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The recent rioting and virtual civil war in Northern Ireland points out, both for libertarians and for the world at large, the vital importance of pushing for and attaining the goal of national liberation for all oppressed people. Aside from being a necessary condition to the achievement of justice, national liberation is the only solution to the great world problems of territorial disputes and oppressive national rule. Yet, all too many anarchists and libertarians mistakenly scorn the idea of national liberation and independence as simply setting up more nation–states; they tragically do not realize that, taking this stand, they become in the concrete, objective supporters of the bloated, imperialistic nation–states of today.

Sometimes this mistake has had tragic consequences. Thus, it is clear from Paul Avrich’s fascinating and definitive book1  that the anarchists in Russia had at least a fighting chance to take control of the October Revolution rather than the Bolsheviks, but that they lost out for two major reasons: (1) their sectarian view that any kind of definite organization of their own movement violated anarchist principles; and (2) their opposition to the national independence movements for the Ukraine and White Russia on the ground that this would simply be setting up other states. In this way, they became the objective defenders of Great Russian imperialism, and this led them to the disastrous course of opposing Lenin’s statesmanlike “appeasement peace” of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, where Lenin, for the sake of ending the war with Germany, surrendered Ukrainian and White Russian territory from the Greater Russian imperium. Disastrously, both for their own principles and for their standing in the eyes of the war-weary Russian people, the Russian anarchists called for continuing the war against “German imperialism,” thereby somehow identifying with anarchy, the centuries-old land grabs of Russian imperialism.

Let us first examine the whole question of national liberation from the point of view of libertarian principle. Suppose that there are two hypothetical countries, “Ruritania” and “Walldavia.” Ruritania invades Walldavia and seizes the northern part of the country. This situation continues over decades or even centuries. But the underlying condition remains: the Ruritanian State has invaded and continues to occupy and exploit, very often trying to eradicate the language and culture of the North Walldavian subject people. There now arises, both in northern and southern Walldavia, a “North Walldavian Liberation Movement.” Where should we stand on the matter?

It seems clear to me that Libertarians are bound to give this liberation movement their ardent support. For their object, while it might not be to achieve an ultimate stateless society, is to liberate the oppressed North Walldavians from their Ruritanian State rulers. The fact that we may not agree with the Walldavian rebels on all philosophical or political points is irrelevant. The whole point of their existence—to free the Northern Walldavians from their imperial oppressors—deserves our wholehearted support.

Thus is solved the dilemma of how Libertarians and anarchists should react toward the whole phenomenon of “nationalism.” Nationalism is not a unitary, monolithic phenomenon. If it is aggressive, we should oppose it; if liberatory, we should favor it. Thus, in the Ruritanian–Walldavian case, those Ruritanians who defend the aggression or occupation on the grounds of “Greater Ruritania” or “Ruritanian national honor” or whatever, are being aggressive nationalists or “imperialists.” Those of either country who favor North Walldavian liberation from the imperial Ruritanian yoke are being liberators and, therefore, deserve our support.

One of the great swindles behind the idea of “collective security against aggression,” as spread by the “internationalist” interventionists of the 1920s and ever since, is that this requires us to regard as sacred all of the national boundaries which have been often imposed by aggression in the first place. Such a concept requires us to put our stamp of approval upon the countries and territories created by previous imperial aggression.

Let us now apply our analysis to the problem of Northern Ireland. The Northern Irish rulers, the Protestants, insist on their present borders and institutions; the Southern Irish, or Catholics, demand a unitary state in Ireland. Of the two, the Southern Irish have the better case, for all of the Protestants were “planted” centuries ago into Ireland by English imperialism, at the expense of murdering the Catholic Irish and robbing their lands. But unless documentation exists to enable restoration of the land and property to the heirs of the victims—and it is highly dubious that such exists—the proper libertarian solution has been advanced by neither side and, as far as we can tell, by no one in the public press. For the present partition line does not, as most people believe, divide the Catholic South from the Protestant North. The partition, as imposed by Britain after World War I and accepted by the craven Irish rebel leadership, arbitrarily handed a great deal of Catholic territory to the North. Specifically, over half of the territory of Northern Ireland has a majority of Catholics and should revert immediately to the South: this includes Western Derry (including Derry City), all of Tyrone and Fermanagh, southern Armagh and southern Down. Essentially, this would leave as Northern Ireland only the city of Belfast and the rural areas directly to the north.

