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‘Maskil’ Does NOT Equal ‘Rasha’!

What’s a ‘maskil’?

In the comments to this post I was asked (pressed?) “How do you define a maskil?” given that the meaning of the term is somewhat elusive, or rather what made (or makes) someone a maskil appears to be elusive. At the time I responded “It depends on time and place. The same definitions will not apply in late 18th century Berlin as in early 19th century Galicia or in mid 19th century Russia, although some common ground will be found between all of them. I cannot offer a concise definition, but I do have thoughts about it and I will happy to dedicate a future post to those thoughts.” This is that post.

Now, I am aware that historians of the haskalah (eg, Klausner, Zinberg, Feiner, Pelli) proposed definitions or modifications. But I am not going to touch on their views. I am also not going to subdivide by place or time. Rather, I will try to provide the common-ground criteria which I think are what a maskil should be defined by to correctly get at the term. So broadly speaking, there will be a list at the end of this post that can apply equally to late 18th century Berlin, mid-1820s Lemberg and late 1890s Odessa.

Awhile ago Gil had a post called Reflections on Who is a Maskil. His definition became so broad that somehow it allowed room for R. Hershel Schachter and R. Elchonon Wasserman to be maskilim. Obviously, I cannot accept that except as a fun exercise in arguing the absurd. Clearly being a maskil was something other than “a Jew who manifests an interest in Jewish history or Hebrew.”

Getting back to the thread which sparked this post, why isn’t the answer simple and why would it require a post at all? I think it’s because there are two kinds of people who want to know what a maskil is (sometimes both types are found in the same person). Someone who wants to know out of pure historical interest. It is obviously a fact that there was something called Haskalah and it was espoused by people called maskilim. What made them maskilim? Was it a time and place bound term? Then there are people who have inherited what we may as well call the traditional or Orthodox attitude toward Haskalah and maskilim, namely that it was a destructive and seductive force among European Jewry, and it spelled destruction of much of the character of traditional society, and to be fair, present sympathizers of Haskalah who do not have only a detached historical interests, perhaps those historians included.

Now, countless traditional stories and anecdotes, new and old, have to do with maskilim, whether it’s Rabbi Mordechai Gifter trying to foil the speech of a famous maskil (here) or Malbim giving a sharp reply to an arrogant question from a maskil (here), or the Neziv explaining his success in acquiring Hebrew language and grammar (here), or Elizer Ben Yehuda being bested in Hebrew proficiency by a ga’on (here) or the Vilna Gaon ordering lashes be applied to a maskil, perhaps the elusive or even fictional Abba Glusk [Salomon Maimon?] (here, and also see here). There are hundreds and hundreds of these stories. It is obvious from them that Haskalah is bad and the maskilim are the villains and seducers and on the wrong track, not to mention delusional, at best, about being enlightened.

Just search the online archive of part of the Israeli Yated Ne’eman’s English version for the word “enlightenment.” There are many such results, including the story that the famous maskil Adam ha-kohen tried to seduce the Chafetz Chaim in his youth toward Haskalah (here).

On the other hand, there are people who are identified as maskilim who appear not as villains but to have been semi-colleagues and friends of traditionalists, and at times they are even quoted as authorities in this or that matter. These do not usually appear in “stories,” because what’s the story in the Neziv being close with Shmuel Yosef Fuenn or R. Dovid Zvi Hoffmann writing about Shadal (Melamed Le-hoilII YD 16) that ידוע שהחכם הנ”ל היה מדקדק מאד במלותיו ועדותו עדות ברורה just after he quotes him concerning a tradition for the kashrut of pheasant? A better example than these is the case of Matisyahu Strashun, who was one of the most prominent maskilim of Vilna (1817-1885), and who I will return to in a moment.

Because of this latter phenomenon, or at least I think it’s because of it, when such figures come up the approach seems to be to disagree with the contention that they were really maskilim at all. This is what I encountered about Heidenheim. How could the author of a venerable commentary on Rashi, an excellent guide to the trope, the highly qualified printer of important works and authoritative prayer books, a man held in high regard by the Chasam Sofer be a maskil? The answer then for some would be that in light of the positive facts presented, he really was not a maskil at all, and it would be wrong to say he was.

That he was held in high regard cannot be questioned, I think. Moreover, although the Chasam Sofer refers to him as ר” , מו”ה and even once as הג”מ “ר, he usually refers to him by some variant of the title חכם, which while hardly insulting, especially the particular ways he uses it for Heidenheim, at that point in time already was the conventional way of refering to a maskilic scholar. This is suggestive both that the Chasam Sofer held him in good regard, but also knew very well what sort of scholar and man he was.

(In an article in Hakirah 4 called Setting the Record Straight: Was the Chasam Sofer Inconsistent? by Rabbi Nosson Dovid Rabinowich the question of Heidenheim is touched upon. Rabinowich notes that Heidenheim is not only said to be a maskil, but even took a Reform-friendly stance in a notorious instance. Unfortunately, Rabinowich only touches on the question, but doesn’t really probe Heidenheim further. Instead, he proceeds to deny strongly that another particular rabbi could be rightfully called a maskil.)

