Why the Economic Predictions in Your Jewish Newspaper Are ALWAYS Wrong

Two Simple Questions That Keynesians Prefer Not to Answer

Gary North – February 20, 2019

“Let us say that a carpenter wishes to cut fifty boards for the purpose of laying the floor of a house. He has marked his boards. He has set his saw. He begins at one end of the mark on the board. But he does not know that his seven-year old son has tampered with the saw and changed its set. The result is that every board he saws is cut slantwise and thus unusable because [the board is] too short except at the point where the saw first made its contact with the wood. As long as the set of the saw is not changed, the result will always be the same.” — Cornelius Van Til

I first read this in the summer of 1963. I spent the academic year 1963/64 studying under Dr. Van Til. I have never forgotten this analogy. Just as a sharp buzz saw cannot cut straight if it is set at a crooked angle, sharp people cannot think straight if they are set at a crooked angle. You can sharpen a crooked buzz saw ever so precisely. It will still not cut straight. The same is true of intellectual defenders of obvious nonsense. This analogy has served me well ever since.

Over the years, I have become convinced about just how well this analogy applies to Keynesians.

Keynesians have above-average IQs. Sometimes they are mathematically skilled. They graduate from institutions of higher learning with advanced degrees. Yet becoming a Keynesian intellectually incapacitates the person who has chosen this intellectual career path. He must become a defender of obvious nonsense. The more rigorously a Keynesian trains himself to defend the system, the more crooked he cuts, conceptually speaking.

KEYNES’ ONE BIG IDEA

John Maynard Keynes offered only one central idea: Government spending overcomes recessions by increasing consumption. This was an ancient error in 1936, the year that The General Theory was published. He dressed up this ancient error with incoherent jargon. His disciples then added irrelevant equations and superfluous graphs.

Keynes never bothered to deal with this crucial question: “Where does the government get the money that it spends into the economy?” This remains the crucial question that Keynesians need to answer. Yet for all of their equations, for all of their incomprehensible jargon, and for all of their rhetoric, they never face this question.

It is such a simple question. It has a simple answer. A government can obtain money from only three sources: taxation, lending, and monetary inflation. There are no other sources.

National governments run massive deficits most of the time. They certainly run massive deficits in depressions and recessions. So, they do not get all of their income from taxation. If they did, they would not run deficits. Keynesians understand that raising taxes in a recession would depress the economy. So, Keynesian policy-makers recommend that the national government borrow money. From whom? Either from the private sector or the central bank.

To believe that government borrowing increases wealth is to believe that politicians and salaried bureaucrats are wiser spenders than money-owners are — people who invest their own money. This is a universal belief among Keynesians. They trust the short-term economic judgment of people with no skin in the game. They trust people who spend other people’s money.

In short, they trust people like themselves: salaried anonymous bureaucrats who are immune from public scrutiny. They cannot be fired because of the failure of their recommendations.

I prefer to trust the free market, which is guided by competitive monetary bids of people with skin in the game. If they guess wrong, they lose money — their own money, not yours and mine.

What about you? Which system do you trust?

PRIVATE INVESTING VS. GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Here is an obvious question that free market economists should ask Keynesians directly, but they never do: “What would the lender who lends money to the government have done with his money had he not lent to the government?” It is a simple question. It has an obvious answer: he would have invested it. The lender was not going to use his money on consumer goods. He owns lots of goods. He does not need lots more goods.

Furthermore, people in a recession cut back on their consumer spending. This is true of rich people, upper-middle-class people, middle-class people, lower-middle-class people and even poor people. Rich people see investment opportunities: capital goods selling at fire-sale prices. The rest of the population gets scared. So, most people put their money in the bank. What does the bank do with the money? It does not put it in a vault, drawing no interest. It buys investment assets. It may make loans to consumers, but consumers tend to be frightened in recessions. They cut back on debt. Maybe a bank makes loans to consumers who want immediate spending, and therefore who run up their credit card debt at high rates. But, as a group, they borrow too little to make a difference for the overall economy. There are not that many of them.

The Pareto 20/80 distribution curve of wealth tells us that the vast majority of any nation’s wealth, approaching 80%, is owned by the top 20% of citizens. This was true when Vilfredo Pareto made the discovery in the 1890’s, and it remains true today.

Most productivity comes from about 20% of the population. Therefore, most of a nation’s wealth is owned by this same group. Most of a nation’s income is directed into the bank accounts of this same group. This should come as no surprise. The reason for this was explained over two centuries ago by J. B. Say in his famous law: “Production creates its own demand [assuming no government-enforced price floors].” Keynes, more than any other economist, rejected Say’s law. The General Theory is an incoherent tirade against Say’s law.

