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The Clear Thinkers of Jerusalem

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by R. Gil Student

The Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem appear a few places in rabbinic literature, always with strict practices that seem to have become normative over time. Who were they and how binding are their stringencies?

I. Who Were They?

Literally, Neki’ei Ha-Da’as means those with clean or pure or clear thoughts, or perhaps pure character traits (like dei’os sometimes means views and sometimes character traits). Rashi (Chagigah 22b sv. neki’ei) says that the phrase means picky or particular (istenis). Perhaps he means that they are very precise in their behavior, taking great care to do things in the best possible way. In the standard edition, the Rambam (Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 9:7) explains that the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as were wise. In that specific case, which we will discuss shortly, they minimized their words (Rashi, Gittin 87b sv. neki’ei), which seems both wise and precise. However, Rav Yosef Kafach (ad loc.) has the Rambam’s edition saying Beki’ei Ha-Da’as, experts (see his note 16).

Rav Yehudah Shaviv (in an article titled “Mi-Nekiyus Ha-Da’as Le-Halakhah Ravachas,” n. 11) quotes a debate among historians about the meaning of the term “Neki’ei Ha-Da’as.” Gedaliah Alon (Mechkarim Be-Toledos Yisrael, vol. 2 p. 26) follows the Rambam and explains the term as referring to wisdom and knowledge of life. Alon disapprovingly quotes Shmuel Klein, who thinks the term refers to the nobility of Jerusalem.

Rav Moshe Chaim Luzzatto (Mesilas Yesharim, ch. 10) distinguishes between someone who is nizhar and someone who is naki in the following way: Someone who is nizhar does not commit any obvious sin. However, he is engaged in a constant battle. A naki (which he explicitly connects to the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as in Jerusalem) has completely overcome his desire to sin and therefore has clear spiritual sight.

II. Their Practices

The Mishnah (Gittin 87b) says that while many people, when signing as a witness on a legal document, add after their name that they are a witness, the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem omitted that apparently superfluous information.

The Gemara (Sanhedrin 23a) says that the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem would not:

  1. Sign their name to a document unless they knew who else was signing
  2. Sit as a judge on a court until they knew who else would serve on the court
  3. Sit at a meal until they knew who else would sit with them

The Gemara (Sanhedrin 30a) says that the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem, when serving as judges, had a very orderly process. They insisted that the litigants would each present their cases, then the witnesses would enter and testify, then everyone but the judges would leave while the judges deliberated.

Masekhes Soferim (14:14) teaches that when the Torah was removed from the ark in synagogue, theNeki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem would walk with the prayer leader holding the Torah, so that the Torah and its holder would not proceed alone.

The Mekhilta (Mishpatim 20 on Ex. 23:1) says that the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem would not enter a saloon until they knew with whom they would be drinking and would not sign as a witness to a get until they know who else would be signing.

III. Stringencies or Law?

The Rosh (Responsa, 59:1) writes that the practice of the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem to only sign as a witness to a document after knowing who else will sign is only good advice, not a binding rule (eitzah tovah ka mashma lan). The Chiddushei Ha-Ran (Sanhedrin 23a sv. a”r yehudah) similarly concludes that this is a stringency for those who reach the level of Neki’ei Ha-Da’as, not for everyone.

The Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Sanhedrin 2:14) writes that a judge is forbidden to sit on a court until he knows with whom he will be sitting. This implies that the practice of the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem is binding as law. However, later (ibid., 22:9-10) he rules that it is forbidden to sit on a court with a wicked judge and quotes the practices of the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem, as if they are stringencies rather than law. From here, it sounds like a judge may sit with someone he doesn’t know, as long as he does not know with certainty that other judge isn’t wicked. The Tur and Shulchan Arukh(Choshen Mishpat (3:4, 7:10) quote these two apparently contradictory rulings. (Note that Shulchan Arukh,Orach Chaim 170:20 seems to quote as a stringency–and not law–the practices of the Neki’ei Ha-Da’asregarding knowing with whom one will eat.)

The Perishah (ad loc., 10) explains that the practice of the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as of Jerusalem is a stringency. When the Tur and Shulchan Arukh write that a judge is forbidden to sit with someone he doesn’t know, they do not mean it as an actual prohibition. The Arukh Ha-Shulchan (Choshen Mishpat 3:7) writes similarly. TheBach (ad loc., 7) rules that this is a law for a great scholar but only a stringency for everyone else.

IV. Contemporary Practice

This became an urgent question in 1948 Egypt, when Rav Ovadiah Yosef was a rabbi in Cairo. The government passed a law that Jewish courts must include lawyers as judges. Since there were no lawyers who were knowledgeable in Torah, the religious court would have to include two rabbinic judges and one Jewishly ignorant lawyer (or 3 rabbinic judges and 2 lawyers). According to the Perishah this court could function because a judge is only advised to refrain, not forbidden, from sitting on a court with someone improper. However, according to the Bach, this is prohibited to a great scholar.