“Oh come, on. Heidenheim wasn’t really a maskil,” seems to be the attitude, and the reason? Because we don’t have a laundry list of negative things to say about him. I encountered this much more strongly on this thread, regarding Mendel Lefin. When I noted that he was a maskil, someone responded that him being titled that on the title-leaf of one of his books doesn’t mean he was a maskil, because the term was being used in its classical sense (see below). The problem with this analysis is that Mendel Lefin really was . . . a maskil! But he and Heidenheim are just illustrative of the fact that unless we’re playing with definitions “maskil” doesn’t mean “rasha who worked nefarious schemes in Europe from about 1775 to 1925,” although some or even many of the maskilim certainly might have been that. Maskil means espouser or participant in Haskalah. Obviously then I also contend that Haskalah doesn’t mean “Godless plot to secularize and introduce impurity into traditional Jewish society between 1775 and 1925,” although perhaps some manifestations of Haskalah were that.

Continue reading…

From On The Main Line, here.

WHO ELSE Agreed With the Satmar Rebbe About the Falsity of Most Chassidic Tales?

Baal Shem Tov Tales – Must They Be Believed?

Thursday, August 1, 2019

Note: This is not a question for Misnagdim. Of course, for them, the answer is no. The question is for Chasidim.

 

Recently an interesting talk was given by Rabbi Daniel Glatstein, a young and talented Rabbi in the NYC area, on the topic “The Adventures of the Ba’al Shem Tov & Must You Believe Them”.

He went through a spectrum of opinion on the matter, ranging from Breslov (people must believe them totally) to the חידושי הרי”ם (first Gerrer Rebbe), who, as reported in the sefer אור פני יצחק in the name of his Rebbe, said that the stories are not true.

Interestingly, even a Breslover source mentioned by the speaker (ספר כוכבי אור) that says that people must believe all the stories in the work שבחי הבעש”ט, says about other Beshtian tales that most of them were related when the speaker was between his third and fourth cup of wine, and the listener was even further along in his משתה יין, in the עולם הדמיונות, and are overwhelmingly false.

More details available in the talk.

May we merit to avoid שקר and serve הקב”ה באמת.

From Musings of a Litvishe Yid, here.

Just Like Mitzrayim, America Is a Weak Reed

An Ally, not a Satellite

Posted on July 13, 2019 by Victor Rosenthal

Despite the fact that my daughter once had one of those T-shirts with a picture of an F-16 and the words “Don’t worry, America, Israel is behind you,” a mutual defense pact with the US is a terrible idea.

Senator Lindsey Graham, a great friend of Israel, recently proposed it, and there are rumors that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is considering it (right before our election, of course).

Don’t do it, Bibi.

With all due appreciation for my former country, which I still love and care about, increasing Israel’s dependence on the US is not in Israel’s interest.

Treaties are pieces of paper; countries act in ways that advance their perceived national interests regardless of what’s on the paper. In 1956, President Eisenhower promised (or appeared to promise) that the US would defend the right of passage through the Strait of Tiran, which was critical for Israel’s import of oil (in those days, we bought it from Iran!) But by 1967, President Johnson, embroiled in Vietnam, felt that he could not afford the risk that keeping Ike’s promise would involve the US in another conflict. When Egypt expelled UN troops and closed the straits to Israeli shipping, Israel was on her own.

In 2004, President Bush wrote a letter to PM Ariel Sharon encouraging him to continue with his plan to “disengage” (read: withdraw) from Gaza and northern Samaria. It included the statement that “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations [sic] centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” This was understood by Israeli officials, and confirmed by Elliott Abrams, a member of Bush’s National Security Council involved in the negotiations, to imply that construction in the large existing settlement blocs such as Betar Illit could continue. Sharon went ahead with the withdrawal. But in 2009, Obama’s new Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, reneged on Bush’s promise, saying “there were no informal or oral enforceable agreements” about construction in any settlements. “These settlements must stop,” said Obama.

So much for Bush’s letter – and so much for American credibility.

Even if there were no worries about whether a future administration would live up to commitments made by a prior one, there is the question of how fast the US could come to Israel’s aid. Israel is a tiny country, with little strategic depth. Our response to an attack must be as close to immediate as possible, or it could be too late – as was almost the case in 1973. And although our politicians would deny it, the existence of a treaty would lead to complacency and the erosion of our own deterrent power. We not only ought to defend ourselves, we must.

One of the false accusations made against Israel by its opponents in the US is that “American boys have died for Israel,” in Lebanon or Iraq. A mutual defense treaty would be read as a commitment for Americans to become casualties in service of Israel, something that Israel doesn’t need or want.

I’ve argued that we would be best served by phasing out American military aid almost entirely, for multiple reasons. Israel can afford it: her state budget in 2019 is $116 billion, of which $17.5 billion goes for defense. The 10-year Memorandum of Understanding on aid negotiated with the Obama Administration calls for it to be spent entirely in the US. This weakens our own military industry. Even boots, which used to be made in Israel, are imported from America. And if we had a thriving military industry, sales of weapons to other countries might offset some of the loss in American aid.