The General Theory really is incoherent. If you don’t believe me, try to read it. This is why it is rarely quoted except by critics who cannot resist quoting obvious nonsense. No one cites Keynes verbatim in order to win an argument. That is because you can’t win an argument by citing incoherent jargon and obvious nonsense.

The man who persuaded the academic world to adopt Keynesianism was not Keynes; it was Paul Samuelson. This began in 1948, when his lower-division college textbook, Economics, was first issued. It has never been out of print. Every edition from 1961 to 1976 sold about 300,000 copies. It is in its 19th edition. It has been the most successful college-level textbook in history. It made Samuelson a multimillionaire from book royalties. It was Samuelson, not Keynes, who became the pied piper of classroom economics. But he was a reverse pied piper. He did not lead the plague-infected conceptual rats out of the afflicted community. He led them in from impoverished villages across the mountains.

Here was Samuelson’s assessment of the impact of The General Theory. He wrote a laudatory essay in 1946, which was published in the arcane journal, Econometrica. He wrote clearly and forthrightly, which has never been Econometrica‘s style.

Herein lies the secret of the General Theory. It is a badly written book, poorly organized; any layman who, beguiled by the author’s previous reputation, bought the book was cheated of his five shillings. It is not well suited for classroom use. It is arrogant, bad-tempered, polemical, and not overly generous in its acknowledgments. It abounds in mares’ nests or confusions. In it the Keynesian system stands out indistinctly, as if the author were hardly aware of its existence or cognizant of its properties; and certainly he is at his worst when expounding its relations to its predecessors. Flashes of insight and intuition intersperse tedious algebra. An awkward definition suddenly gives way to an unforgettable cadenza. When finally mastered, its analysis is found to be obvious and at the same time new. In short, it is a work of genius.

It was not a work of genius. It was a work of conceptual self-deception. It was defended with verbal incoherence. It was Samuelson’s self-appointed task to try to make a silk purse out of this sow’s ear. He persuaded three generations of academic economists that they have wisely (and profitably) devoted their lives to promoting massive government debt that cannot be paid off and will not be paid off.

Ludwig von Mises correctly characterized Keynesian economics in 1948, the year of Samuelson’s textbook: the economics of stones into bread.

FOUR QUESTIONS, THEN TWO

You don’t have to have an IQ above 100 to be able to torpedo Keynesianism. You just ask these questions.

1. “Where did the money come from that the government spends into circulation?”2. If the government runs a deficit, which is what Keynesians recommend in recessions, it did not get all of its money through tax revenues. “Did the borrowed money come from private lenders or from the central bank?”

3. “If the money came from private lenders, what would the lenders have done with their money if they had not loaned it to the government?”

4. If the money did not come from private lenders, then it must have come from the central bank. “How does money created out of nothing create wealth?”

These are really two questions. (1) “What would lenders to the government have done with their money if the government had not offered the promise of guaranteed repayment?” That money would have been spent either on consumption or production. This raises a second question: (2) “Why would either of these options be worse for the economy than spending by government bureaucrats?”

To understand the fallacies of Keynes, you don’t need to understand equations, graphs, and jargon. You just need the ability to follow an argument based on this principle: there is no such thing as a free lunch. Put differently, you cannot get bread out of stones.

Keynesian economists are not skilled in the use of logic, let alone responding coherently to it. They are trained from their Economics 1 course until the day they retire from college teaching not to reason from obvious premises to economic conclusions. They get no tenure consideration for arguing coherently without equations and graphs. They are probably going to be penalized if they attempt to do this. Graduate students in economics learned this fact of academic life no later than their senior year in college. If they did not learn it, their grades would not have been sufficiently high to get them into grad school.

KEYNES’ WAR ON THRIFT

Keynes became famous for his criticism of thrift. What he criticized was thrift in the private sector. Thrift was great as far as he was concerned if the thrifty person bought government bonds, and the government then spent the money on anything. You think I exaggerate? Here is a direct quote from Keynes’ General Theory.

If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing”( p. 129).

Here is what he wrote on page 220.

In so far as millionaires find their satisfaction in building mighty mansions to contain their bodies went to live in pyramids to shelter them after death, or, repenting of their sins, erect cathedrals in and down monasteries or foreign missions, the day when abundance of capital will interfere with abundance of output may be postponed. Quote to dig holes in the ground, unquote paid for out of savings, will increase, not only employment, but the real national dividend of useful goods and services.

