תיקוני עירובין גליון 318#
גליון שאלות הלכתיות המתחדשות מידי שבוע בבדיקת העירובים השכונתיים
השבוע בגליון: איבדנו את מורה דרכינו מרן שר התורה זצוק”ל / ההנהגה שקיבלתי ממנו בנערותי על ידי השאלות של אחרי התפילה / דקדוק ההלכה שראינו בדרכיו / המידע והתיקונים של מוקד העירוב שימשו גם שיהיה אפשר לכבד את מרן בסנדקאות / פסקי מרן בפירצה שרק ילדים עוברים בה, ומה הדין כשאין רשות מהשכנים לעבור / סיום שלב בעירוב הפנימי של ישוב עמנואל / מומר שגר בקראוון נייד, האם אוסר או שנחשב עראי / אם בדירה אין רוחב ד’ אמות והאורך משלים.
Reprinted with permission.
2 Common Kashrus Pitfalls
From Chukei Chaim Part One:
Usually, a kashrus agency’s hashgachah only covers items in the store. Once a product leaves the store, e.g., in a delivery, the agency no longer takes responsibility for it. If the deliveryman is a non-Jew or a secular Jew and the product is not properly sealed, there can be kashrus problems.
The Badatz Eidah Chareidis states that its hechsher on produce stores, fish, pizza, etc. only covers items sold in stores displaying a valid certificate. Once a product leaves the store though, e.g., in a delivery, it takes no responsibility unless the store has an arrangement with the Badatz for that (מדריך הכשרות תשפ”א עמ’ 128).
One must be extremely careful about this with chains of stores that sell identical products, e.g., pizza, when one has a high-level hechsher and another has a low-level one. When ordering, one must find a way to verify that the pizza is not from another branch with a lower hechsher – there are true stories where this has happened.
From Part Two:
All Ingredients Badatz
Many people make homemade food products, e.g., mezonos foods for kiddushim, cakes, potato kugel, Yerushalmi kugel, herring, chickpeas, p’tcha/gala, dips, salads, fruit platters, chocolates, etc. They put a sticker on the package that says “All ingredients Badatz” and sell their products in stores, makolets, or mikvaos, or deliver them directly to customers. People rely on this, thinking, what could be the problem if all the ingredients are Badatz?
Common Shailos
Hafrashas challah. In every home kitchen, shailos come up; any posek who answers these types of questions all day can attest to this. Not infrequently, we are asked questions about foods made and sold from homes. For example, one woman who made sponge cakes for kiddushim had no idea she was supposed to do hafrashas challah after baking a certain minimum amount, because when they are made in small amounts for personal consumption, there is usually not enough flour to require hafrashas challah. This caused a pitfall: people enjoyed the mezonos with ‘all-Badatz ingredients’, but it turned out they ate tevel.
Fleishige keilim. Oftentimes, people use fleishige pots and utensils to make parve food, or they cut onions or garlic with a fleishige knife, such that lechatchilah, the food may not be eaten with milchigs. Because the food is parve, customers do not know they cannot eat it with milchigs. If there was some sort of supervision, the rav would ensure that only parve utensils designated for the food being sold are used.
Checking for bugs. We know that many fruits, vegetables, and flours often have bugs, even if all the ‘ingredients are Badatz’. If one does not know how to properly check each fruit, vegetable, and type of flour, he is likely to transgress the issur of eating bugs. It does not take much effort to check for bugs when making a small amount of food for the family, but when making a large amount to sell, it takes a lot of effort. There is a chance that, due to pressure, the person making the food will be lax; if there is supervision from a rav who gives instructions, it is likely the person will check better.
Heaven help us!
Hashgacha Pratis: Shemini-Tazria 5782
Inspirational messages and contemporary stories of Hashgacha Pratis
Reprinted with permission.
‘Knowing HOW’ Versus ‘Knowing THAT’: Wittgenstein Against Brisk
Lost in Transcription
Friday, August 22, 2008
Sheldon Richman
Following rules, such as the rules of language, of the market, or of just conduct, is more about “knowing how” than “knowing that.” This is a lesson taught by many important thinkers, among them, Gilbert Ryle (who used these terms in the title of chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind), F.A. Hayek, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. On many matters, we know more than we can say. Yet we are tempted to identify knowing with saying. It’s a temptation best resisted. (Wittgenstein distinguished between knowing the height of a structure and knowing how a clarinet sounds. We use the same word know, but we don’t mean the same thing. Do you know the height if you cannot say it?)
Language, economic activity, and law did not begin when someone published a grammar book, an economics text, or a political treatise that people then used to guide their actions. On the contrary, the books were written after the fact to codify what people had long been doing. And, importantly, the books could never fully describe what people had been doing or would do in the future. At best they were imperfect codifications (abstractions) that couldn’t possibly capture all the details involved in applying the rules to the varied circumstances of everyday life. In truth, they weren’t rules — in the formal, self-conscious sense that we usually define that term — until the books were written. Yet they governed behavior.
“For not only do we not think of the rules of usage — of definitions, etc. — while using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren’t able to do so,” Wittgenstein writes. And elsewhere: “One learns the game by watching how others play. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the practice of the game — like a law of nature governing the play.” Think how children learn something as complex as language and social roles.