The Big Problem With Seeking a ‘Halachic State’

I already explained why I oppose the quest for making the State of Israel “Jewish”, or “Halachic”. But the quest is foolish — even on its own terms.

The foremost requirement of changing matters is diagnosing the situation with accuracy. What we have today best resembles “Caesaropapism”.

Wikipedia introduces the concept:

Caesaropapism is the idea of combining the power of secular government with the religious power, or of making secular authority superior to the spiritual authority of the Church; especially concerning the connection of the Church with the government…
Max Weber (1864-1920) wrote: “a secular, caesaropapist ruler… exercises supreme authority in ecclesiastic matters by virtue of his autonomous legitimacy”. According to Weber’s political sociology, caesaropapism entails “the complete subordination of priests to secular power.”
In its extreme form, caesaropapism is a political theory in which the head of state, notably the emperor (“Caesar”, by extension a “superior” king), is also the supreme head of the church (pope or analogous religious leader). In this form, caesaropapism inverts theocracy (or hierocracy in Weber) in which institutions of the church control the state. Both caesaropapism and theocracy are systems in which there is no separation of church and state and in which the two form parts of a single power-structure.
This sounds like Israel (unless you prefer “Clerical fascism“). If we were merely distant from the ideal, it would be difficult enough to achieve it. But, no. The state of Israel is an inversion of a Medinat Halacha (Halachic State)!
Again, here’s what is required to achieve anything:
  • Knowing what is.
  • Deciding what ought to be.
  • Determining what steps lead to the desired end.
  • Determining what steps lead away from the desired end.
  • Knowing which is which.
Any time you are informed of a planned revolution, not just difficult to achieve, but the exact opposite of present reality, make well and sure the organizers know what the real situation is at present, and also that they have a clear model not only of what they want but also a means of determining regarding each and every step if it’s a step forward or backward. It’s very easy to fool oneself and others with political inversions.
And last but not least, be sure you, too, deem their barometer accurate (see here)!
And that’s if you actually seek out the same inversion they do. If you agree with me, a “Halachic State” is not even the goal, however…

re: Gedolim Oppressing the Orphan

One of yesterday’s articles was titled Gedolim Oppressing the Orphan (TRUE STORY by Rabbi Daniel Eidensohn Shlita). Readers are forever wondering why I include such material, especially with the harsh, Biblical description.

I said this before, but it bears repeating:

I derive no sadistic pleasure from breaking hearts, but I can think of no other way to get serious attention paid to revolutionary halacha. Put another way, we wrote about rabbinic human frailty as a license to reproduce Rabbi Brand’s article — the same day — concerning contagious Kulos as found in the laws of Tevillas Keilim in both the Shulchan Aruch and later Achronim.

By the way, the beginning of “Gedolim Oppressing the Orphan” was originally missing, so I added it now.

Sorry, but It’s TRUE: Teshuvos Chasam Sofer Are Often About Meta-Halacha

Chatam Sofer on Women’s Hair Covering

by R. Gidon Rothstein

I wish Star Wars was right when it said only a Sith thinks in absolutes, when in fact many of us fall into the trap, especially in our characterizations of rabbis. One of the ways in which I have been surprised as I’ve studied responsa has been in the nuance I have found in the writings of respondents whose reputations painted them with a broad brush.

Shu”t Chatam Sofer 1; Orach Chayyim 36, dated 16 Sivan 1839 (six months before he passed away) offers an example. He takes what could easily be labeled a stringent position on women’s hair covering, yet his reasoning leaves ample room to wonder whether he would have continued to rule the same way in other circumstances. Let me show you what I mean.

Hair as a Type of Nakedness

He starts with Berachot 24a, where R. Sheshet tells us a woman’s hair is ‘ervah—the word most easily translates as nakedness, although the responsum assumes more specific connotations.  R. Sheshet bases himself on Shir Ha-Shirim 4;1, which praises a woman for her hair (since the man focuses on the woman’s hair as a feature of beauty, hair must be a body part which, if uncovered, will distract him during the recitation of Shema, the topic of the Talmudic discussion).