Notice that he did not call for millionaires to invest. He called on them to spend. He did not ask them to direct their money toward production: he directed them to spend their money as fast as possible. It is spending by millionaires on consumption, not the savings of millionaires for future consumption by others, that is the key to wealth creation in the mental universe of Keynes and his disciples.

Keynes called on governments to spend on public pyramids and burying bottles of money because he did not trust the millionaires to keep spending on mansions and their own personal pyramids. He knew they would invest in capital goods. He attacked the idea that millionaires could benefit the economy by saving and investing in the private sector. His book is dedicated to a refutation of investing during a recession. The entire Keynesian movement, which dominates academia and policy-making today, rests on this intellectual premise: “Consume, don’t invest, during recessions.”

Why would millionaires trust the government with their money? Because the government promises to guarantee the return of their money. But why should millionaires believe this promise? Because governments back up this promise with the threat of violence. Governments have the power to send tax collectors into people’s homes and stick guns in their bellies. “Hand over your money,” says the man with a badge. Governments come before millionaires and say this: “We sell promises to return your money. We can guarantee this because we have the power of taxation. Therefore, you can be certain that you will get your money back. You have our word. What’s not to trust?”

PRESENT-ORIENTATION AND CLASS POSITION

Keynes was the defender of present-orientation. He was the defender of “consumption now.” He was, in this sense, a defender of lower-class economics. Edward Banfield, a Harvard political theorist in the late 1960’s, wrote a section on lower-class and upper-class attitudes in his book, The Unheavenly City (1968). He identified lower-class thinking as present-oriented. The lower-class person thinks little about the future. Lower-class people want to consume now. They borrow at high interest rates in order to get this consumption. Upper-class individuals are the opposite. Keynesian economics is a defense of lower-class economics.

Anti-Keynesian economists in universities dare not use this kind of rhetoric against Keynes and Keynesians. They would not get tenure if they used it early in their careers. They would not be published in mainstream, tenure-generating academic journals. They would become pariahs. Fortunately, I am not part of academia. So, I can call a spade a spade. Keynesianism really is best encapsulated in the famous phrase by Keynes: “In the long run, we are all dead.” In the meantime, Keynesians give this advice to politicians: “Borrow and spend, inflate and spend, monetize government debt, and never pay it off.”

Keynesian economics is the economics of debt-addicted, lower-class spendthrifts: modern governments.

Keynesians are apostles of big government. In his concluding remarks in his 1946 article on Keynes, Samuelson wrote:

With respect to the level of total purchasing power and employment, Keynes denies that there is an invisible hand channeling the self-centered action of each individual to the social optimum. This is the sum and substance of his heresy. Again and again through his writings there is to be found the figure of speech that what is needed are certain “rules of the road” and governmental actions, which will benefit everybody, but which nobody by himself is motivated to establish or follow. Left to themselves during depression, people will try to save and only end up lowering society’s level of capital formation and saving; during an inflation, apparent self-interest leads everyone to action which only aggravates the malignant upward spiral.

The message is clear. “Left to themselves,” people cannot be trusted with their own money. That would mean resource allocation by the metaphorical invisible hand of the market’s process of voluntary exchange. Keynesians prefer to trust the economy to the palsied hands of tenured bureaucrats and the grasping hands of elected politicians, who want access to other people’s money in order to buy votes from special-interest groups.

I would rather live in an economy governed by the invisible hand of the free market than in an economy governed by the palsied hands of government bureaucrats and the grasping hands of politicians. I would rather live in an economy in which customers are in authority rather than politicians and bureaucrats. Customers spend their own money. Politicians and bureaucrats want to spend my money. I resent this. I can spend my money more wisely than politicians and bureaucrats can. Keynes did not believe this. Neither did Samuelson.

The free market economy is governed by the sanctions of profit and loss. The Keynesian economy is governed by the sanctions of badges and guns. I recommend the former: greater personal liberty and greater per capita wealth.

CONCLUSION

Keynesian economics is counter-intuitive. It was answered, line by line, by Henry Hazlitt in his coherent and devastating critique of Keynes: The Failure of the “New Economics.” It was published in 1959. It sank without a trace. Why? Because it was hostile to the prevailing climate of academic opinion. Also, it was easy to read. That is always out of fashion in academia. Fortunately, it is available today from the Ludwig von Mises Institute. You can even download it for free. It is 450 pages long. Yet even Hazlitt, for all of his penetrating insights written in the vernacular and devoid of equations and graphs, did not boil down his critique into two simple questions.

This is odd. The heart of his classic book on economics, Economics in One Lesson (1946), was this insight: the fallacy of the thing not seen. The book calls on readers to ask this question: “What would property owners have done with their money if they had not suffered violence?” This is the question that undergirds my two questions.

