15:16–17) and in the opening chapter of Judges (1:12–13), Caleb offered his daughter Achsa to whoever could conquer the Canaanite stronghold at Kiriath Sepher: And Othniel the son of Kenaz, Caleb’s younger brother, took it; and he [Caleb] gave him [Othniel] Achsah his daughter to wife. Othniel succeeded in conquering the city, and thus wins the hand of his brother’s daughter Achsa in marriage. Most assume that Othniel was Caleb’s full brother, although some explain that they shared only a mother, not a father.[8]

1. Ishtori ha-Parhi (1280–1366), the foremost Rabbinic topographer of the Medieval period, writes (Kaftor Va-Fereh Ch. 5) that the Sadducees consider themselves more pious than Rabbinic Jews because they forbid one to marry his brother’s daughter. Then, ha-Parhi cites this case as a Biblical precedent for allowing such marriages. Nonetheless, ha-Parhi notes that the case of Othniel only proves that one may marry the daughter of his maternal brother, but does not necessarily prove that one can marry the daughter of his paternal siblings.

Elimelech and Naomi

There is a Talmudic discussion (TB Bava Bathra 91a) regarding the Book of Ruth which explains the relationships between its major players. It asserts that Elimelech (Naomi’s husband), Salmon (Boaz’s father), the anonymous relative who refused to redeem Naomi’s field, and Naomi’s father were all sons of Nahshon ben Amminadab. According to this understanding, Elimelech married his brother’s daughter—Naomi.

However, the Midrash (Ruth Rabbah §6:3) presents a dissenting view that Elimelech was a son of Salmon (and brother to Boaz). According to this understanding, Naomi was not Elimelech’s niece but his first cousin.

Mordecai and Esther

The Talmud (TB Megillah 13a) relates that Mordecai not only raised the orphaned Esther, but he also married her. Furthermore, some sources, including Josephus in Antiquities (Book XI, Ch. 6), Targum Rishon (to Est. 7:6),[9] and the Vulgate (Est. 2:7) explain that Esther was Mordecai’s niece. Ibn Ezra (to Est. 8:1) and Maimonides (there)[10] also repeat that claim. Together, these two ideas indicate that Mordecai married his niece. Nonetheless, this understanding is simply mistaken as the Bible quite explicitly states that she was his first cousin, not his niece: And he brought up Hadassah, that is, Esther, his uncle’s daughter… (Est. 2:7) and Now when the turn of Esther, the daughter of Abihail the uncle of Mordecai… (Est. 2:15).

The Talmud encourages marrying one’s niece

The prophet Isaiah tells of several acts of kindness that a man can perform that would prompt God to answer his prayers. He says:

Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him, and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh? Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thy healing shall spring forth speedily; and thy righteousness shall go before thee, the glory of the LORD shall be thy reward. Then shalt thou call, and the LORD will answer; thou shalt cry, and He will say: ‘Here I am.’… (Is. 58:7–9)

When explaining these “good deeds” in practical terms, the Talmud (TB Yevamot 62b–63a) notes that and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh refers to a man who marries his sister’s daughter. While there is a controversy among the commentators concerning whether the Talmud only means one’s sororal niece or even his fraternal niece, it is clear that the Talmud encourages a man to marry his niece. Similarly, the Tosefta (Kiddushin 1:2) teaches, “A man should not marry a woman until his sororal niece comes of age [so that he can marry her], or until he finds [another woman equally] fitting for him.”

Only Sororal niece, or even fraternal niece?

There are two approaches among the earlier commentators in how to understand the Talmud’s endorsement of marrying one’s niece. Rashi understands that the Talmud only endorses marrying one’s sororal niece. He explains that this act is considered particularly kind, because a man has a certain longing for his sister (more so than for his brother). Thus, by marrying her daughter, he will insure that his wife will be especially cherished.

However, the Tosafists (Tosafot to TB Yevamot 62b) quote in the name of Rashi’s grandson Rashbam that the Talmud’s endorsement also applies to one’s fraternal niece, not just to a sororal niece. He explains that the Talmud specifically mentions marrying a sororal niece simply because it is more common that a man’s sister will convince him to marry her daughter than it is for his brother to do so.

Nonetheless, Rabbeinu Tam disagrees with this assertion and instead maintains that the Talmud only means that one should marry his sororal niece. There are two modes of justifications given for this approach: Firstly, one’s sororal niece is similar to her uncle, as the Rabbis say, “Most children are similar to the brothers of their mother” (TB Baba Bathra 110a, Sofrim 15:10). This similarity between the two will insure a stronger marriage and that is precisely what the Talmud means to endorse.

Furthermore, the Tosafists quote in the name of Rivan (a son-in-law of Rashi and uncle to Rabbeinu Tam and Rashbam) that it is actually forbidden to marry one’s fraternal niece, so the Talmud must only have endorsed marrying one’s sororal niece. They explain that according to the rules of the Levirate marriage (mentioned in Deut. 25:5–10), a man (A) is commanded to marry the widow of his brother (B), if B dies childless. However, the Mishnah teaches (Yevamot 1:1) that if the widow is A’s daughter, then A is exempt from that commandment, because a man may not marry his own daughter. Thus, the Rabbis forbid a man (B) from marrying his niece (A’s daughter) so as to prevent a situation where the commandment of Levirate marriage will be abolished. This rabbinic ban on marrying one’s fraternal niece proves that the Talmud’s endorsement of marrying one’s niece only applies to a sororal niece.[11]

Nonetheless, this proof is incomplete because there are situations where there is no clash with the rules of the Levirate marriage. For example, if A is already deceased (and therefore anyways unable to perform the Levirate marriage), then B should be allowed to marry his daughter. Or if A is only B’s maternal brother, but not paternal brother (and therefore is not allowed to marry B’s widow even if she was not his daughter see TB Yevamot 17b), then he should be allowed to marry A’s daughter. Accordingly, one can argue that in these situations, the Talmud endorses marrying even one’s fraternal niece. This is especially compelling in light of ha-Parhi’s abovementioned proof-text from Othniel, which shows that one is allowed to marry his maternal brother’s daughter.