The Pischei Teshuvah (7:23) quotes other explanations of the Shulchan Arukh‘s apparent contradiction. Rav Yonasan Eybeschutz (Tumim, ad loc.) explains that before a case begins, a judge should make sure that he is comfortable with his fellow judges. However, once a case begins, if a judge learns more about his fellow judges, he only must recuse himself from the case if he discovers that another judge is outright wicked (rasha). For anything else, it is only a stringency to drop off the case.

According to Rav Ya’akov Reischer (Shevus Ya’akov 1:137), the law only applies to a judge who does not know any of the other judges. However, if two of the judges know each other as upstanding men, that is sufficient for the rule. It is a stringency to investigate the third judge when the majority of the court will be acceptable.

In Rav Ovadiah Yosef’s case, he felt that it was so clear that the lawyers were not religious that it was forbidden for judges to sit with them on a court, even two Torah scholars who know each with a lawyer as the third member. This was not a matter of Neki’ei Ha-Da’as but the basic law that a judge may not sit on a court with someone non-religious.

In summary, it seems that the practices of the Neki’ei Ha-Da’as are not binding as halakhah, but are stringencies for the pious. They merit consideration because they are important enough to be mentioned explicitly in the Shulchan Arukh.

From Torah Musings, here.

Thorns In Your Sides

Who is the enemy?

 So, All the delusional people who want to believe they can actually differentiate between the leadership of the Arabs and the populations itself (**cough**, ** cough **, nephtuli), a new poll has now come out that shows that 77% of the Arab population supports the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit.

Will those delusional westernized Jews please wake up and realize that we are in a war. Not a war against terror. Not a war against Hamas. Not a war against Hizballa. It is a war against a foreign nation who believes our land belongs to them. They are willing to die (and kill) in order to get their land back and unless we are willing to fight back and realize we are in a REAL war, they will continue making our situation intolerable.

The war is against a violent and evil culture which we must either defeat fully or be defeated.

From Chardal, here.

הבסיס לחוקי המדינה הוא אך ורק כפיה

“כל מדינה מבססת את חוקיה על כוח הכפייה, אולם חוק הבא לקעקע את עיקרי האמונה עלול להיכשל. מולו יתייצבו פלוגות מתאבדים, גיבורי רוח, שכל כפייה לא תוכל להם. נמצא שהחוק לא יחול עליהם, והמדינה תצא וידה על התחתונה. לפיכך שלטון החרד על כבוד מדינתו נמנע מלחוקק חוקים שלא יוכל .לכפותם”

– החזון איש בדורותיו עמוד שב, וכן משה שנפלד ב”דגלנו” חשוון תשי”ד

From Wikiquote, here.

Did the Chasam Sofer Believe in the Zohar?

The Chasam Sofer’s position that the Zohar is a forgery

Summary: He deliberately veils his words, but if you know the specifics of Rav Yaakov Emden’s Mitpachas Sfarim, then the Chasam Sofer’s position becomes clear.

Post: We find the following astonishing statement in Shu”t Chasam Sofer, volume 6, siman 59.

In plain text:

ומ”ש שהרב אמר משם אמ”ו זצ”ל לא שמעתי מפיו ואולי התיר הרב לעצמו ע”ד שאמרו חז”ל רצית להחנק תתלה באילן גדול ואל תאשימהו עבור זה הנה נמצא בשכונתך ס’ מטפחת ספרים למהריעב”ץ תמצא שם כי  דבר גדול דבר הנביא ז”ל בענין זה הלא ישתוממו רואיו וד”ל.

“And that which you wrote, that the rav said in the name Adoni, Mori v’Rabbi {=my teacher} zatzal, I did not hear this from his mouth. And perhaps this rav permitted for himself based on that which Chazal said {Pesachim 112a} ‘If you wish to be strangled, be hanged on a large tree’. And don’t condemn him for this. Behold, the sefer Mitpachat Sefarim is found in your neighborhood, from Moreinu HaRav Yaakov ben Tzvi {=the Yaavetz, Rav Yaakov Emden}, and you will find there that the prophet za”l said a great thing in this matter, which will cause astonishment in those who see it, and it is sufficient to the wise [ודי לחכימא / ודי לחכימא ברמיזא].”

To make this a bit more explicit, Rav Yaakov Emden’s sefer, Mitpachat Sefarim, is about how the Zohar is a forgery, written by an author much later than Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (If I recall the specifics, that the vast majority of Zohar are later, and that the Raya Mehamna and Tikkunim of the Zohar is an absolute forgery.) The Chasam Sofer is telling his correspondent that just as this rav falsely attributed the position he wanted to the rebbe of the Chasam Sofer,so too a kabbalist (Rav Moshe de Leon, or perhaps many kabbalists and copyist adding their thoughts?), who wanted his ideas to gain greater weight falsely attributed his ideas to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, or else to the various Tannaim and Amoraim who appear in the Zohar. And at the very least, he is endorsing the conclusions of Rav Yaakov Emden, as he states: דבר גדול דבר הנביא ז”ל בענין זה.