While this solution would leave the Catholics of Belfast oppressed by outrageous Protestant discrimination and exploitation, at least the problem of the substantial Catholic minority in Northern Ireland—the majority in the areas enumerated above—would be solved, and the whole question of Northern Ireland would be reduced to tolerable dimensions. In this way, the libertarian solution—of applying national self-determination and removing imperial oppression—would at the same time bring about justice and solve the immediate utilitarian question.

1. Paul Avrich, The Russian Anarchists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

From LewRockwell.com, here.

There are a couple of important economic lessons that the American people should learn. I’m going to title one “the seen and unseen” and the other “narrow well-defined large benefits versus widely dispersed small costs.” These lessons are applicable to a wide range of government behavior, but let’s look at just two examples.

Last week, President Donald Trump enacted high tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum. Why in the world would the U.S. steel and aluminum industries press the president to levy heavy tariffs? The answer is simple. Reducing the amounts of steel and aluminum that hit our shores enables American producers to charge higher prices. Thus, U.S. steel and aluminum producers will earn higher profits, hire more workers and pay them higher wages. They are the visible beneficiaries of Trump’s tariffs.

But when the government creates a benefit for one American, it is a virtual guarantee that it will come at the expense of another American — an unseen victim. The victims of steel and aluminum tariffs are the companies that use steel and aluminum. Faced with higher input costs, they become less competitive on the world market. For example, companies such as John Deere may respond to higher steel prices by purchasing their parts in the international market rather than in the U.S. To become more competitive in the world market, some firms may move their production facilities to foreign countries that do not have tariffs on foreign steel and aluminum. Studies by both the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition show that steel-using industries — such as the U.S. auto industry, its suppliers and manufacturers of heavy construction equipment — were harmed by tariffs on steel enacted by George W. Bush.

Politicians love having seen beneficiaries and unseen victims. The reason is quite simple. In the cases of the steel and aluminum industries, company executives will know whom to give political campaign contributions. Workers in those industries will know for whom to cast their votes. The people in the steel- and aluminum-using industries may not know whom to blame for declining profits, lack of competitiveness and job loss. There’s no better scenario for politicians. It’s heads politicians win and tails somebody else loses.

Then there’s the phenomenon of narrow well-defined large benefits versus widely dispersed small costs. A good example can be found in the sugar industry. Sugar producers lobby Congress to place restrictions on the importation of foreign sugar through tariffs and quotas. Those import restrictions force Americans to pay up to three times the world price for sugar. A report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office estimated that Americans pay an extra $2 billion a year because of sugar tariffs and quotas. Plus, taxpayers will be forced to pay more than $2 billion over the next 10 years to buy and store excess sugar produced because of higher prices. Another way to look at the cost side is that tens of millions of American families are forced to pay a little bit more, maybe $20, for the sugar we use every year.

You might wonder how this consumer rip-off sustains itself. After all, the people in the sugar industry are only a tiny percentage of the U.S. population. Here’s how it works. It pays for workers and owners in the sugar industry to come up with millions of dollars to lobby congressmen to impose tariffs and quotas on foreign sugar. It means higher profits and higher wages. Also, it’s easy to organize the relatively small number of people in the sugar industry. The costs are borne by tens of millions of Americans forced to pay more for the sugar they use. Even if the people knew what the politicians are doing, it wouldn’t be worth the cost of trying to unseat a legislator whose vote cost them $20 a year. Politicians know that they won’t bear a cost from sugar consumers. But they would pay a political cost from the sugar industry if they didn’t vote for tariffs. So they put it to consumers — but what else is new?

From Lewrockwell.com, here.

My last article gave a cursory overview of some of my thoughts on organ scarcity. It didn’t, however, address specifically how a solution to that problem could work or why any of a plethora of proposed organ allocation schemes would function most effectively. I believe there is one way to best deal with the high demand for organs and relatively short supply. And it stands up beautifully to the barrage of criticisms thrown at it.

I am convinced that the best way to approach organ allocation is simply to allow a free market in human organs. I want to convince you, too.

I must tell you that proponents of an organ market have been making their case for years; some of these basic arguments are not my own but part of a discourse on the subject. If you are interested in reading about practical considerations and ethics in organs markets, I have listed some intriguing resources at the end of this article.

Now, for the objections.

• Some organs — such as kidneys — can be removed and sold while the donor is still alive, but who would want to sell organs which kill the donor when removed?

This is usually the first objection raised after anyone broaches the subject of making organs into commodities. You cannot benefit from the sale of your organs if you are not alive. This problem is best addressed by allowing a futures market in organs. In a futures market, individuals could sell the right to harvest their organs after they die. Benefits would become part of the individual’s estate, and would be paid to their next of kin. Alternatively, sellers could be paid a small amount of money during their lifetime for the rights to harvest their organs; the sum paid out would reflect the probability of the seller dying in a manner suitable for organ harvesting.