In short, Rabbeinu Tam—in agreement with his grandfather Rashi—understands that the Talmud only endorses marrying one’s sororal niece, but actually forbids marrying one’s fraternal niece. Rabbi Betzalel Ashkenazi (1520–1592) testifies that this is also the opinion[12] of the non-yet-extant Tosafot Shantz to the Talmudic Tractate Gittin.[13] In his commentary to the Bible, the ‎Alsatian sage R. Yohanan Luria (1440–1514) also follows Rabbeinu Tam’s view.[14]

However, Maimonides (in his commentary to the Mishnah Nedarim 8:5 and in his Laws of Sexual Prohibitions, end of ch. 2) understands that the Talmud does not mention one’s sororal niece to the exclusion of his fraternal niece. He thus rules that is considered a Mitzvah for a man to marry either his sororal or fraternal niece.[15] R. Meir Abulafia (1170–1244) writes (Yad Ramah to TB Sanhedrin 76b) that marrying one’s niece is considered commendable because she is the closest relative that a man is allowed to marry. He thus follows his older contemporary Maimonides in offering no distinction between a sororal niece and fraternal niece (because the degree of kinship to both is the same). Nonetheless, he notes that the Talmud mentioned one’s sister’s daughter in specific simply because marrying her is even more commendable. By doing so, he is performing an act of kindness towards his sister, who might otherwise have difficulty marrying off her daughter.[16]

1. Moses Isserles (1520–1572) settles the matter by ruling in accordance with the view of Maimonides and Rashbam that one should marry his sororal or fraternal niece (see his glosses to the Shulhan Aruch, Even Ha’Ezer §2:6; 15:25).

The Rabbinic View regarding Forbidden Relationships

Rabbinic Judaism extends the meanings of the Biblical passages (Lev. 18 and 20) which delineate forbidden relationships. They note that the Torah spoke of the incest laws from the man’s point of reference, but the laws apply equally to a woman. Thus, the Rabbis understand that all incestuous relationships mentioned in the Bible are forbidden to both the man and the woman involved (TB Yevamot 84b). However, the Rabbis do not add more forbidden relationships than those listed by the Bible; they only say that both parties are culpable. The Sadducees, on the other hand, add cases to the Bible’ list, and forbid more cases of the same types of relationship. In this, the Rabbis understand the Bible’s meaning differently than the Sadducees and remain more faithful to the text of the Torah than did they.

The Sadducee view regarding forbidden relationships

A Sadducean work found by Solomon Schechter at the Cairo Geniza criticizes those who marry their brother or sister’s daughter. This work reasons that since according to Mosaic law, a man is not allowed to marry his mother’s sister because she is his mother’s flesh (Lev. 18:13), a woman is also not allowed to marry her parents’ brother. The rationale for such an extension of the Biblical law is that the Torah does not simply list forbidden cases of incest, it lists forbidden categories of relationships. These relationships are determined by degree of kinship, without regard for gender. Thus, if a man is forbidden to his parents’ sister, the same prohibition says that a woman is forbidden to her parents’ brother because the degree of kinship—in this case, parent’s sibling—is the same.[17]

A copy of this document, now known as the Damascus Document, was also found among the Dead Sea Scrolls at Qumran (4Q270). It contains a condemnation of those men who marry their brothers’ daughters (although that particular source omits the prohibition of one’s sister’s daughter). A legal scroll found at Qumran known as Midrash Mishpatim (4Q251) contains a list of the Biblical prohibitions of incest, and includes a man marrying his brother’s or sister’s daughter. Another important document from Qumran known as the Temple Scroll (11Q19) also[18] forbids marrying one’s brother’s or sister’s daughter.[19]

The Sadducean method of interpretation creates three pairs of redundancies in the Bible’s list (Cases 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12) and also creates four new cases of incest which are not mentioned in the Bible, in addition to marrying one’s niece (Cases 4, 6, two scenarios, 10).

These two points demonstrate the weakness of the Sadducean approach: The method of interpretation used to justify including one’s niece in the Biblical prohibition against marrying one’s aunt would create a series of redundancies in the other listed cases of incest. Furthermore, according to the Sadducean methodology of Biblical interpretation, four other relationships should be classified as incestuous (in addition to marrying one’s niece). However, the Sadducees are inconsistent in that they explicitly mention their added prohibition against marrying one’s niece, but fail to account for the other new cases of incest which their methodology creates.[20]

In fact, Saul Lieberman argues that the Rabbis classified marrying one’s niece as a positive deed specifically in order to counter the Sadducean view that marrying one’s niece is Biblically forbidden. He notes it is the Rabbis’ way to take things which are simply “allowed” by the Bible and encourage people to do them in order to undermine sectarian heretical views.^[21]

Interestingly, in his abovementioned work, ha-Parhi notes that the Sadducees were not innovators in banning marriage to a niece: They adopted the prohibition from the Samaritans, who took the idea from the Arabs.[22] Later, the Karaites also followed suit and outlawed uncle-niece marriage.[23]

R. Yehuda Ha-Hassid’s view

The 12^th century German leader of the Hassidei Ashkenaz movement, R. Judah Ha-Hassid, declares that one should not marry his niece, neither sororal nor fraternal (in his ethical will §22 and in Sefer Hassidim §477). However, his understanding of this prohibition clearly differs from the Sadducean approach. The Sadducees understood that the Bible itself prohibits marrying one’s niece, while Ha-Hassid does not. As a follower of Rabbinic tradition, Ha-Hassid must comply with Talmudic law, yet his mention of a prohibition against marrying one’s niece is clearly at odds with the Rabbinic approach which not only allows for such marriage, but even encourages it.

1. Ezekiel Landau of Prague (1713–1793), in his halachik responsa (Noda B’Yehuda, Even HaEzer Tinyana §79) offers an innovative solution. He proves that R. Judah Ha-Hassid only wrote the prohibitions in his will and Sefer Hassidim for his descendants — not for all Jews — because otherwise his prohibition would contradict an explicit Talmudic passage which not only allows but even applauds a man marrying his niece.[24] Others interpret Ha-Hassid’s warning in accordance with contemporary science, which warns of the genetic dangers to children born to an uncle and niece.

Nonetheless, Ha-Hassid himself explains his true intent. He writes (Sefer Hassidim §488) that only a pious individual is allowed to marry his niece in order that his children be similar to himself (per the rabbinic dictum mentioned above). However, a wicked man who only intends to fulfill his own pleasures should not marry his niece, so that his children will not be like him. Thus, Ha-Hassid actually allows for avunculate marriage in the right circumstances, yet elsewhere he writes blankly that it is forbidden so that the not-necessarily-pious masses would refrain from such unions.[25]

Conclusion

There are essentially two general views regarding avunculate marriage in the Bible. The Rabbinic position is that avunculate marriage is permitted by Biblical law. In fact, according to Rabbinic tradition there are even Biblical precedents for allowing such marriages. Nonetheless, the Rabbis do limit the circumstances under which one may marry his niece. They forbid marrying one’s fraternal niece since this might interfere with the commandment of the Levirate marriage. There is also the pietistic view of the Hassidei Ashkenaz, who rule that only a pious man may marry his niece (because he will have pure intentions), while the masses should not engage in such unions.