Rosh thought the Gemara referred to married women, since unmarried women did not cover their hair [Chatam Sofer will not follow up on the implications for a society where married women as well do not cover their hair; we will get there]. Beit Yosef Even Ha-‘Ezer 75 mentions Rashba’s further leniency, based on married women’s tendency  to leave a few strands (or a thin line) of hair outside their hair covering. Their husbands are accustomed to seeing those hairs and can recite Shema even when they are visible.

How to Cover the Hair

Rashi reads “mi-ba’ad le-tzamatech, behind your veil” as a description of her hair (in contrast to the English translations I saw, which think the veil in the verse covers the beloved’s eyes, praised just before, and her hair is praised for being like flocks of goats). Rashi thinks the verse praises her hair and her modesty, shown by her keeping her beautiful hair tied up.

Rashi refers to one way of covering or keeping her hair in check, where Chatam Sofer sees two ways in the verse, the ordinary hat (which he assumes is there, as far as I can tell), and the further veil or tie she wears to ensure no unusual hairs slip out. Chatam Sofer understands Rashba to have permitted only the random hairs which slipped out of the second covering, because the husband does not pay attention to them.

The Way of Jewish Women

The other Talmudic passage relevant to women’s hair covering appears on Ketubbot 72a, where a Mishnah discusses dat Moshe, the ways of life prescribed by Moshe (really, the Torah), and dat Yehudit, the common practice of Jewish women. Violation of either standard opens a wife to being divorced with financial prejudice, meaning she loses her ketubbah, the payment Chazal instituted to safeguard her from being summarily ejected from a marriage. The Mishnah says dat Yehudit prohibits a woman from wearing flowing hair in public.

The Gemara questions the Mishnah’s characterization, because Bamidbar 5;18 says the sotah ceremony, which checks the fidelity of a woman who has given her husband legal cause to suspect her of adultery, should include the priest uncovering her hair. Married women ordinarily covering their hair seems to be a matter of Biblical law, not dat Yehudit.

Basic and Additional Covering

The Gemara resolves the problem by positing two obligations, the Torah-level one of kalta, and the further step of dat Yehudit (the specifics are not as important; Rambam, Laws of Marriage 24;12 referred to a mitpachat and a redid, a kerchief and a veil, but Chatam Sofer understands the second level to be a hat).

Aside from how she covers her hair, the Gemara also discusses where she must do so. In her own chatzer, for example, the Gemara assumes no Jewish women bother to cover their hair. We ordinarily translate chatzer as courtyard, whereas Tosafot limit the permission to her room in her house. Shulchan Aruch Even Ha-‘Ezer 115;4 did not mention Tosafot’s stringency, speaking only of the second level of covering when she goes from one courtyard to another.

Chatam Sofer notes Ba”ch, who read Rambam as going further than Tosafot, having prohibited completely uncovering her hair even in the privacy of her own room, and Beit Shemuel both did expand the areas where she was required to cover her hair.

Accepted Custom

Chatam Sofer agrees with them, recommends such conduct as the proper course of action—a significant stringency for most women today—but his reasoning leaves room to wonder whether he would have ruled the same way in our times. Given the debate on the matter, he promotes following the conduct of most women, which in his time was to cover their hair even in their homes. He takes it as evidence kibbelu ‘alayhu, they’ve accepted this as proper Jewish conduct.

Magen Avraham enunciated an obligation to follow common practice unless and until one performed hattarat nedarim, the ceremony releasing a Jew from a vow (551;7, about whether one may do business during the nine days leading up to the fast of Tish’a B’Av).  The same applies to women’s common practice, says Chatam Sofer. Leaving home with only one covering certainly violates dat Yehudit, in his view, and justifies divorce with financial prejudice.

[Pay attention to how he bases himself on the practice of women in all places he knows, who cover their hair even at home. Were practice to change, or were we to find out there were many other Jewish women practicing in other ways, his rule would seem open to change as well].