1. “What would lenders to the government have done with their money if the government had not offered the promise of guaranteed repayment?”2. “Why would this have been worse for the economy than spending by government bureaucrats?”

Keynesians never answer these two questions in anything resembling common language. That is because they cannot answer it this way without sounding ridiculous.

These men are the wizard of Oz. They are, collectively, the man behind the curtain.

Call me Toto.

Toto did not complete the procedure. Pulling back the curtain was step one. He should have completed the procedure by lifting his leg on the wizard. That is what humbugs deserve whenever they impose economic quackery with deception backed by government power.

In the movie, the now-unemployed wizard departed from Oz by ascending in a hot-air balloon. The junior wizards of Keynesian economics will not find their departure so easy. They hold their tenured positions in governments and universities, isolated and secure from downturns in private labor markets. But the day is coming when governments around the world are going to default on their economic promises to the voters. Keynesians will be called upon by politicians to provide justifications for this default, and also provide explanations showing why it is not really the governments’ fault. It is the free market’s fault. When they attempt to fulfill their role in public affairs as court prophets, defending massive government failure in the name of Keynes, they will be seen by the enraged public as intellectual laughingstocks and charlatans.

They have always been charlatans. They should have been laughingstocks. I recommend patience. The day of fiscal reckoning draweth nigh.

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For more articles on the quackery of Keynes and how to refute it, go here: https://www.garynorth.com/public/department135.cfm.

From Gary North, here.

Rabbi Noah Weinberg: ‘Every Jew Is a Neurotic’

Next Year in Jerusalem, Conclusion

 

A groundbreaking chronicle of spiritual search, originally published in Rolling Stone magazine, April 1977


Click here to read Part 1 and Part 2.

Click here for a pdf version of the entire article.

There began to be moments – usually early in the morning, before I forced myself to get up and face the day – when I was more inclined than not to believe that it was all true, that I was only resisting because I couldn’t stand the pain of admitting how wrong I was. What about the prophecies … and the way modern history seemed almost a conspiracy to drive the Jews back to Israel … and the Bible… Mike and I had been going over Genesis, along with the Rashi commentary, and I had had a sudden vision, like an acid flash, of a Garden, and a Presence … and my personality, my Sagittarian compulsion to aim straight at the cosmic bull’s-eye… “The blessing and curse of being a Jew,” said Reb Noach, “is that Jews are thirsty for God, for the absolute. A Jew can never have peace. Whatever he does he’ll be the best at, whether it’s being a radical or being a criminal. It’s all misplaced searching for God. Every Jew is a neurotic...”

Insanity, decadence, call it what you please, I could never be a traditional Jewish mother. But maybe I didn’t have to be.

And if I became religious, what would I do? Insanity, decadence, call it what you please, I could never be a traditional Jewish mother. But maybe I didn’t have to be. Actually only men were subject to a specific mitzvah to marry and have children. And not everyone took the Weinbergs’ hard line on procreation – according to one rabbi I’d met, a psychologist, the halacha permitted contraception when necessary to preserve a woman’s health, including her emotional health. Nor were the role divisions in the family absolute, no law actually forbade women to work outside the home, or men to share housework. Even within the bounds of Judaism I could be a feminist of sorts, crusading for reforms like equal education, perhaps contesting the biased halachic interpretations of male rabbis. And my experience would put me in a unique position to reach women like me and bring them back.

In private I could have this fantasy, even take it seriously. Which would not stop me, an hour or a minute later, from getting into a furious argument with a man. It was one thing to consider the abstract possibility that women’s role in Judaism was not inherently oppressive, another to live in a culture that made me feel oppressed. Once when Mike and I were dinner guests of another of his teachers I complained, “You know, it makes me feel like a servant when you sit there like a lump while I help serve and clean up.”

“It isn’t customary for the men to help,” Mike said, “and if I got up I’d make everybody uncomfortable, including the women.” He had a point – when in Rome and all that – but it was a point he was not exactly loath to make. The fact was that for Mike, moving from Western secular society to Orthodox Judaism had meant an increase in status and privilege; for me it meant a loss.

One night Mike and I got together with Dick Berger, one of his best friends at the yeshiva. Mike was very high on Dick, who, he said, was an unusually perceptive person with a gift for sensing someone’s emotional blocks. He had been encouraging Mike to get more connected to his feelings. I had met Dick once and he had told me a little about himself. He had been a newspaper reporter in Pittsburgh, had written an unpublished novel, had been into psychedelics and Transcendental Meditation. Later he had told Mike that he felt I had seen him only as material for my article. I didn’t think that was true, but I worried about it anyway. I hated it when people claimed to know my motives better than I did, but I always worried that they were right.

