תהלים פרק ט’ – לקרוא נכון

הנה פסוק בתהלים ט’ י”ד:

חָֽנְנֵ֬נִי יְהוָ֗ה רְאֵ֣ה עָ֭נְיִי מִשֹּׂנְאָ֑י מְ֝רוֹמְמִ֗י מִשַּׁ֥עֲרֵי מָֽוֶת.

שמתם לב שיש עוד נו”ן באמצע המילה?

‘Never Believe a Story Unless NOT Believing It Makes You an Apikores’

Ibn Ezra Shemos 2:22:

ותלד. כי אמר, משה. וזאת צפורה הוא האשה הכושית אשר אמר. ואשר כתוב בדברי הימים דמשה אל תאמן. וכלל אומר לך כל ספר שלא כתבוהו נביאים או חכמים מפי הקבלה אין לסמוך עליו ואף כי יש בו דברים שמכחישים הדעת הנכונה. וככה ספר זרובבל. וגם ספר אלדד הדני ודומה להם.

 

עוד לא משוכנע שחזרה התכלת האמתית? – התקשרו לקו התכלת

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Government Failure Is WORSE Than Market Failure

Do Capitalists Manipulate, Deceive, and Cheat?

Not as Much as Politicians Do

Real-world markets, according to Nobel laureate economist Robert Shiller, are all about manipulation and deception.

So he argues in a New York Times article summarizing his new book, coauthored with fellow Nobel laureate economist George Akerlof: Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. According to Shiller, merchants and vendors regularly “phish for” ignorant consumers who they can mislead into acting less in their own interests and more in those of the phishermen.

The question is not whether the market fails, but whether the government is more likely than the market itself to correct those failures. 

Shiller claims that the theoretical defense of the free market depends on consumers being rational and well informed — a condition that doesn’t hold true in the real world. Drawing on behavioral economics, he argues that consumers are often possessed with cognitive biases that allow them to be systematically deceived by unsavory merchants. For this reason, Shiller argues, consumers need government regulation to protect their interests. The internal forces of the market are not sufficient.

Deux ex Nirvana

But government regulation is not an infallible deus ex machina. The question is not whether the market fails, but whether the government is more likely than the market itself to correct those failures. Economist Harold Demsetz coined the term “nirvana fallacy” to make this point: it is not enough to find flaws in the real world; one must prove that some feasible alternative is likely to be less flawed. James Buchanan, one of the fathers of public choice economics, compared advocates of government regulation to the judges of a singing contest who, after hearing an imperfect performance from the first contestant, immediately award the second contestant, reasoning that he must be better.

No, the market is not perfect, and consumers are often ignorant and manipulable. But the real question is this: Will government do any better?

Just because the first singer offered a less-than-perfect performance is no proof that the second singer will be any better. Ironically, Nudge author and former member of the Obama administration Cass Sunstein, no friend of economic freedom, accidentally makes this very point in his positive review of Shiller and Akerlof’s book.

According to Sunstein,

Bad government is itself a product of phishing and phoolishness, for “we are prone to vote for the person who makes us the most comfortable,” even when that person’s decisions are effectively bought by special interests.

So yes, people behave irrationally in their capacities as market participants, but they are no more rational in how they cast their votes than in how they spend their dollars.

Buying What You Don’t Want

The difference is that in a market, there are feedback signals, however attenuated. If a vendor cheats his customer by holding back information about his product, at least the customer will learn about the product’s faults after he purchases it, and he will buy from someone else next time. He will likely warn others, too. The consumer may have cognitive biases, but he has the opportunity to learn from his mistakes, prevent others from making them, and correct them in the future. The deceptive merchant will develop a bad reputation, and paying customers are motivated to learn about merchants’ reputations — especially as 21st-century technology develops ever-more-robust reputation markets, accessible through anyone’s smartphone.

By contrast, there are fewer feedback signals in politics and even fewer opportunities to act on that feedback. One vote barely counts, and each voter must vote not for specific policies, but for politicians with a range of policies. Electoral politics doesn’t really offer a choice so much as it imposes a bundle. A vote for a particular candidate implies endorsement of all the policies in that bundle when the truth is more likely that the voter has selected the least bad option. In the market, customers can easily split their “dollar votes” to purchase only the specific products they want.

In Freedom and the Law, Bruno Leoni notes that we are all doubly unrepresented by politics: we vote for A, but B defeats A in the election. Then, when B is sitting in the legislature, he is outvoted on a bill by C. So in the end, a person is governed by politician C who beat B, who in turn beat the voter’s preferred choice, A.

When Phoolishness Is Rational

In such a situation, it makes sense for voters to be rationally ignorant of the effects of government policies they are helpless to affect. Politicians are free to peddle shoddy products when they know voters have few opportunities to learn from their mistakes — and even fewer opportunities to correct them.

Meanwhile, markets tend to concentrate benefits and costs on the consumers who use a specific product. This internalization of costs and benefits promotes learning and feedback. In a market, a person must bear the consequences of his or her own actions.

In politics, benefits are concentrated on those whom the politician wishes to favor — such as financial donors and special interests whose attention is narrowly focused — while costs are dispersed among those whose attention is elsewhere, including many who focus on producing wealth instead of transferring it.

The combination of rationally ignorant voters and informed and motivated special interests encourages rent seeking. Private benefit and social cost diverge as the political process encourages the creation of new externalities. While markets tend to internalize the costs, politics encourages externalities.