Maharam Al-Ashqar’s Leniency

Chatam Sofer knows of Shu”t Maharam Al-Ashqar 35, who responded to a questioner troubled by a practice he saw, women leaving a row of hair uncovered between their ears and forehead. Maharam infers from Baba Batra 60b the practice goes back to Talmudic times. The Gemara lists ways we can and should continue to remember the destruction of the Temple, and Rav says one such is bat tzeda’a. Rashbam and ‘Aruch dispute what Rav meant, whether women would burn off the hair (using lye), or would refrain from perfuming it as a sign of their lasting mourning over the Destruction. For ‘Aruch, they clearly left the hair uncovered.

Maharam thought a passage in Zohar supported his leniency; Chatam Sofer both disagreed with Maharam’s reading and thought we need not pay attention to the Zohar. ‘Aruch understood the Gemara to specifically contradict the Zohar, and whenever the Zohar contradicts the Gemara, we follow the Gemara [at the end of the responsum, he concedes he could have avoided seeing a contradiction between the Gemara and Zohar had he adopted Rashbam’s reading, but does not seem overly bothered].

Maharam further thought Ashkenazic women who come to visit Sephardic regions could follow Sephardic women’s more lenient practice while they were there. Ordinarily, a Jew who temporarily relocates must observe the stringencies of both places, whence s/he came and where s/he is currently. Maharam thought hair covering was different, because Ashkenazic women covered all their hair as a matter of what all women—non-Jewish as well—did in their home locale. In a place where the general standard allowed for more hair, there was no reason for them to continue to cover so much.

Continuing Custom When Circumstances Change

In Chatam Sofer’s world, non-Jewish women no longer covered their hair in public, which seems to open room for Jewish woman to take on a different standard as well. Chatam Sofer assumes, however (and quotes a Mahar”a Stein who had already taken this position), the women of his area decided to follow the more stringent view of the Zohar. While halachah would never have ruled this way, the women’s decision to do so turns it into a custom and halachic requirement.

Chatam Sofer uses the phrase minhag ‘oker halachah, custom uproots the law, where here the custom seems more to be asking more than required. Of greater interest to me, Mahar”a Stein said custom can uproot halachah when the custom bases itself on a passage in works such as Massechet Soferim or Semachot— Talmudic-era works not canonized in the Talmud. Chatam Sofer took for granted, without explanation, Zohar qualifies.

He also sourced the idea of the immutability of established customs to Magen Avraham 690;22. It’s a surprising choice, because Magen Avraham gives much reason to think the women of Chatam Sofer’s time could handle hair covering differently. Chatam Sofer quotes Magen Avraham accurately, but he ignores Magen Avraham’s having cited Shu”t Rema 21, who in turn quoted Maharik to have allowed people to change customs when underlying circumstances changed. Were the women of Chatam Sofer’s time—or ours—to say the women around them no longer cover their hair, reducing the extent to which the Jewish women needed to cover their hair, Magen Avraham, Rema, and Maharik all seem to leave room for some such adjustments.

Machatzit Ha-Shekel (a supercommentary to Magen Avraham, who was also one of Chatam Sofer’s childhood teachers) gives the example of water left uncovered, which the Talmud forbade for worry a snake had drunk from it. No longer a worry for us, we drink such water.

Magen Avraham also thought only customs established by reputable authorities have the power to override halachah; customs which spring up popularly are errors, and need not be followed.

As I present Chatam Sofer’s conclusion, then, it’s one to think about carefully. He omitted material (in sources he cited) which could have shaped his own ruling differently, and based himself on practice current in his time, no longer in ours. For his time, general practice (among non-Jewish women as well) led him to conclude married women had to cover all their hair, even in their bedrooms, and to have a second covering when out in public. For our times, matters seem more equivocal, even from his perspective.

From Torah Musings, here.