By contrast, the Sadducean approach outlaws avunculate marriage entirely and attributes this prohibition to the Bible. Even according to Rabbinic tradition, the aforementioned Biblical cases are not unanimously viewed as actually consisting of avunculate marriages. The Sadducees would likely interpret these cases such that they do not serve as precedents for legitimately marrying one’s niece.

[1] L. A. Feldman (ed.), Pirush HaRan Al HaTorah (Jerusalem: Machon Shalem, 1968) pg. 149.

[2] While Ibn Ezra does not explicitly note his objections to this identification, other sources quote a question in his name which implies a reject of this tradition. Ibn Ezra asks that if we assume that the Bible lists Terah’s sons in order of their birth, then Abraham was at least two years older than Haran. Furthermore, it is evident from the Bible that Abraham was ten years older than his wife Sarah (Sarai), as it says Then Abraham fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his heart: ‘Shall a child be born unto him that is a hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?’ (Gen. 17:17). This would mean that Haran fathered Iscah/Sarai at the extremely unlikely age of eight. Rabbeinu Hayyim Paltiel answers this objection by noting that the Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 69b) itself already raised this point. In fact, it uses this calculation to prove that in early generations men fathered offspring from as early as the age of eight. See I. S. Lange (ed.), Pirushei HaTorah L’Rabbeinu Hayyim Paltiel (Jerusalem, 1981) pp. 26–27 and S. Sasson (ed.), Moshav Zeqenim (London, 1959) pg. 15.

[3] S. Sasson (ed.), Moshav Zeqenim (London, 1959) pg. 15.

[4] The commentators propose this distinction because of the fact that the Bible splits the genealogy of Haran’s descendants into two verses. The first verse only mentions Lot, while the second says that he was the father of Milcah and Iscah. However, Kimhi explains these verses in the exact opposite way: He argues that the Torah sought to clarify that Haran was not only the father of Lot, but also of Milcah and Iscah (which follows the view that this passage only discusses one Haran).

[5] Josephus (in Antiquities of the Jews Book II, Ch. 6) also understood that Joseph’s wife was literally the daughter of Potiphar. However, see Midrash Sekhel Tov (to Gen. 39:1) and Midrash Tadshe (Ch. 21), printed in J. D. Eisenstein (ed.), Otzar Midrashim (New York, 1915) pg. 486 and also cited by Yalkut Shimoni (Joshua §9), which say that Osnath was among several righteous female converts.

[6] This Midrash appears nowhere else, save for Rabbeinu Hayyim Paltiel’s commentary. However, there is a similar tradition (Genesis Rabbah §80:11) which says that Dinah refused to leave the house of Shechem until Simeon promised to marry her. According to that Midrash, Simeon married his sister Dinah, not her daughter.

[7] I. S. Lange (ed.), Pirushei HaTorah L’Rabbeinu Hayyim Paltiel (Jerusalem, 1981) pg. 166.

[8] The Talmud (TB Temurah 16a), followed by Rashi (to Jos. 15:17 and Jud. 1:13), writes that Othniel was only Caleb’s maternal brother, not full brother. The rationale for this statement is that Caleb’s father is always given in the Bible as Jephunah (Num. 13:6; 14:30; 26:65; 32:12; 34:19; Deut. 1:36′; Josh. 14:6; 14:14; I Chron. 4:15), while Othniel is always mentioned as a son of Kenaz (Josh. 15:17; Jud. 1:13; 3:9; 3:11; I Chron. 4:13). According to this approach, after Caleb was born, his mother married someone named Kenaz, and bore Othniel to him. Rashi remains consistent with this view when he writes (in his commentary to TB Sukkah 27b) that he is unsure of Othniel’s tribe, because his relationship to Caleb was only through their mother, and matrilineal descent does not impart tribal affiliation.

Kimhi (to Josh. 15:17) adds that in the instances that Caleb also is referred to as a Kenizzite (Num. 32:12; Josh. 14:6; 14:14), this term is a reference to his step-father. Kimhi then suggests that Caleb and Othniel were actually full brothers and that their father had two names: Jephunah and Kenaz (which is why Caleb is also called a Kenizzite). Ultimately, Kimhi rejects this approach and argues that the appellation “Kenizzite” refers to the family of Kenaz, a common ancestor of both Caleb and Othniel. Ha-Parhi (cited below) and Abarbanel (to Josh. 15:16 and in his introduction to Judges) concur with Kimhi’s conclusion. [It has yet to be explored whether the term Kenizzite used in connection with Caleb is related to the Kenizzites, a Canaanite tribe which God promised Abraham will be conquered by the Israelites (Gen. 15:19).]

[9] Although, see Targum Rishon earlier (to Esther 2:7 and 2:15) who explicitly writes that Esther was the daughter of Mordecai’s uncle, making them first-cousins, not niece and uncle.

[10] Y. Rivlin (ed.), Pirush Megillat Esther L’Rambam (Jerusalem, 1952) pg. 60.

[11] See Tosafot (TB Yevamot 99a) and Tosafot Yeshanim (ibid. 62b). The same point is made earlier by Rav Sherira Gaon (who predated Rabbeinu Tam) in a responsum printed by M. Grossberg (ed.), Gvul Menashe (Frankfurt, 1899) pg. 15.

[12] R. Abraham Haim Schor (d. 1632) writes (Torat Haim to TB Sanhedrin 76b) that marrying one’s sororal niece is especially praiseworthy because according to Biblical law, a daughter does not inherit her deceased father’s property unless he has no sons. Accordingly, there is likely animosity between a man and his sister, for the former will inherit their father’s property and the latter will not. Therefore, it is especially praiseworthy for a man to marry his sister’s daughter in order to alleviate this animosity and show his sister that even she will derive benefit from their deceased father’s estate. Tosafot Shantz, as quoted by Ashkenazi, offers a very similar approach and adds that marrying one’s brother’s daughter does not achieve the same effect because one’s paternal brother will in any case inherit his father’s property. In this, Tosafot Shantz offers another strong argument for Rabbeinu Tam’s position.

[13] M. Y. Blau (ed.), Shitah Mekubetzet Yevamot (New York: Shitat HaKadmonim, 1986) pg. 302. See also Shitah Mekubetzet (to TB Nedarim 63b) who also seems so inclined.

[14] Y. Hoffman (ed.), Meshivat Nefesh (Jerusalem: Machon Yerushalayim, 1998) pg. 18.

[15] See also Meiri (to TB Yevamot 62b) who seems to agree with Maimonides.