The conversation that night was pleasant enough until Dick and I got into an argument about men sharing child care. Dick suggested that 3,000 years of tradition shouldn’t be tampered with, and I started getting angry in a way I knew from experience led to no good. Then he really pushed the wrong button.

“You’re so emotional! Can’t we talk about this objectively?”

“You’re hardly being objective. It’s in your interest as a man to think what you think.”

“I’m feeling detached,” Dick insisted. “By that I mean attached to my basic essence. You’re reacting out of your conditioning in Western culture.”

“You’re reacting out of your male-supremacist prejudices, only you have 3,000 years of tradition on your side.”

“But I’m not being aggressive and hostile – you are!”

“You can afford to be ‘objective’ and ‘detached’! You’re happy with the system – I’m the one who’s being oppressed by it! Why shouldn’t I be hostile – what right do you have to demand that we have this conversation on your terms…” My sentence went hurtling off into the inarticulate reaches of un-God-like rage.

Another time, another friend of Mike’s: Harvey, a tall, dark, intense South African. “I’m not here because I want to be,” he said. “I want freedom and money and the pleasures of the body. I was happy in my non-religious life – I miss it. But once you know there’s a God…”

We started arguing about design and evolution. “Either there’s a God,” Harvey said, “or all this harmony and purpose is a coincidence.”

“Those aren’t the only possibilities…”

“And there are vast odds against coincidence. If you had a dart board that had lots of red and just a little white, where do you think your dart would hit?”

“That’s a silly analogy,” I said.

“What if you had to lay money on it?”

“I’m not going to play this game! It’s ridiculous! It’s irrelevant!”

“Answer me,” the prosecutor insisted. “Would you bet on white or red?”

“I’m not Pascal!” I yelled. “And I’m not about to change my entire life because of some abstract intellectual decision about what the odds are on there being a God!”

“The Torah isn’t only a carrot, you know. It’s a stick, as well. There’s punishment – you get cut off…”

And I’m not going to play your guilt game, either! You men are not going to cram your sexist religion down my throat!

There it was, the dirty little secret: I might be persuaded to return to Judaism – but not by a man.

* * *

V. EXODUS

You know her life was saved by rock and roll. – VELVET UNDERGROUND

Mike and I were walking in Mea Shearim talking about happiness. My revised departure date was nearly two weeks away, time for plenty of changes, but I knew that I would not, at least for the present, become an Orthodox Jew. My decision had involved no epiphany, no cathartic moment of truth; my doubts remained and perhaps always would. But to put it that way was looking at it backward. The fact was that only a compelling, inescapable moment of truth could have made me religious. Nothing less could shake my presumption in favor of a life that made me happy.

From Mike’s point of view, I was refusing to accept the truth because of a strong emotional resistance; though he too had resisted, his unhappiness with secular life had made it easier to give up. On the other hand, he kept suggesting, I might be a lot less happy than I thought.

“Dick sees you as a very unhappy person,” Mike said. “And Reb Noach thinks you’re really unhappy.”

Continue reading…

From Aish.com, here.

Why Do Hamodia and Mishpacha STILL Quote These Fools?!

Why Are These Professional War Peddlers Still Around?

Pundits like Max Boot and Bill Kristol got everything after 9/11 wrong but are still considered “experts.”

One thing that every late-stage ruling class has in common is a high tolerance for mediocrity. Standards decline, the edges fray, but nobody in charge seems to notice. They’re happy in their sinecures and getting richer. In a culture like this, there’s no penalty for being wrong. The talentless prosper, rising inexorably toward positions of greater power, and breaking things along the way. It happened to the Ottomans. Max Boot is living proof that it’s happening in America.

Boot is a professional foreign policy expert, a job category that doesn’t exist outside of a select number of cities. Boot has degrees from Berkeley and Yale, and is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has written a number of books and countless newspaper columns on foreign affairs and military history. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, an influential British think tank, describes Boot as one of the “world’s leading authorities on armed conflict.”

None of this, it turns out, means anything. The professional requirements for being one ofthe world’s Leading Authorities on Armed Conflict do not include relevant experience with armed conflict. Leading authorities on the subject don’t need a track record of wise assessments or accurate predictions. All that’s required are the circular recommendations of fellow credential holders. If other Leading Authorities on Armed Conflict induct you into their ranks, you’re in. That’s good news for Max Boot.