הרש”ר הירש: ‘טובת הכלל’ זו לא תירוץ

בראשית מ”ט ז’:

ארור אפם כי עז ועברתם כי קשתה אחלקם ביעקב ואפיצם בישראל.

פירוש הרש”ר הירש זצ”ל:

ישנה חשיבות מרובה לכך שכאן בהנחת אבן הפינה לעם היהודי, מוטלת קללה על כל התפרצות אלימה המנוגדת לצדק ולמוסר, אפילו אם היא מכוונת לטובת הכלל.

כל יתר המדינות והאומות אימצו את העיקרון שכל פעולה תהיה כשרה וחוקית, כל עוד היא משרתת את עניינה של המדינה. מעשי ערמה ואלימות, שעונשם הרחקה או מוות אם ייעשו על ידי הפרט למטרת רווח אישי, באים על גמולם בתהילה ובכבוד רב באם נעשו למען מה שנחשב לכאורה כטובת המדינה. חוקי המוסר שייכים רק לחיי הפרט, ואילו בעניינים המדיניים ויחסי החוץ, החוק היחיד שמכירים בו הוא חוק התועלת העצמית של המדינה.

כאן לעומת זאת מטילה הצוואה שעליה נוסד העם היהודי קללה על עורמה ואלימות, אפילו אם הן משמשות לטובת העניינים הלאומיים הצודקים ביותר; והיא קובעת אחת ולתמיד את העיקר שאפילו בחיים הציבוריים ובקידום טובת הכלל, לא רק שעל המטרה להיות טהורה, אלא גם על האמצעים להיות כאלה.

אולם הקללה הוטלה רק על ״אפם ועברתם״. והיא אינה מכוונת לא על שמעון ולוי באופן אישי, ולא על מטרותיהם כשלעצמן.

אחלקם ביעקב ואפיצם בישראל – כוונת ה״מחלק״ אינה להחליש דבר שהיה שלם עד כה, אלא לחלק דבר בעל ערך, כדי שאנשים רבים ככל האפשר יוכלו ליטול בו חלק. ה״מפיץ״ לעומת זאת, מפצל את הדבר השלם לחלקים קטנים ככל האפשר, בכדי לבטל את ליכודו ואחדותו.

״יעקב״: דמות העם היהודי בגלות, מדוכא ונרדף.

״ישראל״: דמות העם היהודי עטור הנצחון, אשר בא לו מיד ה׳.

לפי זה: הסכנה העומדת לאומה מפאת כעסם ופזיזותם של שמעון ולוי, קיימת רק בעת פריחתה של האומה, כשהיא מהווה ציבור רב־כח, העלול בנקל להמשך אחר השפעת שני שבטים מאוחדים, המלאים בהכרת כחם ושבוערת בהם תחושת אחווה. משום כך: ״אפיצם בישראל״, במדינה היהודית הפורחת, עליהם להיות מפוזרים.

ואכן זה בדיוק מה שקרה: שבט לוי לא קיבל כלל חלק בארץ, וקיומו היה תלוי במעשר, ברצונו הטוב של כל יחיד ויחיד. שכן, בשונה מהמעשר הניתן לכנסייה ולאדון האחוזה, היה המעשר היהודי ״ממון שאין לו תובעים״. בעל הקרקע היה מחוייב להפרישו, אך לאף לוי מסוים לא הייתה תביעה ישירה עליו. אדם רשאי לתת את מעשרו לכל לוי שיבחר, ולאף אחד אין זכות לתבוע אותו ממנו. נחלת שמעון הייתה מובלעת בתוך חלקו של יהודה, ושמעון היה תלוי לחלוטין באותו שבט רב־כח. נמצא שבעת שישראל פרח כאומה, הייתה ההשפעה המדינית של שמעון ולוי משותקת לגמרי.

אך בגלות, שבה לחץ גורלנו מעיק על הכל, והאומה עצמה מפוזרת; שם הסכנה הקיימת והממשית היא שכל הכבוד העצמי ייאבד וכל חיות רוחנית תיחנק. וכדי לאפשר אפילו לרוכל היהודי הנודד לעמוד בראש מורם מול אנשי הרחוב האירופאי, עם הכח להחזיק בהכרתו העצמית ובתחושת שייכותו לעמו – לזה יש צורך ש״אחלקם ביעקב״.