[16] In a similar explanation, R. Todros HaLevi ben Joseph Abulafia (1225–1285), a nephew of R. Meir Abulafia, writes that marrying one’s sister’s daughter is especially meritous because his sister likely has financial difficulties in marrying off her daughter. Hida (Birkei Yosef to Even HaEzer §2:6) quotes this unpublished explanation of R. Todros and adds that according to this, there is no difference between a sororal niece and a fraternal niece, the difference is only in whether the groom’s sibling has financial difficulties.

[17] S. Schechter (ed.), Documents of Jewish Sectaries Vol. 1, Fragments of a Zadokite Work (Cambridge, 1910) pg. 5.

[18] Interestingly, Midrash Mishpatim lists the prohibition of marrying one’s niece before it lists one’s aunt, while the Temple Scroll lists marrying one’s niece afterward.

[19] See E. Eshel, “The Proper Marriage according to the Genesis Apocryphon and Related Texts,” Meghillot: Studies in the Dead Sea Scrolls Vol. 8–9 (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2010) pp. 29–51, who discusses numerous examples of the DSS embellishing Biblical passages by adding marriages between first cousins. She explains that the authors of those scrolls added cases of marriage between first cousins and not between man and his niece precisely because the Qumranic sect believed the latter to be forbidden.

[20] It should be noted that three out of four of those cases (i.e. grandmother, mother’s paternal brother’s wife, and grandfather’s wife) are explicitly banned by Rabbinic decree, even though according to Rabbinic interpretation they are permitted by Biblical law (see TB Yevamot 21a).

[21] S. Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshutah (New York: JTS, 1973) pg. 915. Cf. E. Segal, “Sarah and Iscah: Method and Message in Midrashic Tradition”, JQR, vol. 82:4, pp. 417–429 who seems content to similarly explain the Midrashic identification of Sarah with Iscah (mentioned above).

[22] Tosafot (to TB Horayoth 4a) write that there are three cases of incest which the Sadducees do not agree are forbidden: one’s daughter (who is not his wife’s daughter), one’s mother-in-law’s mother, and one’s father-in-law’s mother (see Rashi to TB Hagigah 11b who explains that these three are derived through exegetical interpretation in TB Sanhedrin 75a, and are not explicit in the Bible).

Ha-Parhi, in his abovementioned polemic against Sadducees, writes that should one meet a Sadducee, one should tell him that according to Sadducean religion one is allowed to marry his daughter because the Bible does not explicitly forbid it and the Sadducees do not recognize the hermeneutical arguments set forth by the Rabbis (TB Sanhedrin 76a) for its prohibition. However, in light of the above, Ha-Parhi’s polemic is no longer applicable because according to the Sadducees’ internal logic, marrying one’s daughter is included in the prohibition of marrying one’s mother because both are a violation of the child-parent relationship. That is, the Torah forbids a man to lie with his mother and both Rabbinic and Sadducean interpretation extend this prohibition to a woman who is forbidden from lying with her son. However, Sadducean interpretation would also argue that included in this prohibition is a man lying with his daughter because the Torah’s intent is not simply to forbid a man and his mother, but to declare incestuous any fornication between the child-parent line. The Rabbis, on the other hand, understood that this is not the intent of the Torah and instead offer their own source for the prohibition of marrying one’s daughter.

[23] N.A. Stillman (ed.), “Malik al-Ramlī.” Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World (Brill Online, 2013).

[24] For an extensive survey of various authorities who agree or disagree with Landau’s characterization of the prohibition cited by R. Yehuda Ha-Hassid, see Sdei Hemed Vol. 7 (Brooklyn: Kohath Publishing, 1950) pp. 2483ff.

[25] See S. Guttman (ed.), Sefer Tzava’at Rabbi Yehuda HaHassid HaMefoar (Jerusalem: Otzar HaPoskim, 2011) pp. 177–188 for an in-depth analysis of Ha-Hassid’s stance on the topic.

Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein is the author of the newly-released work God versus Gods: Judaism in the Age of Idolatry (Mosaica Press, 2018). His book follows the narrative of Tanakh and focuses on the stories concerning Avodah Zarah using both traditional and academic sources. It also includes an encyclopedia of all the different types of idolatry mentioned in the Bible.

Rabbi Klein studied for over a decade at the premier institutes of the Hareidi world, including Beth Medrash Govoha in Lakewood and Yeshivas Mir in Jerusalem. He authored many articles both in English and Hebrew, and his first book Lashon HaKodesh: History, Holiness, & Hebrew (Mosaica Press, 2014) became an instant classic. His weekly articles on synonyms in the Hebrew language are published in the Jewish Press and Ohrnet. Rabbi Klein lives with his family in Beitar Illit, Israel and can be reached via email to: rabbircklein@gmail.com

In this article, we will discuss two different temples which the Jews built in Egypt: the temple at Elephantine, and Chonyo’s Temple. After providing the reader with the historical background to both temples, we will analyze the nature of the worship which took place there, as well as their possible Halachic legitimacy.

The Temple at Elephantine

Ancient papyri found on the Egyptian island Elephantine (יב, Yev in Aramaic) reveal the forgotten story of a Jewish Temple that was built there.

According to those documents, Jews living in Egypt when it was still an independent state built a Temple for Hashem at Elephantine. This occurred after the destruction of the First Temple, but before the construction of the Second Temple. Later, when the Persians conquered Egypt, they destroyed most of its temples,^[1] but allowed the Jewish Temple at Elephantine to remain. Sometime afterward, the priests of the Egyptian deity Khnum and the local Persian rulers colluded against the Jewish community at Elephantine, destroying their Temple and taking the Temple’s gold and silver for themselves.

The Jewish priests of the Elephantine temple, led by a priest named Jedaniah, sent letters appealing to the Persian-appointed Jewish governor of Judah and the Cuthean governate of Samaria to intervene on their behalf and lobby the Persians for the restoration of their temple. In these letters, the priests of Elephantine repeatedly mentioned that they wished to resume sacrificing meal-offerings, burnt-offerings, and incense (which as we will see seems to be Halachicly problematic). It seems that the Second Temple in Jerusalem had already been built by this time; as the Elephantine priests mentioned in their letter that they had also written to Yochanan, the Kohen Gadol in Jerusalem, but had not received a reply.

The Elephantine Temple was eventually rebuilt, but the Jewish community at Elephantine did not last much longer.^[2]

Were the Jews at Elephantine Loyal to Halachah?