Boot first became famous in the weeks after 9/11 for outlining a response that the Bush administration seemed to read like a script, virtually word for word. While others were debating whether Kandahar or Kabul ought to get the first round of American bombs, Boot was thinking big. In October 2001, he published a piece in The Weekly Standard titled “The Case for American Empire.”

“The September 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition,” Boot wrote. “The solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation.” In order to prevent more terror attacks in American cities, Boot called for a series of U.S.-led revolutions around the world, beginning in Afghanistan and moving swiftly to Iraq.

“Once we have deposed Saddam, we can impose an American-led, international regency in Baghdad, to go along with the one in Kabul,” Boot wrote. “To turn Iraq into a beacon of hope for the oppressed peoples of the Middle East: Now that would be a historic war aim. Is this an ambitious agenda? Without a doubt. Does America have the resources to carry it out? Also without a doubt.”

In retrospect, Boot’s words are painful to read, like love letters from a marriage that ended in divorce. Iraq remains a smoldering mess. The Afghan war is still in progress close to 20 years in. For perspective, Napoleon Bonaparte seized control of France, crowned himself emperor, defeated four European coalitions against him, invaded Russia, lost, was defeated and exiled, returned, and was defeated and exiled a second time, all in less time than the United States has spent trying to turn Afghanistan into a stable country.

Things haven’t gone as planned. What’s remarkable is that despite all the failure and waste and deflated expectations, defeats that have stirred self-doubt in the heartiest of men, Boot has remained utterly convinced of the virtue of his original predictions. Certainty is a prerequisite for Leading Authorities on Armed Conflict.

In the spring of 2003, with the war in Iraq under way, Boot began to consider new countries to invade. He quickly identified Syria and Iran as plausible targets, the latter because it was “less than two years” from building a nuclear bomb. North Korea made Boot’s list as well. Then Boot became more ambitious. Saudi Arabia could use a democracy, he decided.

“If the U.S. armed forces made such short work of a hardened goon like Saddam Hussein, imagine what they could do to the soft and sybaritic Saudi royal family,” Boot wrote.

Five years later, in a piece for The Wall Street Journal, Boot advocated for the military occupation of Pakistan and Somalia. The only potential problem, he predicted, was unreasonable public opposition to new wars.

“Ragtag guerrillas have proven dismayingly successful in driving out or neutering international peacekeeping forces,” he wrote. “Think of American and French troops blown up in Beirut in 1983, or the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in Somalia in 1993. Too often, when outside states do agree to send troops, they are so fearful of casualties that they impose rules of engagement that preclude meaningful action.”

In other words, the tragedy of foreign wars isn’t that Americans die, but that too few Americans are willing to die. To solve this problem, Boot recommended recruiting foreign mercenaries. “The military would do well today to open its ranks not only to legal immigrants but also to illegal ones,” he wrote in the Los Angeles Times. When foreigners get killed fighting for America, he noted, there’s less political backlash at home.

American forces, documented or not, never occupied Pakistan, but by 2011 Boot had another war in mind. “Qaddafi Must Go,” Boot declared in The Weekly Standard. In Boot’s telling, the Libyan dictator had become a threat to the American homeland. “The only way this crisis will end—the only way we and our allies can achieve our objectives in Libya—is to remove Qaddafi from power. Containment won’t suffice.”

In the end, Gaddafi was removed from power, with ugly and long-lasting consequences. Boot was on to the next invasion. By late 2012, he was once again promoting attacks on Syria and Iran, as he had nine years before. In a piece for The New York Times, Boot laid out “Five Reasons to Intervene in Syria Now.”

Overthrowing the Assad regime, Boot predicted, would “diminish Iran’s influence” in the region, influence that had grown dramatically since the Bush administration took Boot’s advice and overthrew Saddam Hussein, Iran’s most powerful counterbalance. To doubters concerned about a complex new war, Boot promised the Syria intervention could be conducted “with little risk.”

Days later, Boot wrote a separate piece for Commentary magazine calling for American bombing of Iran. It was a busy week, even by the standards of a Leading Authority on Armed Conflict. Boot conceded that “it remains a matter of speculation what Iran would do in the wake of such strikes.” He didn’t seem worried.

Listed in one place, Boot’s many calls for U.S.-led war around the world come off as a parody of mindless warlike noises, something you might write if you got mad at a country while drunk. (“I’ll invade you!!!”) Republicans in Washington didn’t find any of it amusing. They were impressed. Boot became a top foreign policy adviser to John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2008, to Mitt Romney in 2012, and to Marco Rubio in 2016.