So yes, consumers are often “irrational” and deceived and make mistakes. But, as Sunstein himself tells us, this is true in both politics and markets. The question is, Which institutional environment is more likely to promote learning from mistakes? And which institution — the market or politics — maximizes a person’s ability to correct those mistakes? Shiller and Akerlof have failed to prove that government regulation will detect or correct mistakes better than the market itself can.

‘Do You Know Hilchos Shabbos?’ by Rabbi Michoel Fletcher – Sample Chapter

‘Do You Know Hilchos Shabbos?’ – A Teaser

“Do You Know Hilchos Shabbos? – Practical Questions for the Whole Family” is an entertaining new Halacha book by Rabbi Michoel Fletcher, published by Menucha Publishing, Brooklyn NY, USA.

With a beautifully designed hardcover, the book includes chapters on every Melacha and major aspect of keeping Shabbos properly. Every discussion is kept admirably brief and is introduced with an amusing real-life question from an imaginary family showcasing actual dilemmas faced weekly.

The book can be purchased here. The author’s previous work, “A Practical Guide to Our Daily Brochos”, can be bought here.

The following chapter (aka “Do You Know Hilchos Shabbos?”) is an excerpt (pages 27 – 30).

Enjoy!

There are twenty questions in the following short story. How many can you answer correctly?

It had been a busy Erev Shabbos at the Goldsteins.  Moshe was delayed at the office, Chaim had come home from cheder with a grazed knee, Chaya couldn’t find the belt which goes with her new dress and the cleaning lady’s children were sick so she couldn’t come.

It wouldn’t have mattered so much except for the fact that we’d invited our neighbors, the Cohens  (because Mr Cohen was away on business), 2 seminary girls, and of course old Mr. Black who’s quite a regular here since his wife went into the old age home.

But baruch Hashem “bo shabbos bo menucha” and at licht benshen everything was spick and span.

The first question we had was about Chaya’s belt which she finally found. Can she thread it through the belt-loops [1] and tie the bow[2]?

Then Chaim decided he needed a new band-aid. Can he have one?[3]

We were short of lechem mishnes. Can we take one from the freezer?[4]

I couldn’t remember the seating plan. Good job I fixed it to the fridge. But who’s going to read it out?[5] Mrs. Cohen gave me a bottle of wine which she said was to pay me back for the one we lent her last week. Could I accept it?[6]

Oy vey. I left the bathroom light off and the bedroom lights on. Can I call in the non-Jewish neighbor?[7]

I don’t believe it. Chaya left her purse on the couch, just where I relax after the meal.

Is the couch a bosis?[8]

We’re only five minutes into the meal and Moshe has spilt the wine. I wiped up the red wine with a red napkin and one of the seminary girls gave me a funny look. Did I do something wrong?[9]

Then Mr. Black wanted his avocado mashed the way his wife used to make it. The whole table discussed the problem until Mrs. Cohen came up with a simple solution. What was it?[10] Moshe then said that he wanted to add some more mayonnaise to his chopped liver. Was that allowed?[11]

Three minutes peace and then tragedy. Avi started with his carrot. If there’s one thing Avi doesn’t like, it’s carrot in his soup. Can he take it out and pass it on to me?[12]

This is getting beyond a joke. Moshe’s found a broken bone in the chicken. The Rov’s out of town but Moshe said, ‘Let’s get out a ruler. Seeing that it is for a mitzva we are allowed to measure how far along the bone it’s broken.’— Another funny look from the sem girl. Was she right this time?[13]

Boruch Hashem, I had some spare meat and then we had some nice singing and a dvar Torah expounding on the theme of “bo shabbos bo menucha”.

Chaim went off to read (or so I thought) and we had some sensible conversation until a red-faced Chaim re-emerged, with Mr. Black’s hat looking more like a flying saucer than his best Shabbos hat. Can he fix it?[14]

The meal was drawing to its conclusion. There was a bit of a problem when Avi wanted to put his ice cream right on the hot apple pie; was he allowed?[15] Mr. Black had brought some peanuts. Could we shell them?[16]  Somebody forgot to say retzei in benching; did he need to repeat the benching?[17] We needed to bring over two mattresses from a neighbor. We made an eiruv last Pesach — it’s just that new people have moved in downstairs and they weren’t included in the eiruv. Does that matter?[18]

By the time all the guests had gone I was really exhausted. But baruch Hashem for my wonderful husband. He’d secretly washed up all the dishes we need for tomorrow and was standing there with some beautiful jewelry with a note attached: ‘For the world champion baleboste” But could I accept it?[19]

19:20  Excellent.

16-18: Very good.

12-15:  Good

5 – 11: A good start

0 –   4:  Enjoy learning Hilchos Shabbos

Whatever mark you achieved, you will enjoy learning this sefer by yourself, with a friend or with your family. Test yourself when you have finished. You’ll see how much you have learnt. Hatzlacha!

[1] Chapter 45 Question 2

[2] Chapter 31 Question 2 and 4

[3] Chapter 33 Question 8

[4] Chapter 4 Question 6

[5] Chapter 5 Question 8

[6] Chapter 40 Question 9

[7] Chapter 13 Questions 4 and 5 (2 answers).

[8] Chapter 12 Question 12

[9] Chapter 29 Question 7

[10] Chapter 22 Question 2

[11] Chapter 24 Question 7

[12] Chapter 21 Question 5

[13] Chapter 10 Question 1

[14] Chapter 45 Question 4

[15] Chapter 25 Question 7

[16] Chapter 19 Question 2

[17] Chapter 4 Question 10

[18] Chapter 46 Question 9

[19] Chapter 9 Question 2 and 4

Have something to say? Write to Avraham Rivkas: CommentTorah@gmail.com