The academic consensus views the Jews at Elephantine as practitioners of a syncretistic mixture of Judaism and Egyptian/Aramean idolatrous cults.^[3] This comes as no surprise because Jeremiah (Chapter 44) already mentioned that the Jews who remained in Judah after the destruction of the First Temple and the subsequent assassination of Gedaliah (the Babylonian-appointed Jewish governor over what remained of Judah) migrated to Egypt, where they engaged in idol worship.^[4] As such, the deviant practices of these wayward Jews does not warrant any attempt at justification.^[5]

However, some scholars have called this picture into question. In the Ancient Levant, it was standard practice for people to bear personal names that refer to their gods. Such references to deities within a person’s name is known as a theophoric element. Accordingly, if the Jewish community at Elephantine was truly syncretistic, then we would expect the Jews of that community to incorporate the names of foreign gods into their personal names. But the evidence shows that they did not. Partially because of this lack of idolatrous theophoric elements, some scholars argue that the Jewish community at Elephantine was not idolatrous—rather they remained wholly devoted to Hashem. These scholars explain away alleged allusions to foreign gods at Elephantine as the assimilation of various pagan religious concepts into their brand Judaism, as opposed to the outright acceptance of pagan deities.^[6] Similarly, the Jews at Elephantine may have used Aramean phraseology to refer to Jewish ideas, but they did not adopt Aramean religion.^[7]

According to this approach, we must seek out the Halachic justification for offering sacrifices at the temple in Elephantine, a practice which seems to defy the Torah’s ban on sacrifices outside of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem. Assuming that the Elephantine Jews were basically loyal to normative Judaism, how did they justify building a temple, complete with sacrifices?

As mentioned previously, it seems that those Jews who built the Temple at Elephantine only did so after the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem. Based on this, R. Ephraim Dov ha-Kohen Lapp (1859–1925) proposes that they followed a minority Halachic opinion which maintains that when the First Temple was destroyed, the site in Jerusalem lost it holy status, thus legitimizing the use of private altars.^[8] Accordingly, the Temple at Elephantine had the Halachic status of a legitimate private altar. As a result of this status, the Jews at Elephantine only offered voluntary, votive sacrifices such as meal-offerings, burnt-offerings, and incense (as opposed to obligatory sacrifices, like sin-offerings or guilt-offerings). This is, in fact, in accordance with the Mishnah^[9] that limits the permissible sacrifices at legitimate private altars to exactly such offerings.^[10]

Private Altars in the Second Temple Period

Nonetheless, the issue that remains unresolved is why this temple was not discontinued or dismantled upon the construction of the Second Temple. We can possibly resolve this question by comparing the issue of the temple at Elephantine to the issue of private altars in the Kingdom of Judah.

As evident in the Book of Kings, private altars existed in the Kingdom of Judah throughout the First Temple period. There was no systematic campaign to destroy them until Hezekiah came along. This begs the question: Why did righteous kings of Judah, such as Asa and Jehoshaphat allow these private altars to remain, if sacrifices were only allowed at the Holy Temple in Jerusalem?

1. Moshe Sofer (1762–1839) answers that many of the private altars in question were built before the prohibition of private altars came into effect (i.e. before the Temple in Jerusalem was built). Therefore, since these private altars were built legitimately, they maintained a certain degree of holiness. Consequently, it was actually forbidden to destroy them, and this prohibition remained in effect even once using them for ritual purposes became prohibited (i.e., when the Temple was later built). For this reason, even the “good” kings of Judah did not remove the private altars.^[11]

Based on this understanding, we can conjecture that a similar approach may have taken hold at the temple in Elephantine. If that temple was originally built at a time when private altars were permitted (because the First Temple in Jerusalem had already been destroyed), then perhaps some Jews attached a certain degree of holiness to the temple, and refused to dismantle it after the Second Temple in Jerusalem was built. Nonetheless, even if they were justified in allowing the temple at Elephantine to remain standing, there does not seem to be any justification for continuing to offer sacrifices outside of Jerusalem once the Second Temple was built.

The House of Chonyo

The Mishnah^[12] mentions another Jewish temple in Egypt—the House of Chonyo (Onias). Chonyo was the son^[13] of Shimon the Just, a righteous Kohen Gadol in the Second Temple in Jerusalem. Before his death, Shimon the Just said that his son Chonyo should succeed him as Kohen Gadol.

The Talmud^[14] offers two Tannaic accounts of how Chonyo’s temple came about. According to R. Meir, Chonyo’s older brother Shimi became jealous that their father chose Chonyo to succeed him, so he tricked Chonyo into making a mockery of the Temple rituals and angering the other Kohanim. Shimi gave Chonyo “instructions” for his inaugural service by telling him that he was expected to wear a leather blouse and a special belt. When Chonyo came to the altar wearing those “feminine” articles of clothing, Shimi insinuated to the other Kohanim that Chonyo wore those clothes in order to fulfill a promise to his “lover”.^[15] This raised their ire and they chased him to the Egyptian city of Alexandria,^[16] where he established an idolatrous temple.

According to R. Yehudah, the story unfolds differently. Although Shimon the Just advised that his son Chonyo should become the next Kohen Gadol, Chonyo deferred that honor, allowing his older brother Shimi to be appointed instead. Nonetheless, Chonyo became jealous of his older brother, so he devised a plan to embarrass him and deprive him of his office. Chonyo gave Shimi “instructions” for his inaugural service by telling him that he was expected to wear a leather blouse and a special belt. When Shimi came to the altar wearing those “feminine” articles of clothes, Chonyo insinuated to the other Kohanim that Shimi wore those clothes in order to fulfill a promise to his “lover”. When the other Kohanim found out the truth, i.e. that Chonyo had tricked Shimi by giving him incorrect instructions for his inaugural service, they chased Chonyo to Alexandria, where he established a temple for Hashem.^[17]

The Talmud concludes this second account by relating that Chonyo justified the establishment of his temple by citing the words of Isaiah,^[18] On that day, there will be an altar for Hashem inside the Land of Egypt, and a single-stone altar to Hashem next to its border (Isa. 19:19).

Josephus’ Account of the Chonyo Story

Josephus offers a third account of how Chonyo’s temple was established. After the death of Alexander the Great, Greek holdings in the Middle East were divided between the Seleucid kingdom in Syria and the Ptolemaic kingdom in Egypt. A flashpoint of contention between these two rival kingdoms was the Holy Land, and different groups of Jews took different sides in the conflict. When the Seleucid king, Antiochus Epiphanes, led his army to Jerusalem, he violated the Holy Temple and halted the offering of daily sacrifices for three and a half years.