(To see Shadal’s summary of some of Rav Yaakov Emden’s Mitpachat sefarim, see here and then here, where he speaks of additions, forgery, and Rav Yaakov Emden telling over the famous story from sefer haYuchsin of Rav Moshe de Leon forging the Zohar and granting credence to the story.)

Note also that the Chatam Sofer takes care not to say this explicitly, but rather hints at it, for those who would look up the relevant sefer and read it. And he ends וד”ל, either ודי למבין, or ודי לחכימא. That is, he won’t say more, but the hints he has given is sufficient. Presumably this is because he is trying to avoid backlash from those who would strike out at him for taking such a controversial position. And he succeeded, for the most part. It is one passing cryptic paragraph in the midst of a teshuva, among many other teshuvot. Who would really notice this?

This is a rather straightforward reading of this paragraph in this teshuva, I think.

The Chasam Sofer’s student, Rabbi Eliezer Lipman Naizatts, writes in sefer Mei Menuchot, page 43a:

“אילו היה יכולת ביד אדם להעמיד מדרשי רשב”י על טהרתן, לברר מהם מה שנתחבר אליהם מחכמי הדורות שאחריו, לא יהיה כולו רק ספר קטן כמות מאוד, מחזיק דפים מעוטים”

“And of the haggadot of Chazal in this {meaning demons}, behold it is already known their approach za”l in holiness, to hide their inner meaning within allegory, flowery phrases and riddles in their haggadot, za’l. And the hidden midrashim of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai in which come many discussions of demons and spirits, behold it is known that these midrashim are hidden, with their extremely deep inner meaning concealed and encrypted.

And also, it is known to all who knows, that many [and perhaps the vast majority] of the statements in those midrashim came from the mouths of the generations after him, and clung in there. And this is as I explicitly heard from the holy mouth of Adoni, Mori veRabbi, the Geon Yisrael, Kedosh Yisrael Mechubad, Moreinu HaRav Rabbi Moshe Sofer, zecher tzadik vekadosh livracha, av bet din verosh mesivta of the holy community of Pressburg, that he said before many of his students: if there were the human ability to establish the midrashim of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in their pristine state, to pick them out from that which was attached to them from subsequent generations, its entirety would only be an extremely small sefer, taking up few pages.”

Still, for something as earth-shattering as this, it is helpful to have others citing this material, and saying similar things. And so, I will seek company in the assertion that the Chasam Sofer held that the Zohar (or most of it) was not from Rashbi.

Here is Rabbi Berel Wein in a speech about the authenticity of the Zohar, speaks about the Chasam Sofer as someone who disbelieved that most of the Zohar was from Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. It starts at 2:58, with Rav Yaakov Emden; Chida’s defense at 5:40. At 6:07, he speaks about Chasam Sofer and quotes this teshuva, in favor of Rav Yaakov Emden (though he leaves out the introductory remarks). And then he skips to the other statement, from Mei Menuchot.

And here is Rabbi Natan Slifkin, in his article on Shiluach HaKen, (available for purchase via donation, and download here) who writes:

Footnote 55, to document this statement I underlined in red, refers us to this very teshuva of the Chasam Sofer: Responsa Chatam Sofer, 6:59, s.v. U’ma sheKatav sheHaRav. Indeed, that is how I first encountered this statement.

Both Rabbi Wein and Rabbi Slifkin do not discuss deliberate forgery. Rather, it is just that most of the Zohar is not from Rashbi. This could be from simple latter accidental accruing, perhaps.

While this a pretty shocking statement in and of itself, I would note that I would say further than this somewhat tamer statement, and think the text in the teshuva implies deliberate forgery and not just later authorship. After all, the context in the teshuva is someone falsely attributing to the Chasam Sofer’s rebbe, and the Chasam Sofer’s partial excuse of this on the basis of a statement of Chazal. And his citation of Rav Yaakov Emden comes by way of example of this deliberately false attribution. And Rav Yaakov Emden in fact makes such a statement about deliberate forgery and false attribution.

I would also note that believing the Zohar to be a forgery does not mean one must disbelieve all of kabbalah. Rav Yaakov Emden, who authored Mitpachat Sfarim, was a great kabbalist, even after his discovery. Indeed, it was what empowered his discovery. Similarly, even if the Chasam Sofer thinks that a good portion of the Zohar is not from Rashbi, and is indeed a forgery, that does not mean rejection of the truth and/or value of kabbalah in general. The specifics of how this can work out will be left for another post, b’Ezras Hashem.

From Parshablog, here.