The organ seller would enter into a contract with a firm — it could be a lifetime contract or an annual one. This is an interesting essay which details how the author envisions practical futures markets in organs.

Of course, organs like kidneys and lobes of the liver can be removed without killing the donor. These types of organs could still be sold in a futures market. They would probably be more commonly sold in the manner of most other goods. Sellers would have a choice between making a large, immediate profit from the sale of non-vital organs or selling vital organs on a futures market.

• An organ market would encourage organ thieves. It also encourages the killing of comatose and brain dead patients to harvest their organs and make a profit.

Everyone has heard the urban legend about the guy who goes to a bar, has a few too many drinks, and wakes up the next day in a bathtub full of ice with one of his kidneys missing. It’s just that — an urban legend.

Practical considerations prevent organ theft from becoming a real threat. Any organ transaction requires that several immunological factors, such as blood type, match between the donor and the recipient. The possibility of finding a match for a specific recipient in a random victim of organ theft is practically zero. It would not be profitable for organ thieves to randomly attack victims; nor would it be feasible for them to search and target a specific match for the recipient.

Additionally, organs must be harvested surgically and handled in a very specific manner in order to be viable for transplant. Organ thieves would have to hire a qualified surgeon to do the job. Many qualified surgeons make so much money that they have no incentive to get involved with shady organ thieves. The potential costs of being caught would be immense enough to deter participation in organ thievery even for those surgeons in training or in financial trouble.

Another factor that makes organ stealing implausible is physical distance between the donor and the recipient. A live victim would have to be sedated and transported to a location near the recipient before he knew he was being robbed of an organ. If the victim was murdered in another location, his organs probably would not be viable once they reached the recipient anyway. However, a significant market in the development of new technology instrumental to the preservation and transport of organs exists. Companies such as Organ Recovery Systems are making it possible to harvest and transport organs from donors whose hearts have stopped beating. (Thanks to Dr. Ron Klatz for drawing my attention to this technology.)

Some people also worry that doctors will encourage their families to “pull the plug” if they end up on life support and their organs are viable. For many people this is a very real concern. But an organ market would increase the supply of organs so much that it would lessen the impetus for doctors to pressure families of brain dead or comatose patients. A patient truly concerned about this should make it clear to his family that he does not wish to be an organ donor, or that he does not want to be an organ donor unless he is already completely dead — i.e. his heart has stopped of its own accord. Anyone who wishes to be an organ donor can stipulate to his family which specific organs he wants to donate, and to whom he wants them to go.

Remember that organ donation is completely voluntary, as would be organ sale.

Some people complain that under the current system, doctors and transplant surgeons pressure families to remove their loved ones from life support in order to profit from harvesting their organs. If the family were allowed to reap some of this profit, money from organ sales could even help to offset the enormous hospital costs associated with keeping a loved one on life support. I refuse to believe that any family would decide to remove a loved one from life support just to make money from the sale of his organs.

• An organ market would supply poor quality organs — those who would be most likely to sell their organs have organs that are of the worst quality.

This is not true, but even if it were: aren’t organs of poor quality preferable to no organs at all? Right now, the supply of organs is so short that nobody has a choice about which organs they receive. A market in organs would increase the supply so much that recipients would probably be able to choose among several matching organs.

Legitimate organ brokerage firms would emerge. They, or insurance companies, would do diagnostic testing to ensure donor-recipient match. They would screen potential donors for diseases and probably establish a rating system for the quality of donor organs. The organ’s price would take into account several factors: organ type, organ quality, current supply and demand, surgical costs, transportation costs, diagnostic testing costs, and a finder’s fee. I’m sure that broker firms would have an incentive to screen donors carefully — imagine the lawsuits which would result if a recipient contracted a disease from a donated organ. Over time, these firms would build reputations for safety and quality. Consumers could choose among them just as we choose among competing companies for any other product.

• An organ market exploits the poor. They do not get paid enough for their organs. They will sell their organs for drugs.

Although poor people would probably be the most likely to sell their organs, an organ market would not be exploitative — in fact, it would help poor people by increasing the amount of options they have for money making.

Realistically, the most common organ transaction would probably be that of kidneys. According to UNOS, there are more people currently waiting for kidneys than any other type of organ. A kidney can be harvested without killing the donor, and the donor can lead a relatively normal life with just one kidney after the transaction.

I won’t claim that recovering from having a kidney removed is easy or fun. I don’t want to downplay the fact that the donor’s quality of life will probably suffer. However, allowing the sale of organs affords people a choice that they don’t have under the current system.