Chonyo, who was the Kohen Gadol in Jerusalem, was a supporter of the rival Ptolemaic kingdom. When the Seleucids came to Jerusalem, he fled to Egypt. In Egypt, Ptolemy granted Chonyo permission to establish a Jewish community in the district of Heliopolis. There,^[19] Chonyo built a city resembling Jerusalem, along with a temple that resembled the one in Jerusalem. Centuries later, Chonyos’ temple met its eventual demise at the hands of the Romans. After they destroyed the Second Holy Temple in Jerusalem, the Romans ordered the closure of Chonyo’s temple in Egypt, and eventually its destruction.^[20]

Josephus seems to attribute noble intentions to Ptolemy. He was said to have sponsored the establishment of a Jewish temple in Egypt so that the Jews there would have the opportunity to worship Hashem (and would be more willing to help Ptolemy battle the Seleucids). However, in explaining Chonyo’s rationale for building the temple in Egypt, Josephus reports that Chonyo built it in order to compete with the Temple in Jerusalem and draw Jews away from worshipping Hashem properly. Chonyo had a bone to pick with the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem on account of their rejection of him, which forced him to flee to Egypt.

Josephus also reports that Chonyo rationalized his building of a temple on foreign soil^[21] by citing Isaiah’s above-mentioned prophecy.^[22]

Chonyo’s Temple in Halacha

As we have seen above, whether or not Chonyo’s temple was idolatrous remains a matter of contention. According to Josephus and R. Meir, Chonyo sought to worship something other than Hashem. On the other hand, according to R. Yehuda, Chonyo’s temple was established for the sake of Hashem. If we follow the first view, then there can be no justification for what Chonyo did and the establishment of his idolatrous temple in Egypt. However, if he sought to worship Hashem, then from a Halachic perspective, there may be two ways of looking at Chonyo’s temple: Either his temple was a place of forbidden worship (albeit not quite idolatry in the classical sense of worshipping a foreign deity), or it might have been a completely legitimate place of worship.

Maimonides^[23] follows R. Yehuda’s version of events and explains that Chonyo’s temple was not idolatrous, per se, even though it violated the ban on sacrifices outside of the Temple in Jerusalem. In other words, the practices at Chonyo’s temple reflected an illegitimate way of worshipping Hashem. Maimonides also notes that many local Egyptians—known as Copts—became involved in Chonyo’s temple, and were thus drawn to worshipping Hashem.

The Tosafists^[24] disagree with Maimonides’ premise that Chonyo’s temple violated Halacha. Instead, they explain that Chonyo avoided the prohibition of offering sacrifices outside of the Temple in Jerusalem by only offering sacrifices belonging to non-Jews. According to this approach, there was nothing technically wrong with Chonyo’s temple and the services there.

Gentiles Sacrifices outside of Jerusalem

Nonetheless, the commentators grapple over reconciling the Tosafists’ explanation with the opinion of the Tannaic sage R. Yose who maintains that the prohibition of offering sacrifices outside of Temple even extends to sacrifices of non-Jews.^[25]

1. Avrohom Chaim Schor (1560–1632)^[26] explains that the dispute about whether Chonyo’s temple was legitimate or not centers around whether or not one accepts R. Yose’s view. In other words, R. Meir accepted R. Yose’s view that even a non-Jew’s sacrifices may only be offered in the Holy Temple. As a result of that, R. Meir understood that Chonyo’s temple must have been illegitimate, so he branded the temple idolatrous. In contrast, R. Yehuda rejected R. Yose’s opinion, so he reasoned that there could be Halachic justification for Chonyo’s temple. Because of this, R. Yehuda asserted that Chonyo’s was not idolatrous, but reflected the genuine worship of Hashem, albeit—as the Tosafists explain—specifically for gentiles.

Alternatively, R. Schor proposes that although R. Yose forbids offering the sacrifices of gentiles outside of the Temple in Jerusalem, this prohibition only applies to Jewish priests. Accordingly, R. Yehuda believed that Chonyo and the Jewish priests at his temple did not actually participate in the ritual offerings there. Rather, they offered instructions for the attending gentiles to properly offer sacrifices to Hashem. In this way, no one at Chonyo’s Jewish-run temple ever violated the prohibition against offering sacrifices outside of the Temple in Jerusalem, because they themselves never engaged in such actions, they only helped the gentiles do so.^[27]

Others suggest that even R. Yose differentiates between two different types of sacrifices offered by a non-Jew. If a non-Jew consecrated a sacrifice to be brought in the Temple in Jerusalem,^[28] then R. Yose would say that this sacrifice may not be offered outside of the Temple in Jerusalem. However, if a non-Jew consecrated a sacrifice without specific intent that it should be offered in Jerusalem, then his offering may Halachically be brought elsewhere. According to this, all opinions agree that a Jew may offer a gentile’s sacrifice outside of the Temple in Jerusalem provided that the gentile did not initially consecrate the sacrifice with intent to bring to Jerusalem.^[29] With this in mind, we may justify the services at Chonyo’s temple by explaining that they only offered the sacrifices of non-Jews that were consecrated without specific intent to be offered in Jerusalem.

1. Yehonassan Eyebschitz (1690–1764) proposes another answer: the Tosafists’ discussion reflects the rejected opinion of the Amoraic sage R. Yitzchok.^[30] R. Yitzchok understood that the prohibition of sacrificing outside of the Temple does not apply outside of the Holy Land, thus justifying the existence of Chonyo’s temple which stood in Egypt.^[31]
2. Lapp extends this logic to also justify the continued existence of the Jewish temple at Elephantine (mentioned above), even after the construction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. He argues that in accordance with R. Yitzchok, the entire prohibition of sacrifices outside of the Temple only applies in the Holy Land, not in Egypt.^[32]

Egyptian Temples and Eradication of the Idolatrous Inclination

In short, there were two Jewish Temples in Egypt that coexisted with the Second Temple in Jerusalem: the Jewish Temple at Elephantine and Chonyo’s Temple in Alexandria/Heliopolis. We have shown that it is unclear whether or not these temples were idolatrous. If the two Jewish Temples in Egypt were non-idolatrous, then there may be some Halachic justification for their existence.

This, of course, also does not hamper our understanding of the Talmudic assertion that the idolatrous inclination was abolished with the beginning of the Second Temple Era. However, if these Jewish Temples in Egypt were indeed idolatrous, then they pose a challenge to the Talmudic assertions regarding the elimination of the idolatrous inclination.^[33]

We shall resolve this difficulty by addressing each temple separately.