Everything changed when Trump won the Republican nomination. Trump had never heard of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He had no idea Max Boot was a Leading Authority on Armed Conflict. Trump was running against more armed conflicts. He had no interest in invading Pakistan. Boot hated him.

As Trump found himself accused of improper ties to Vladimir Putin, Boot agitated for more aggressive confrontation with Russia. Boot demanded larger weapons shipments to Ukraine. He called for effectively expelling Russia from the global financial system, a move that might be construed as an act of war against a nuclear-armed power. The stakes were high, but with signature aplomb Boot assured readers it was “hard to imagine” the Russian government would react badly to the provocation. Those who disagreed Boot dismissed as “cheerleaders” for Putin and the mullahs in Iran.

Boot’s stock in the Washington foreign policy establishment rose. In 2018, he was hired by The Washington Post as a columnist. The paper’s announcement cited Boot’s “expertise on armed conflict.”

It is possible to isolate the precise moment that Trump permanently alienated the Republican establishment in Washington: February 13, 2016. There was a GOP primary debate that night in Greenville, South Carolina, so every Republican in Washington was watching. Seemingly out of nowhere, Trump articulated something that no party leader had ever said out loud. “We should never have been in Iraq,” Trump announced, his voice rising. “We have destabilized the Middle East.”

Many in the crowd booed, but Trump kept going: “They lied. They said there were weapons of mass destruction. There were none. And they knew there were none.”

Pandemonium seemed to erupt in the hall, and on television. Shocked political analysts declared that the Trump presidential effort had just euthanized itself. Republican voters, they said with certainty, would never accept attacks on policies their party had espoused and carried out.

Republican voters had a different reaction. They understood that adults sometimes change their minds based on evidence. They themselves had come to understand that the Iraq war was a mistake. They appreciated hearing something verboten but true.

Rival Republicans denounced Trump as an apostate. Voters considered him brave.

Trump won the South Carolina primary, and shortly after that, the Republican nomination.

Republicans in Washington never recovered. When Trump attacked the Iraq War and questioned the integrity of the people who planned and promoted it, he was attacking them. They hated him for that.

Some of them became so angry, it distorted their judgment and character.

♦♦♦

Bill Kristol is probably the most influential Republican strategist of the post-Reagan era. Born in 1954, Kristol was the second child of the writer Irving Kristol, one of the founders of neoconservatism.

The neoconservatism of Irving Kristol and his friends was jarring to the ossified liberal establishment of the time, but in retrospect it was basically a centrist philosophy: pragmatic, tolerant of a limited welfare state, not rigidly ideological. By the time Bill Kristol got done with it 40 years later, neoconservatism was something else entirely.

Almost from the moment Operation Desert Storm concluded in 1991, Kristol began pushing for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In 1997, The Weekly Standard ran a cover story titled “Saddam Must Go.” If the United States didn’t launch a ground invasion of Iraq, the lead editorial warned, the world should “get ready for the day when Saddam has biological and chemical weapons at the tips of missiles aimed at Israel and at American forces in the Gulf.”

After the September 11 attacks, Kristol found a new opening to start a war with Iraq. In November 2001, he and Robert Kagan wrote a piece in The Weekly Standard alleging that Saddam Hussein hosted a training camp for Al Qaeda fighters where terrorists had trained to hijack planes. They suggested that Mohammad Atta, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was actively collaborating with Saddam’s intelligence services. On the basis of no evidence, they accused Iraq of fomenting the anthrax attacks on American politicians and news outlets.

Under ordinary circumstances, Bill Kristol would be famous for being wrong. Kristol still goes on television regularly, but it’s not to apologize for the many demonstrably untrue things he’s said about the Middle East, or even to talk about foreign policy. Instead, Kristol goes on TV to attack Donald Trump.

Trump’s election seemed to undo Bill Kristol entirely. He lost his job at The Weekly Standard after more than 20 years, forced out by owners who were panicked about declining readership. He seemed to spend most of his time on Twitter ranting about Trump.

Before long he was ranting about the people who elected Trump. At an American Enterprise Institute panel event in February 2017, Kristol made the case for why immigrants are more impressive than native-born Americans. “Basically if you are in free society, a capitalist society, after two, three, four generations of hard work, everyone becomes kind of decadent, lazy, spoiled, whatever.” Most Americans, Kristol said, “grew up as spoiled kids and so forth.”

In February 2018, Kristol tweeted that he would “take in a heartbeat a group of newly naturalized American citizens over the spoiled native-born know-nothings” who supported Trump.