Aid also distorts our purchase decisions. If the Americans are offering something for “free,” why build our own or buy something else that might be better?

Further, the existing aid arrangement gives the US too much leverage over Israeli policy. Perhaps we are happy with the Trump Administration’s recent actions on Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, UNRWA, and so on, but have we forgotten how the Obama Administration cut off the supply of Hellfire missiles during the 2014 war with Hamas in Gaza?

In 2012, PM Netanyahu and then Defense Minister Ehud Barak wanted to preemptively attack Iranian nuclear facilities, but were prevented from doing so by massive American pressure, including leaks about Israeli intentions. Perhaps Obama would have stopped Israel in any event, but the leverage of military aid on Israeli defense officials made it easier. I can’t prove it, but couldn’t then Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi – who strongly opposed bombing Iran – have been influenced by the folks that provided almost a quarter of his budget?

Trump will not be president forever, and some of his opponents today make Obama and Kerry look like Zionists. Shouldn’t we prepare for the worst case, rather than the best?

There are some things that we do want from the US. Continued diplomatic support in international forums, continued security and intelligence cooperation (which often greatly benefits the US), and continued sharing of defense technology, as we had with Iron Dome and other systems. We want to be treated as an ally, not as a target of diplomatic warfare and espionage, as we are by many European governments – and as we were for the Obama Administration.

We would like to be able to buy the weapons that we need with our own money and would like to see the policy of helping us maintain a qualitative edge over our enemies continue. We would appreciate non-interference in our internal affairs, and also in our economic relations with other nations. These things would cost the US nothing – indeed, they would pay dividends – and save $3.8 billion in annual military aid.

One of the lessons the Jewish people learned from the Holocaust was that we could not rely on the non-Jewish world to come to our aid in times of danger. Today as antisemitism is growing throughout the world, even in the US, and when our regional enemies are putting strategies into place that they believe will be our undoing, it is more important than ever that we stay as strong – and as independent – as possible.

From Abu Yehuda, here.

The Contrivance of Trade Members to Raise Prices: What Does the Gemara Say?

The Jewish Ethicist – Price Fixing

Feb 2, 2008, by 

Restraining trade is sanctioned only when it serves the public interest.

Q. Some merchants in my area have agreements to fix prices. Is this ethical?

A. The Talmud relates the following incident of collusion which took place in Babylonia about 1500 years ago:

Two slaughterers made a deal that if either would work on the other’s [designated] day, [the other] could tear up the hide. One of them went and worked on the other’s day, and he came and tore up the hide. They went before [the judge] Rava, and Rava made him liable to pay [for the damage]. Rav Yeimar bar Shlamia objected to Rava based on the law, “They [community members] may establish punishment on their regulations”. . . Rav Pappa said . . that’s only if there is not great person, but if there is a great person they don’t have the authority to make this condition.

The full explanation is as follows: The two slaughterers agreed to limit competition by dividing up the days of the work week between them. They also agreed on an enforcement mechanism. Since Jewish law views a profession or guild as an autonomous community with the right to make and enforce rules and regulations, Rabbi Yeimar assumed that this agreement was binding. (Evidently, the two slaughterers were the only ones in town and were thus considered like a small guild.) But Rav Pappa pointed out wherever there is a recognized authority, any such agreements are subject to the approval of this “great person” — in this case, Rava.

Jewish law doesn’t have a blanket prohibition against fixing prices and wages; skilled artisans are allowed to make regulations intended to advance their field and this may include prices. However, these regulations are subject to mandatory oversight to ensure they are consistent with the public interest; otherwise, they are null and void. Note that Rava didn’t merely order the two to cease their agreement; he ruled that it was void and that the enforcement mechanism was invalid and considered a tort. Likewise, Rav Pappa doesn’t say that Rava has the authority to nullify the condition; he states that there is no authority to make the condition in the first place given the presence of someone capable of exercising oversight.

Nowadays this oversight function is fulfilled by antitrust commissions. Price fixing among retailers is among the kinds of restraint of trade forbidden by antitrust regulations and enforced by the law. So such agreements would violate the condition requiring prior approval of a duly authorized overseer. In the hypothetical case of an autonomous Jewish community, they would need prior approval of the local Jewish court or Beit Din.

Another relevant consideration here is that only members of a trade are considered an autonomous community. This makes sense because we want to encourage them to work together, promote advanced standards and training, and thus develop their unique skills But it is questionable if retailers would be considered a community at all. So even in the absence of an authority I don’t believe that retailers would be empowered to enforce any kind of price-fixing agreement.

There is some solace in the fact that most price-fixing agreements of this nature fall apart eventually, as the temptation to defect becomes great. But the customer certainly loses in the meantime, and even when the arrangement becomes rickety prices are still affected. (Some secret cartels, like that between Westinghouse and GE in the 1950s, can last successfully for years.)

Conclusion: Jewish law confirms that any price regulation among retailers should be subject to appropriate regulatory oversight to ensure that it does not oppose the public interest.

SOURCES: (1) Babylonian Talmud Bava Batra 9a

The Jewish Ethicist presents some general principles of Jewish law. For specific questions and direct application, please consult a qualified Rabbi.

From Aish.com, here.