The Elephantine Temple seems to have predated the construction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem, and thus the eradication of the idolatrous inclination. As such, the Temple existed before the sages removed the idolatrous inclination. It is not a stretch of the imagination to postulate that even if the idolatrous inclination suddenly ceased to exist, those who already engaged in systematic idolatry beforehand would continue to do so simply out of habit. Once the Elephantine Temple had already been functioning for some time, it would not simply shut down operations overnight because the sages rid the Jews of the idolatrous inclination. There was too much at stake for the priests and other functionaries who profited from the temple.

Regarding Chonyo’s Temple—which certainly did not predate the construction of the Second Temple—even if it was idolatrous, we can argue that it was not the drive for committing idolatry which led to its establishment. Rather, Chonyo’s own ego and pursuit of honor led him to establish a new Temple in Egypt. Those who participated in his cult were merely supporting characters in Chonyo’s own private scheme. In other words, the existence of Chonyo’s idolatrous temple does not contradict the Talmudic statement that the sages had removed the idolatrous inclination, because the idolatrous inclination was not what drove Chonyo’s temple.

To recap, the Idolatrous inclination was not in play at these two temples. At Elephantine, it was the priests’ greed which motivated their continued idol worship and at Chonyo’s temple, it was a personality cult intended to elevate Chonyo which sponsored idolatry.

^[1] This is a fulfillment of Jeremiah’s prophecy (Jer. 43:12–13), which foresaw that Babylon’s Persian successors would overrun Egypt, and destroy the Egyptian places of idol worship. All source I have encountered assume that the establishment of the Jewish community in Elephantine occurred after the destruction of the First Temple. However, Rabbi Moshe Leib Haberman (editor-in-chief of Kovetz Chitzei Gibborim) calls this assumption into question, because he notes that from the Elephantine Papyri themselves, one only sees that the Jewish settlement there predated Cambyses, but it is unknown by how much.

^[2] B. Porten & A. Yardeni (eds.), Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Ancient Egypt, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1986), pgs. 62-64, 68-78 and B. Porten The Elephantine Papyri in English (Brill, 1996) pgs. 135–137; 139–151.

^[3] M. H. Silverman, “The Religion of the Elephantine Jews—A New Approach,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies, חלק ו vol. I division A (World Union of Jewish Studies, 1973), pg. 377. Texts found amongst the Elephantine Papyri invoke the name of a goddess Anat-Yahu. Some scholars argue that the composite name of this goddess implies a syncretistic merge of the Canaanite goddess Anat with Hashem (“Yahu”, makes up the first three-fourths of His name). Others argue that Anat-Yahu is wholly an Aramean creation, rather than a composite of Canaanite-Jewish conception. Aramean religion had a god named Ashim-Bethel and his consort was named Anat-Bethel. These scholars argue that idolatrous Jews, under Aramean influence, began to confuse Bethel with Hashem, eventually equating the two gods, so that Anat-Bethel was synonymous to them with Anat-Yahu. See K. Van der Toorn, “Anat-Yahu, Some Other Deities, and the Jews of Elephantine,” Numen: International Review for the History of Religions vol. 39:1 (1992), pgs. 80–101 and M. E. Mondriaan, “Anat-Yahu and the Jews at Elephantine,” Journal for Semitics vol. 22:2 (2013), pgs. 537–552.

^[4] J. M. P. Smith, “The Jewish Temple at Elephantine,” The Biblical World vol. 31:6 (1908), pgs. 453–454 also favors identifying the founders of the Jewish colony at Elephantine with the Jews who ignored Jeremiah’s call to remain in Babylonian-occupied Judah, and instead fled to Egypt.

^[5] C. Cornell, “Cult Statuary in the Judean Temple at Yeb,” Journal for the Study of Judaism vol. 47 (2016), pgs. 291–309 is a bit more generous in his assessment of the Jewish community at Elephantine. He submits that the Jews there worshipped the One Hashem, but that their temple held multiple images/idols which purported to depict Him in various hypostases. Still, this development represents a significant deviation from standard Judaism and if he is correct, we need not concern ourselves with seeking any justification for their practices. The fact that these Jews self-identified as Judean has no bearing on our discussion because it was/is common practice for deviant sects to claim to be Jewish.

^[6] Silverman 1973:383.

^[7] A similar approach argues that seemingly idolatrous elements of the Jewish presence at Elephantine do not represent their theological outlook, but rather reflect attempts to evoke Persian sympathy for their cause by implying to the Persians that their religion have shared components. In other words, when the Jews at Elephantine implied things which seem idolatrous, they were simply doing so for political expediency, but they did not actually believe/practice those deviant facets. See T. Bolin, “The Temple of יהו at Elephantine and Persian Religious Policy” in D. Edelman (ed.), The Triumph of Elohim: From Yahwisms to Judaisms (Kok Pharos, 1995), pgs. 127–142.

^[8] Maimonides (Laws of Beis ha-Bechirah 6:15) rules that the Temple’s site became permanently holy when King Solomon sanctified it. However, Raavad (there), disagrees and accepts the opinion that once the Temple was destroyed, the site was no longer holy, until it was re-consecrated upon the construction of the Second Temple (see below).

^[9] Megillah 1:10.

^[10] Zivchei Efrayim Al Meseches Zevachim (Piotrków, 1922), pg. 6.

^[11] Responsa Chasam Sofer (Orach Chaim §32). See also R.C. Klein, God versus Gods: Judaism in the Age of Idolatry (Mosaica Press, 2018), pgs. 28–32.

^[12] Menachos 13:10.

^[13] In Antiquities, Josephus attributes the temple in Egypt to a later Chonyo, who was not the son of Shimon the Just. Nonetheless, some scholars claim that Josephus purposely attributed the establishment of the temple in Egypt to a later Chonyo who had never served as Kohen Gadol in Jerusalem in order to delegitimize its religious value. See J. E. Taylor, “A Second Temple in Egypt: the Evidence for the Zadokite Temple of Onias,” Journal for the Study of Judaism vol. 29:3 (1998), pgs. 297–321. Interestingly, R. Yisroel Lipschitz (1782–1860) in Tiferes Yisroel (Menachos 13:10, Boaz §2) writes that the Chonyo in discussion was not literally a son of Shimon the Just, but rather a grandson of Shimon the Just (a son of Shimon’s son Chonyo), accepting Josephus’s account and adjusting his understanding of the Talmud accordingly.

^[14] TB Menachos 109b.

^[15] R. Gershom and Rashi explain that this “lover” was his wife. Maimonides (in his commentary to the Mishnah Menachos 13:10) writes that this “lover” was an alleged mistress.