By the spring of 2018, Kristol was considering a run for president himself. He was still making the case for the invasion of Iraq, as well as pushing for a new war, this time in Syria, and maybe in Lebanon and Iran, too. Like most people in Washington, he’d learned nothing at all.

Tucker Carlson is the host of Fox News’s Tucker Carlson Tonight and author of Ship of Fools: How A Selfish Ruling Class Is Bringing America to the Brink of Revolution (Simon & Schuster). This excerpt is taken from that book.

Da’as Torah: Trust, But Verify

Da’as Torah or Advice?

Many religious Jews today ask rabbis life questions–whom to marry, where to live, what career path to follow–and take their answers as authoritative rulings. In one sense, the modern world is based on autonomy, independent choice. Submission to a rabbi’s authority on these major decisions is a wholesale rejection of the modern enterprise. If this is what the Torah requires then so be it. However, according to the Vilna Gaon’s tradition, this is not the Torah approach for life choices.1

Every person has a different path in life but finding one’s direction is often difficult. The Vilna Gaon (Commentary to Mishlei 16:4) explains that in ancient times, Jews would ask prophets for guidance. With his access to divine insight, the prophet would show each person where the nature of his soul and body direct him. But prophecy is long gone.

In theory, we should each be able to utilize our own access to ruach ha-kodesh, the divine spirit, to discover our own paths but we face too many obstacles to successfully achieve that. Instead, the Vilna Gaon says, we must observe the commandments. God wants our Torah study and observance. In return, He will show us our paths in life.

Note the lack of a Torah scholar in this discussion. Apparently, the Vilna Gaon thought that Torah scholars play no unique role in each individual’s search. His student, R. Chaim Volozhiner, saw this subject slightly differently.

No human has the power to see into our souls or to predict the future

Hillel says (Avos 2:7): “The more counsel, the more understanding.” In his commentary on this (Ruach Chaim, ad loc.), R. Chaim Volozhiner quotes a common saying he endorses that you should seek advice but then do what you think is best (she’al eitzah va-aseh ki-rtzonkha). Why, he asks, bother asking for advice? He answers that other people do not grasp all the fine details of the issue. If you ask many people, each will see some of the details. After listening to all the different perspectives, the individual will have the best idea of how to deal with the situation.The Vilna Gaon recommends waiting for divine inspiration based on Torah study and observance. In contrast, R. Chaim Volozhiner advises consultation with multiple people. Neither suggest going to a single Torah scholar and following his advice.

The Netziv, a grandson-in-law of and successor to R. Chaim Volozhiner, takes a third approach. In his Torah commentary (Ha’amek Davar, Deut. 29:8), the Netziv states that one finds the right counsel in the merit of Torah study. In this, he follows the Vilna Gaon. In his commentary to Koheles (Eccl. 8:1), the Netziv points out that a Torah scholar’s mood will affect his advice. Additionally, not everyone can always predict the future. Therefore, a questioner has to use his own judgment to decide whether to follow any advice he receives. According to the Netziv, you can ask a Torah scholar but then decide whether to follow his advice.

These three approaches are hardly contradictory. They all reflect the inherent human difficulty of seeing the future and even the innermost present. No human has the power to see into our souls or to predict the future. At best, they can make educated guesses. Some people will try to independently decide their own paths. Others will ask many for advice. And still others will seek guidance from a Torah scholar. No one will argue that a wise rabbi is somehow excluded as a source of wisdom for seekers simply because he is a rabbi. However, because no one today can access the divine knowledge of inner truths, each individual has to use his own best judgment in deciding his life path. Advice is just that, an input from a (hopefully) wise person to be applied by the individual to his circumstances.

I never had the merit of speaking with R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik because he was ill when I entered Yeshiva. However, in my many conversations with some of his students, I noted that they have (almost) never told me what to do.2 They consistently discuss the issues from various angles, providing insight and not even advice. Even when the conclusion is obvious, they always leave it to me to reach the conclusion, to make the appropriate decision. I believe that this is the tradition of the Vilna Gaon, which is uniquely appropriate to the modern world where autonomy is so important.3


  1. We are only discussing advice for life choices. Halakhah and fundamental beliefs are a separate discussion.
  2. With two exceptions: 1) One rabbi told me not to send my children to schools with religious outlooks that are very different from my own, to avoid forcing my children to choose between their teachers and their parents. 2) The same rabbi also told me to stay away from someone who seemed dishonest. He did not merely discuss the issues but specifically said to do or not to do something. They stand out for me as understandable exceptions.
  3. All these sources are found in R. Moshe Zuriel, Otzeros Ha-Netziv, sv. eitzah.

From Torah Musings, here.