We make economic choices every day — if I buy a cup of tea at Starbucks, I have shown that I prefer having a cup of tea to having a few bucks in my pocket. If I sell my kidney for $20,000, I have shown that I prefer $20,000 in my bank account to a kidney in my gut.

People choose whether or not to sell their organs. Choice represents economic power. The option to sell organs is one opportunity for poor people to lift themselves out of poverty. Nobody can force a person to sell his organs. But if he makes an informed decision to sell, more power to him.

If a person sells an organ in exchange for drug money — well, that’s also his choice. My guess is that one of two things will happen if drug addicts decide to start selling their organs: either the addict will run out of non-vital organs to sell, or the addict will not be able to market his or her organs because they will be distressed from drug use and possibly infected with diseases. Of course, the reason drugs are so dangerous and expensive is precisely because of the “War on Drugs.” That, however, is another subject for another column.

• Selling organs is dangerous, even for those organs which can be removed without killing the donor.

Isn’t it more dangerous to have black market organ transactions?

Black market organ removals must be done in secret. Often this means they take place under poor or dangerous conditions. Sellers of organs on the black market take enormous risks because they essentially have no legal recourse if they don’t get paid, or if they suffer complications from the surgery. Sellers may not be able to afford treatment for those complications, which could result in death. A legitimate market in organs would allow donors to choose a firm to broker their organ transactions, and to enter a contract where the specifics of the transaction were clearly delineated. Violating the contract would warrant legal action. Competing organ brokerage firms would have an incentive to gain a reputation for being the safest, the cleanest, and the highest paying (for the donor) or the most economical (for the recipient).

• An organ market is unfair. Only the wealthiest people could afford to buy organs.

Wealthy people on the UNOS waiting list already do buy organs on the black market. They also get preferential treatment if they are “important” enough. The current “fair” system is actually massively unfair.

If the market were legitimized the price of organs would plummet.  Many more people would be able to afford them, because the supply would increase. Besides, having an organ market would in no way prevent people from donating their organs for free – either in death or while they are still alive.

Regardless of a patient’s financial status, a condition which requires having an organ transplant is bound to incur huge costs. The financial cost of staying in the hospital or getting treatment (such as dialysis) while waiting for an organ may surpass the price of buying an organ on a legitimate market. Consider, too, the opportunity costs of losing wages, missing time with family and friends, and enduring years of poor quality of living.

• Isn’t it more ethical to use xenografting? What about other techniques?

No, xenografting is not more ethical. A market in organs facilitates voluntary exchange between the donor and recipient; the donor consents to sell his or her organs. Animals cannot give consent. And as far as we can tell, they do not experience altruism. An animal would not receive any benefit from having its organs involuntarily removed. We can reasonably assume that no animal would consent to having its organs removed, were it even able to give consent. Therefore, xenografting is not ethical.

It also poses additional problems. First, having a xenotransplant probably would be less cost-effective than buying an organ on a free organ market, at least with the present technology. There are also concerns about viruses which naturally occur in some species intermingling with human ones. Some scientists believe that this could potentially create a new pathogen which might be very dangerous. And perhaps the most significant problem with xenotransplantation is the issue of rejection by the recipient’s body. Some companies are working to develop technologies that address these issues.

As far as other methods, a cost-efficient way of cloning single organs or body parts or a way of synthesizing organs would be an ideal solution to this problem, provided the parts were made available on an unfettered market. I don’t doubt that these things may one day be possible with the continuing incentives for innovation that capitalism provides. However they are not available right now, so they can’t be considered as a practical solution to the organ shortage at this point in time. (An interesting footnote: synthetic blood is already emerging as a possible solution to the ever-prevalent blood shortage.)

• Some religions prohibit organ donation as body mutilation.

Organ donation is voluntary. Organ sale would be voluntary if it were legal. You decide what do with your body. On the same token we should all respect other people’s wishes to do as they please with their own bodies. Ultimately, a market in organs boils down to one key concept: autonomy.

In 1999, someone attempted to sell a “fully functional human kidney” on eBay. Some debated whether or not the auction was a hoax. But bids apparently rose to $5.7 million before eBay decided to shut down the auction. Jeffrey Tucker tells me that the Mises Institute had to put out this notice. Why? A Mises daily article which extolled the virtues of a human organ market prompted numerous emails and phone calls from people asking to buy or sell organs.

These situations merely demonstrate the high demand for organs.

It’s time to start thinking seriously about letting the market do what it does best — allocate scarce resources efficiently — with human organs.

Continue reading…

From Lewrockwell.com, here.