בהפצת שבטי שמעון ולוי בין יתר שבטי המדינה היהודית, עשה ה׳ לנו חסד גדול. שכן התוצאה הטבעית הייתה שכאשר נחרבה המדינה והאומה נפוצה לכל רוחות השמים, תמיד היו ביניהם בני שמעון ולוי, בכל מקומות פזוריהם. בכל מקום הם יעודדו ויגדלו בנו כח ואומץ לב, התלהבות והכרה יהודית אצילית. כך הובטח שהרוח היהודית נותרה חיה וחזקה אף לאחר שחלפה המדינה. וכך היא מסורת חז״ל שבידינו: ״משמעון סופרים ומשנים [מלמדים] בבתי כנסיות ומשבט לוי בתי מדרשות היו עוסקין בתורה״ (ילקוט שמעוני, בראשית קנח).

Gedolim Oppressing the Orphan (TRUE STORY by Rabbi Daniel Eidensohn Shlita)

A true story of how gedolim dealt improperly with a pedophile

I recently met with some rabbis who have had extensive experience dealing with abuse issues in the frum community. The following is one of the stories that they told me regarding rabbinic incompetence dealing with abuse. The incompetent rabbis that were described are not community or shul rabbis but are genuine gedolim They had sufficient funds and access to experts who would have informed them that they should have called the police. However, they relied on their own judgment and a disaster resulted. This is the story – with identifying details removed.

There was a promising bochur. He was intelligent and diligent in his studies and handsome. He also had good midos and came from a distinguished family. He had only one problem – he was a pedophile. He had abused over a hundred children by the time he was 24 years old. When this was brought to the attention of seniors rabbis at the major yeshiva where he studied, they came up with what they thought was a brilliant solution to his problem. They arranged and encouraged a match with an orphan girl. It was the perfect match they thought. She got a real catch and he would now be able to manage his sexual appetite with his wife – rather than with little children. They picked an orphan because she would not be able to do serious background checking and would have to rely on the advice of these gedolim.  Of course she wasn’t told about his problem – after all, that would be lashon harah. Since they “knew” that the problem would be solved by marriage there obviously wasn’t any reason to mention to her that this young man had destroyed the life of 100 children. They also didn’t bother checking with a psychologist with expertise with pedophiles – after all, what does a psychologist know?

Of course, the young lady was ecstatic that gedolim had taken such a personal interest in her and she was overwhelmed with gratitude that the great men had devoted time and energy for her – a nobody but with a lot of emunas chachomim. It was just like the Artscroll stories that she read every Shabbos about great tzadikim. The marriage seemed to be in fact the solution to the problem. The young couple was very happy They eventually had several children. Unfortunately, however, the young man still had his perverted lusts which did not go away with marriage. This was something that anybody with even a minimum knowledge of pedophiles would have predicted.

Periodically there were rumors of his activity but his wife didn’t understand why she was treated coldly by the neighbors. The senior rabbis suggested that they move to Brooklyn where they would be able to start life fresh. The wife still didn’t know her husband’s problem – but the new neighbors did not know either because the rabbis knew that if they informed anybody the young couple would not get a chance for a new life.  Unfortunately, the change of neighborhood did not help his condition.  This time however she found out the hard way – by a visit from the police who were investigating charges against him for abusing children. As you may imagine she was traumatized. Not only was her husband a destroyer of children, but she had been betrayed by gedolim. In addition, she feared for the safety of her own children. But what could she do – she had no family or friends and she had no money to pay for advice or a divorce.

Fortunately, the rabbi who told me about this tragedy found out about this horror story and successfully raised money for the divorce. He even got one of the gedolim to write a letter to aid in fundraising because that gadol humbly acknowledged that he had made a serious mistake!