Was Rabbi S.R. Hirsch Against Kabbalah? Of Course Not!

Rabbi Shelomoh E. Danziger, in a 5756 Jewish Action review of Rabbi Joseph Elias’ “The World of Rabbi S. Hirsch: The Nineteen Letters”, accuses the latter of distorting Rabbi Hirsch to make him seem tamer than he really is. Rabbi Danziger claims Rabbi Hirsch viewed Kabbalah as misconstrued “suggestions” (and also that Rabbi Hirsch thought the same of Aggadah. As for that one, the reader can judge for himself over here).

I intend to place Rabbi Hirsch in the boring, pro-Kabbalah camp.

But first let’s quote Rabbi Danziger to the contrary (pages 3-4):

In Letter Eighteen, Rav Hirsch writes: Presently, a form of learning came into existence about which, not being initiated in it, I cannot venture to pass judgment, but which, if I comprehend rightly what I believe I understand, is an invaluable repository of the spirit of Tanach and Talmud, but which has unfortunately been misunderstood. What should have been eternal progressive development was considered a static mechanism, and the inner significance and concept thereof was taken as external dream-worlds… Had it been correctly comprehended, practical Judaism might perhaps have been imbued with spirituality. Since it was misconstrued, however, it became thereby a magic mechanism, a means of influencing or resisting theosophic worlds and anti-worlds.

This criticism is also voiced in Letter Ten, in which Rav Hirsch complains that the misinterpretation of kabbalah reduced its spirit to physical terms, and man’s inner and outer endeavors came to be interpreted as mere mechanical, magical, dynamic building of cosmic worlds – thereby often reducing all those activities that were meant to train and give vitality to the [human] spirit to mere amuletic performances.

Rav Hirsch’s critical attitude to kabbalah, or as Dayan Grunfeld prefers to term it, “this guarded attitude” (Introduction to Horeb), has in the interest of “ideological correctness” been reinterpreted apologetically by Jakob Rosenheim and Dayan Grunfeld, who are followed by Rabbi Elias. The apologia runs as follows:

  1. Rav Hirsch does, after all, acknowledge kabbalah as “an invaluable repository of the spirit of Tanach and Talmud.”
  2. We find in Rav Hirsch’s writings echoes of and parallels to ideas from kabbalistic literature.
  3. Preparatory notes for Horeb indicate that Rav Hirsch made use of the Zohar.
  4. It is said that his personal siddur contained marginal notes of a kabbalistic nature.

Therefore, the explanation of Rav Hirsch’s attitude is, in the words of Dayan Grunfeld (Introduction to Horeb), that “Hirsch was concerned with the ethical side of Jewish symbolism and not its mystical side … His ethical symbolism did not exclude the possibility of a mystical symbolism which holds that every mitzvah has also a cosmic significance and that the effect of a commandment observed reaches to the remotest ramifications of the universe.”

Or, in the words of Rabbi Elias (p. 155): Rabbi S. R. Hirsch’s avoidance of mystical and otherworldy speculation does not, however, indicate a denial of kabbalistic ideas. His ethical interpretations of the mitzvos and of Judaism in general merely represented emphasis on a different aspect of the Torah’s teachings which complements the kabbalistic approach, rather than contradicting it. Both Rabbi S.R. Hirsch’s approach to mitzvos and the kabbalistic approach stress that all human action produces effects. They differ only in that the kabbalistic approach emphasizes the effects on the whole universe, whereas the other approach underlines the effect on the doer and his world.

Rabbi Danziger himself disagrees, claiming the two approaches are opposing, not complementary:

A non-apologetic reading of Rav Hirsch’s words in Letter Eighteen about kabbalah will indicate that Rav Hirsch is referring to two opposing, rather than complementary, approaches – the ethical, on the one hand, and the mystical, extramundane on the other. He is not complaining that the ethical does not complement the extramundane. His complaint is that the proper understanding of kabbalah should have been ethical, not extramundane. No amount of apologetics can get around the hard fact that Rav Hirsch calls the extramundane worlds of (what is in his opinion) “misconstrued” kabbalah “external dream-worlds.”

In the same vein, Rav Hirsch’s commentary to Leviticus 7:38 reiterates: They (i.e., the korbanos) are neither a transitory concession to a generation that was still steeped in heathen ideas nor do they form a chapter of kabbalistic, magic mysteries. They are mitzvos, laws like the rest of the Torah. Their meaning and purpose is teaching the way to keep the ideals of the Torah, and a means of help to keep the Torah.

To Rav Hirsch, kabbalah is “an invaluable repository of the spirit of Tanach and Talmud” in the same sense as the aggadah contains that spirit. Both, in his view, are rhetorical and metaphorical works designed to suggest the betterment and spiritual elevation of man as he strives, through his acts, to draw nearer to God. Rav Hirsch, who was opposed to all theological speculations about Divinity (mystical as well as philosophical), uses kabbalah only as midrashic, metaphorical suggestions to man about his  duties. He does not use kabbalah as a theological source of information about Divinity.

See the rest of Rabbi Danziger’s arguments here.