^[16] TB Yoma 38a and JT Shekalim 5:1 relate that the House of Garmu did not wish to reveal the secrets behind making the shew-bread and the House of Avtinas did not wish to reveal the secrets behind making the incense for the Temple. In response, artisans from Alexandria were imported to try and mimic those secret recipes, but they were unsuccessful in exactly copying what those families had been able to make. Both R. Yosef Shaul Nathansohn (1808–1875) in Divrei Shaul (to TB Yoma 38a) and R. Shalom Massas (1909–2003) in ve-Cham ha-Shemesh (Jerusalem, 2003) pp. 326–327 independently draw an explicit connection these Alexandrian artisans to Chonyo’s Temple in Alexandria, although no other authorities do so. The notion of Alexandrian artisans being unable to exactly replicate something from Jerusalem is also found in Targum to Est. 1, which relates that Achashverosh wished to create a replica of King Solomon’s famed throne, and employed Alexandrian artisans to do so—but to no avail. That story must have transpired before the establishment of Chonyo’s Temple in Alexandria because Achashverosh lived before the construction of the Second Temple. In light of this, we may suggest that Alexandrian artisans were employed in all cases simply because Greek Alexandria was a center of knowledge in its time, so the most knowledgeable craftspeople lived there.

^[17] The Jerusalem Talmud (JT Yoma 6:3) slightly differs in its retelling of this discussion. Whilst in the Babylonian Talmud, the names of the two rival sons of Shimon the Just are Chonyo and Shimi, in the Jerusalem Talmud, they are Nechunyon and Shimon. However, R. Tanchum ha-Yerushalmi (a 13^th century Egyptian Rabbi) writes that Chonyo had two names, Chonyo and Nechunyo; see B. Toledano (ed.), ha-Madrich ha-Maspik (Tel Aviv, 1961), pg. 154.

Furthermore, according to the Babylonian Talmud, R. Meir believed that Chonyo was the victim of Shimi’s deceit and ended up establishing a temple for idolatry, while R. Yehuda believed that Chonyo tricked Shimi, and ended up fleeing for fear of Kohanic retribution and established a temple for Hashem. The Jerusalem Talmud echoes the dispute in the Babylonian Talmud regarding the story of Chonyo, but differs in the conclusions. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, R. Meir understood that Chonyo’s Temple was for Hashem, while R. Yehuda understood that it was for idolatry. See also Piskei ha-Rid (to TB Menachos 109b) who copies the entire story as related by R. Meir, but concludes that Chonyo’s intent was to establish a temple for Hashem—not for idolatry—in line with the Jerusalem Talmud.

^[18] See Isa. 19:18 which calls this Egyptian place Ir ha-Heres (עיר ההרס, the city of destruction), which the Talmud (TB Menachos 110a) translates as Karta de-Beis Shemesh(קרתא דבית שמש, city of the House of the Sun, i.e. Heliopolis). Indeed, deviant versions of the Bible (such as the Septuagint and the Dead Sea Scroll 1QIsa3) insert this tradition into the text and read Ir ha-Cheres (עיר החרס, the city of the sun), instead of Ir ha-Heres.

^[19] As we saw above, the Talmud locates Chonyo’s temple at Alexandria, which is quite distant from Heliopolis. We can reconcile this discrepancy between the Talmud and Josephus by noting that the term “Alexandria of Egypt” used by the Talmud does not necessarily refer just to the Egyptian city of Alexandria, but to the entirety of Egypt; see R. Ulmer, Egyptian Cultural Icons in Midrash (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), pg. 210 and A. Kasher, The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt: The Struggle for Equal Rights (Tubingen: Mohr, 1985), pg. 347.

13. Last, “Onias IV and the ἀδέσποτος ἱερός: Placing Antiquities 13.62–72 into the Context of Ptolemaic Land Tenure,” Journal for the Study of Judaism vol. 41 (2010), pgs. 494–516 makes the case that Ptolemy originally granted Chonyo land in Alexandria for the construction of the temple, but Chonyo later appropriated other, ownerless lands near Heliopolis upon which he built his temple.

^[20] Josephus concludes with a note that Chonyo’s temple lasted 343 years, although some argue that this figure is exaggerated by close to a century; see S. G. Rosenberg, “Onias, Temple of.,” Encyclopedia Judaica 2^nd ed. vol. 15 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), pg. 432. R. Yisroel Lipschitz writes in Tiferes Yisroel (Menachos 13:10, Yachin§57) that Chonyo’s temple lasted close to 250 years.

^[21] Ibn Yachya in Shalsheles ha-Kabbalah (Jerusalem, 1962), pg. 49 writes that after Chonyo built his temple in Egypt, he later built another temple at Mount Gerizim with the help of the Samaritans. An observation of noted Bible scholar Emanuel Tov accentuates the affinity between these two renegade Jewish cults (i.e. the Alexandrian/Egyptian sect and the Samaritans). Tov categorizes witnesses of textual variations in the Torah by essentially dividing them into two blocks: The Masoretic Text (which Tov admits was the original) and the Septuagint/Samaritan block (which was derived from the MT, but splinters off into other directions). By using this mode of classification, Tov recognizes a certain shared affinity, or perhaps even correspondence, between these non-mainstream Jewish sects which existed in the Second Temple period. See E. Tov, “The Development of the Text of the Torah in Two Major Text Blocks,” Textus vol. 26 (2016), pgs. 1–27.

^[22] The War of the Jews (Book I, Chapter 1 and Book VII, Chapter 10) and Antiquities of the Jews (Book XII, Chapter 9 and Book XIII, Chapter 3).

^[23] In his commentary to the Mishnah Menachos 13:10.

^[24] To TB Menachos 109b.

^[25] Cited in TB Zevachim 45a.

^[26] Tzon Kodashim to TB Menachos 109b.

^[27] This explanation is also proposed by Sfas Emes (to TB Menachos 109b).

^[28] The Mishnah (Shekalim 1:5) rules that the Temple can only accept from non-Jews votive sacrifices, but not what are otherwise considered obligatory offerings.

^[29] See Mikdash David (Kodshim §27:9), written by R. David Rappaport (1890–1941), Even ha-Azel (Laws of Maaseh ha-Korbanos 19:7), by R. Isser Zalman Meltzer (1870–1953), and Sefer ha-Mitzvos le-Rasag vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1914), pg. 233b, by R. Yerucham Fishel Perlow (1846–1934).

^[30] See TB Megilla 10a.

^[31] Yaaros Dvash (vol. 1, drush #9).

^[32] Zivchei Efrayim Al Meseches Zevachim (Piotrków, 1922), pgs. 5–7.

^[33] For a fuller discussion of this Talmudic assertion, see R.C. Klein, God versus Gods: Judaism in the Age of Idolatry (Mosaica Press, 2018), pp. 244–276.