I disagree below with both Rabbi Danziger and the “apologias” of Jakob Rosenheim, Dayan Grunfeld, and Rabbi Elias (as presented, anyway).

Exactly like all Litvaks everywhere, Rabbi Hirsch submits ignorance of the subject matter, reminding us of Niddah 7b: אין אומרים למי שלא ראה את החודש שיבא ויעיד. Who can know the truth about what Litvish rabbis really knew? As Chazal say: למד לשונך לומר איני יודע שמא תתבדה ותאחז.

The “ethical side” of Judaism versus the “mystical, extramundane side”? False Dichotomy!

Bi’ur Hagra Y.D. 179: אלא כל הדברים הם כפשטן, אלא שיש בהם פנימיות, לא פנימיות של בעלי הפילוספיא שהם חיצוניות, אלא של בעלי האמת. Indeed, the perennial response to opponents of Zohar/Kabbalah is that they err in taking metaphors literally. Sefer “Tomer Devorah” is meant to be a summary of the Ramak’s system, but it’s hardly obscurantist. In a weaker example, Mesilas Yesharim is reportedly a summary of Ramchal’s ideas, too.

As the Zohar says:

ולית לך מלה באורייתא דלא אית בה רזין עלאין וקדישין וארחין לבני נשא לאתתקפא בהו.

The Gra famously said the Arizal’s words, too, were intended as Meshalim (according to Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin). Rabbi Yehuda Leib Ashlag had a famous running disagreement with his contemporaries about our role in deciphering these parables (אכמ”ל).

Baal Shem Tov on the Torah, Va’eschanan 51, quoting “Keter Shem Tov”:

לימוד חכמת האמת נקרא נסתר, פירוש כי נסתר נקרא מה שאין אדם יכול להשיגו, כמו טעם של המאכל אי אפשר לספר לאדם שלא טעם טעם זה מעולם, שאי אפשר לפרש לו בדיבור איך ומה, ונקרא זה דבר סתר, כמו כן ענין אהבת הבורא ויראתו יתברך שמו אי אפשר לפרש לחבירו איך הוא האהבה בלב, ולכן נקרא זה נסתר, כי הלא כל מי שרוצה ללמוד הספר פתוח לפניו ואינו נסתר, ואם אינו מבין הרי הוא עם הארץ, ולפני איש כזה, גמרא ותוספות גם כן נקרא נסתר, אלא ענין הנסתרות שבספר הזוהר וכתבי האר”י ז”ל הכל בנויים על פי הדבקות האלהית.

Kabbalists, too, forever complain of being misunderstood. The Noda Beyehuda responsum against reciting “Leshem Yichud” is also saying Kabbalah is being “misconstrued”. Come on, is the Noda Beyehuda a Kabbalah reductionist, too?!

As is known, one must acquire via this study the qualities of Yir’as Haromemus/Ha’onesh, and Ahavas Hashem. If one remains unchanged, he missed the message (maybe for lack of the chief preconditions, especially purity, and maybe-maybe a beard).

(Rabbi Hirsch may also be referring to Chassidus’ adherents, who do funny things like “concretize” the Hebrew letters symbolized by Yachatz by actually trying to break the two pieces of Matza into the right letter shapes…)

Even written amulets aren’t meant as “magic mechanisms”, but a continuous-action prayer, though rarer in Ashkenaz.

Now, I don’t know what the original German contains, but the Hebrew translation uses the words “הם אינם ויתור זמני לדור הנתון עדיין תחת השפעת האליליות, ואף לא פרק נפרד שכולו קסם ומסתורין“, not “kabbalistic, magic mysteries“.

And who would deny Korbanos are “mitzvos like any other”? Nobody, that’s who. In which Kabbalah sefer can one find such a claim?! Correspondingly, the “transitory concession” idea from the Moreh Nevuchim is viewed by some Rishonim as not reflecting the Rambam’s true opinion (Ritva’s Sefer Zikaron, for instance). Which Kabbalist would protest upon seeing Rabbi Hirsch’s commentary to the Torah, including the sections on sacrifices?

Please don’t lump Rabbi Hirsch with even controversialist Yeshayahu Leibowitz (who considered Gershom Scholem a scholar…).

I first showed this article to a friend. He relates:

Many years ago I heard a Rosh HaYeshiva say that he is well-versed in Rav Hirsch and found so much either consistent with Kabbalah or developed from Kabbalah and expressed in the lashon more familiar to Rav Hirsch’s constituents. I heard him say that he did not see contradictions. Rather, he saw an uncanny (not sure if these were his exact words) consistency and familiarity in Rav Hirsch’s with the Rosh HaYeshiva’s own understanding of Kabbalah.

Bottom line, our great teacher Rabbi Hirsch is not putting even one toe out of the mainstream, that is, measured adoption of Kabbalah. He wasn’t “guarded”, “critical” (in the modern sense of the word), or all the rest.  There is a letter by the Chazon Ish explaining the praise of “שלא אמר דבר שלא שמע מפי רבו מעולם” which describes Rabbi Hirsch well.


I don’t relish even writing about Kabbalah, so I hope these hints suffice.